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SAMENVATTING 
 
Uit onderzoek blijkt dat Europese onderzoeksinstellingen, traditioneel sterk 
verbonden aan de overheid en ingebed in een historisch diep gewortelde academische 
cultuur, steeds meer actief zijn in het opstarten van ondernemingen vanuit de schoot 
van de instelling. Bovendien wordt gesteld dat bedrijven ontstaan vanuit 
onderzoeksresultaten een belangrijke rol spelen in economische ontwikkeling (OESO, 
2003). 
 
Een mogelijke verklaring voor dit fenomeen is dat universiteiten en 
onderzoeksinstellingen interne systemen ontwikkeld hebben voor de commericalisatie 
van hun technologie. Omdat heel wat producten en processen tegenwoordig op de 
markt, niet ontwikkeld waren zonder wetenschappelijk onderzoek (Mansfield, 1998), 
benadrukte de OESO het belang van onderzoeksinstellingen om structuren en formele 
beleidslijnen te ontwikkelen om de overgang van onderzoek naar het creëren van 
nieuwe bedrijven mogelijk te maken (OESO, 1998). Dit stemt overeen met de 
hedendaagse notie van (academisch) ondernemerschap, dat evolueerde van een 
individuele aangelegenheid naar een sociale en georganiseerde activiteit (Jacob et al., 
2002). Bepaalde onderzoekers bestudeerden het effect van institutionele structuren en 
beleidslijnen op het nemen van patenten, het sluiten van licentie overeenkomsten 
(Bercovitz et al., 2000) en op het aantal academische spin-offs dat wordt opgericht 
vanuit onderzoeksinstellingen. De studie naar deze institutionele determinanten 
omvatte ondermeer karakteristieken van beloningsystemen, de ondernemings- en 
academische cultuur, het beleid rond intellectuele eigendom en de algemene 
organisatorische structuur van de onderzoeksinstelling. De interactie tussen 
academische starters en publieke onderzoeksinstellingen van waaruit deze 
ondernemingen ontstaan, is een onderwerp dat tot op heden slechts zeer weinig werd 
belicht. 
 
Nochtans stellen onderzoekers binnen het neo- institutionalisme dat nieuwe bedrijven 
vaak interne consistentie opbouwen met de verwachtingen die leven binnen hun 
institutioneel, organisatorisch kader. Isomorfe krachten zouden zelfs veel sterker 
kunnen spelen in jonge, startende bedrijven die typisch een beperkte basis aan 
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middelen hebben. Vanuit dit perspectief is het denkbaar dat academische starters 
structurele elementen incorporeren om de benodigde legitimiteit te bekomen en om de 
nodige middelen te kunnen aantrekken. Bovendien is er een consensus dat gedrag 
beïnvloed wordt door sociale structuren die zowel beperkingen als opportuniteiten 
met zich mee brengen (Granovetter, 1985). Individuele ondernemers handelen in een 
sociale context, maar deze context is geen "dwangbuis" waarin ze slaafs bepaalde 
scenarios volgen: ‘agency’ en ‘structuur’ lijken dynamisch op elkaar in te spelen. Dit 
doctoraal onderzoek bestudeert de interactie tussen academische starters en de micro-
institutionele context waarin deze bedrijven hun oorsprong kennen: eerst op het 
niveau van één spin-off (waarbij inzicht wordt verkregen in een spin-off proces); 
vervolgens op het niveau van één onderzoeksinstelling (waarbij de relatie belicht 
wordt tussen het micro- institutionele beleid met betrekking tot technologie transfer en 
de academische starters die hierin tot ontwikkeling kwamen) en, ten derde, in een 
steekproef van Europese publieke onderzoeksinstellingen en academische starters 
(waarbij de relatie tussen institutionele link, middelen en groei van academische 
starters wordt bestudeerd). Dit onderzoek bestaat dan ook uit drie empirische studies, 
die conceptueel, methodologisch en op vlak van niveau van analyse op elkaar verder 
bouwen. 
 
Een eerste studie is een diepgaande analyse van een spin-off proces ingebed in een 
Belgische universiteit. Het basisargument van deze longitudinale, exploratieve studie 
is dat de ontwikkeling van de ‘project kampioen’ en van het ondernemersteam als 
geheel duidelijk verband houdt met de verschillende ontwikkelingsstadia in de 
levenscyclus van het bedrijf. Veranderingen in het team gaan hand in hand met 
strategische veranderingen in het bedrijf, waarbij telkens een nieuw evenwicht wordt 
tot stand gebracht. De start-up fase, zoals beschreven in traditionele levenscyclus-
modellen wordt conceptueel uitgebreid en vanuit management oogpunt wordt gesteld 
dat er tijd over gaat vooraleer het oprichtende team de nood aan een ervaren CEO 
accepteert. De rol en het belang van de specifieke onderzoeksinstelling van waaruit 
deze onderneming ontstond wordt toegelicht. Immers, nieuwe bedrijven die gevormd 
worden om onderzoeksresultaten en/of intellectuele eigendom te exploiteren zijn sterk 
ingebed in de moederorganisatie, met een specifieke cultuur, regels en procedures. 
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De tweede studie bouwt hier dan ook op verder door de mate te bestuderen waarin het 
technologie transfer beleid van een Belgisch onderzoeksinstituut de financiële, 
technologische en menselijke middelen bepaalt waarmee academische starters 
oprichten. We maken gebruik van een duale case studie methodologie (Leonard-
Barton, 1990) en volgen daarbij Eisenhardt’s (1989) en Yin’s (1991) richtlijnen voor 
case study onderzoek. We integreren historische analyse, prospectieve studie en 
gestandaardiseerde vragenlijsten om te onderzoeken of de middelen die naar 
academische starters gaan, verweven zijn met veranderingen in organisatorische en 
micro- institutionele technologie transfer gebruiken. In deze studie geven we een 
integraal beeld van de organisatie van het commercialisatieproces in een publiek 
onderzoekscentrum, dat wereldwijd erkend wordt als een ‘centre of excellence’ op het 
gebied van micro-electronica. Met kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve data tonen we aan 
hoe veranderingen in het transferbeleid van onderzoeksresultaten een impact hebben 
op de middelen die naar (potentiële) academische starters gaan. We onderscheiden 
drie generaties van academische starters, die telkens de micro- institutionele set-up 
rond technologie transfer reflecteren. 
 
Een derde studie behandelt theoretische en empirische leemtes in de relatie tussen de 
institutionele link, de middelen en de groei van academische ondernemingen in een 
Europese steekproef. Institutionele link wordt geconceptualiseerd als een 
tweedimensioneel construct dat bestaat uit technologie transfer (formeel of niet 
formeel) en de specificiteit van de onderzoeksactiviteiten van een publieke 
onderzoeksinstelling (specifiek of generisch). De beide categorische variabelen 
worden gehypothetiseerd de middelen waarmee academische starters oprichten te 
beïnvloeden. Gezien de aandacht van academici en beleidsmakers voor academische 
starters gebaseerd op intellectuele eigendom – de zogenaamde pure ‘spin-offs’ - ligt 
het in de lijn van de verwachtingen dat deze bedrijven een hogere groei kennen dan 
academische starters die geen formele overdracht van technologie kregen bij opstart 
van hun activiteiten (de ‘start-ups’). In dit perspectief testen we een aantal hypothesen 
in een dataset van een 100 tal academische starters, die 24 publieke 
onderzoeksinstellingen vertegenwoordigen. Multivariate variantie analyse toont aan 
dat institutionele link de middelen van een bedrijf voorspellen. We vinden significante 
resultaten voor het startkapitaal en de mate waarin de technologie al dan niet een 
product benadert. Een ordinaal interactie effect toont echter dat bedrijven die 
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opgestart zijn met een formele technologie transfer ‘groter’ starten als ze afkomstig 
zijn van een publiek onderzoeksinstituut met een specifieke onderzoeksbasis. Tegen 
de verwachtingen in, toont een 2SLS regressie aan dat een formele transfer van 
technologie enkel een effect heeft op groei in werknemers gemedieerd door het 
startkapitaal waarme de onderneming opricht. Er is echter wel een gematigd direct 
effect – los van startkapitaal -- van een formele transfer van technologie op het 
aantrekken van additioneel kapitaal. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Studies report that European research labs, traditionally closely tied to government 
and enshrouded in the cocoon of academia, are increasingly involved in spinning off 
ventures. Moreover, these companies are argued to play an increasing role in 
economic development (OECD, 2003). 
 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that universities and research institutes alike 
have increasingly developed internal systems for the commercialisation of their 
technology. Since a lot of products and processes currently on the market could not 
have been developed without scientific research (Mansfield, 1998), the OECD has 
stressed the importance for research organisations to develop structures and formal 
policies to facilitate the transition from research to the creation of new spin-offs 
(OECD, 1998). This is line with the contemporary notion of entrepreneurship, and 
science-based entrepreneurship in particular, which is shifting from serendipitous and 
individual to being perceived as social and organised (Jacob et al., 2002). Some 
researchers have looked at the effect of institutional structures and policies on the 
patenting and licensing behaviour (Bercovitz et al., 2000) and on the rate of 
establishing science-based entrepreneurial firms from universities and research 
organisations. These institutional determinants include, among others, characteristics 
relating to reward systems, entrepreneurial / academic culture, IP policies and the 
overall organisational structure of the research organisation. However, the nature of 
the interaction between science-based entrepreneurial firms and the institutional 
parent has largely remained an unexplored theme. 
 
Institutional theorists argue that emerging firms build internal consistencies that are in 
alignment with their institutional context. Isomorphic forces might even be especially 
true in new ventures, which typically have a limited resource base: science-based 
entrepreneurial firms incorporate legitimating structural elements in order to gain the 
legitimacy needed and to attract the necessary resources. Additionally, there is a 
consensus that behaviours are influenced by social structures, which represent both a 
set of constraints and of opportunities (Granovetter, 1985). Individuals act within a 
social context, but this context is not an “iron cage” in which they follow scripts 
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slavishly: agency and structure seem to dynamically interact. This doctoral research 
looks in depth at these issues: first at the level of one spin-off (providing knowledge 
about the spin-off process), then at the level of one research institute (providing 
insight in the interrelation between spin-off generation and micro institutional policies 
regarding technology transfer) and in a sample of European public research 
organisations and science-based entrepreneurial firms they generated. Thus, my PhD 
consists of three studies each following up on the previous study’s findings, both 
methodologically and conceptually. 
 
Taking a contextualised, qualitative approach, the first study in this thesis provides an 
in depth analysis of a spin-off process from a Belgian university. The basic argument 
of this prospective study is that the development of the champion role and the 
entrepreneurial team as a whole clearly interrelates with life cycle stages of the 
venture – extending the “start-up phase” described in traditional life cycle models -- 
and that it takes time before a founding team finds its role and accepts the need for an 
experienced CEO. Changes in the team go hand in hand with shocks in the emerging 
business, pointing to a self-organising process of punctuated equilibriums. The role 
and the importance of the institutional parent in which this start-up trajectory takes 
place is highlighted. Clearly, new firms founded to exploit intellectual property 
emerging from science are typically embedded in a parent organisation, bringing 
about its own culture, rules and procedures.  
 
The second study explores empirically whether and how a Belgian research institute – 
and the technology transfer policies in particular -- shapes the founding resources of 
ventures that are set up to commercialise its research results. Using a dual case study 
methodology (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and following Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Yin’s 
(1991) guidelines for case study research, we methodologically integrate historical 
analysis, prospective study and a standardised questionnaire, to examine whether and 
how the resources going to science-based entrepreneurial firms are intertwined with 
changes in the organisational, micro institutional technology transfer practices. In this 
study, we offer an integrative perspective on how the commercialisation process is 
organised in a public research organisation, which is recognised as being a worldwide 
centre of excellence in the field of microelectronics. We show how changes in the 
nature of knowledge transfer have an impact on the resource endowments going to 
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science-based entrepreneurial firms. In this perspective, we distinguish between three 
generations of science-based entrepreneurial firms, reflecting the micro-institutional 
set-up regarding the commercialisation of research through setting up companies.  
 
The third paper addresses theoretical and empirical gaps in the relationships between 
the nature of institutional linkage, firm resources and growth in the context of 
spinning off ventures from public research organisations (PROs). Institutional linkage 
is considered a two dimensional construct consisting of the formality of technology 
transfer (formal or informal) and the research specificity of a PRO (generic or 
specific). In this perspective, both categorical variables are hypothesised to predict the 
resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms. Additionally, given the 
widespread attention from academics and policy makers to IP based science-based 
entrepreneurial ventures, the formality of technology transfer is expected to be 
associated with growth of these firms. Empirical tests of hypotheses derived from this 
view are based on data from about 100 science-based entrepreneurial firms, 
representing 24 public research organisations. The research sought to identify how the 
variables interrelate at the multivariate level. Multivariate analysis of variance shows 
that institutional linkage predicts firm resources in general, showing significance 
levels for start capital and the degree of productisation of the technology. An ordinal 
interaction effect shows that companies established with a formal transfer of 
technology start with higher resource levels when started from a PRO with a specific 
research base. Contrary to expectations, two-stage least squares regression analysis 
indicates that the formality of technology transfer has no single direct effect on 
growth in employees, although it is mediated by start capital. A formal transfer of 
technology however does affect the propensity to attract additional capital, 
independent of the start capital of the firm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the mid-nineties, there is increasing attention for spinning off ventures as a 
venue for commercialising research. Since only few empirical research has been 
devoted to the spin-off phenomenon in Europe and to the processes underlying the 
emergence of research-based spin-offs in particular, this study started in an 
explorative way: if one is to gain insight and understanding about spin-offs from 
public research organisations, we argued the first step was to investigate real time the 
way a spin-off gets established. The first article in this thesis is the result of this 
explorative phase. The first draft of this article was presented on a conference 
organised by Journal Business Venturing and National University of Singapore and 
published in the Conference proceedings (Moray and Clarysse, 2001). A revised and 
elaborated version of this article was published in January 2004 in Journal of Business 
Venturing (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). This process study provides an in depth 
analysis of a spin-off trajectory from a Belgian university. More specifically, an 
evolutionary perspective on the role of the entrepreneurial champion, his surrounding 
entrepreneurial team and the co-evolution with shocks in the business is provided. 
Next to this, the study highlights the role and the importance of the institutional 
parent. Clearly, new firms founded to exploit intellectual property emerging from 
science are typically embedded in a parent organisation, bringing about its own 
culture, rules and procedures. Therefore, the second study in this PhD thesis explores 
empirically whether and how changes in a Belgian research institute’s spin-off 
trajectory shapes the founding conditions of the ventures that are set up to 
commercialise research results. Using a dual case study methodology (Leonard-
Barton, 1991) we integrate historical and prospective case analysis. A third study 
analyses a theoretically sampled selection of European PROs and firms that has been 
established from their research base. The research addresses theoretical and empirical 
gaps in the relationships among the nature of institutional linkage, firm resources and 
growth and sought to statistically analyse these issues at the multivariate level.  
 
The studies in this thesis subsequently build on the previous study’s findings and 
dynamically integrate a variety of data collection techniques: participant observation, 
face to face structured and semi-structured interviews, archival searches and 
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standardised surveys at the institutional as well as at the company level. The first two 
studies are process studies, providing detailed knowledge about the specifics of a 
spin-off trajectory, how such a process evolved over time and whether it shapes the 
resource conditions of emerging research-based spin-offs. Whereas process 
researchers provide explanations in terms of the sequence of events leading to certain 
outcomes (Langley, 1999), ‘variance’ researchers provide explanations for 
phenomena in terms of relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
Thus, the first two papers are particularly concerned with ‘events’; ‘variables’ are 
important in that they represent the operationalisation of concepts and constructs but 
these are not used in a classical hypothesis testing or statistical sense. The third paper 
in turn, provides some evidence that variability in terms of resource endowments at 
time of founding can be partly explained by institutional linkage.  
 
We start the discussion shedding some light on the definitional complexity that has 
characterised (studies on) spin-offs from public research organisations. We explain 
how our research has evolved in the use of terminology: from research-based spin-
offs to science-based entrepreneurial firms. We also provide a summary of the studies 
in this thesis.  
 
 
1. CONCEPTUALISATION OF RESEARCH-BASED SPIN-OFFS 
 
Both academics and policy makers have been developing a variety of definitions for 
research-based spin-offs. A common two-dimensional definition of a research-based 
spin-off is a new company that is formed (1) by a faculty member, staff member or 
doctoral student who left university to found the company or started the company 
while still affiliated with the university, and/or (2) a core technology (or idea) that is 
transferred from the parent organisation (e.g. Smilor et al., 1990; Steffenson et al., 
1999). The OECD posits that a spin-off is a company that meets at least one of the 
following criteria: (1) one of the founders is an employee of the public research 
organisation (PRO), (2) the company licenses a technology from the PRO, (3) a PRO 
has equity in the company or (4) the PRO directly established the company (Callan, 
2002). The latter criterion opens up the distinction between spin-offs that are set up 
with the support of the parent organisation – push or passive spin-offs – and ventures 
that are established without participation or support from the parent organisation, the 
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so-called ‘pull or active spin-offs’ (e.g. Matkin, 2001). Another inclusive, broad 
definition has been proposed by UNISPIN, a project of the 4th Framework 
Programme of the European Commission: a spin-off is a new firm that is largely 
dependent on knowledge / research from a public research organisation for its 
establishment (Callan, 2002). The Association of University Technology Managers 
(AUTM hereafter)1 suggested making a distinction between companies established 
with and without formal transfer of technology at time of founding. They refer to the  
companies as “spin-offs” and “start-ups” respectively. Spin-offs denote all the 
companies or traders as persons engaged in businesses that were dependent upon 
licensing or assignment of the institution’s technology for initiation. Conversely, start-
ups are those companies that were not dependent upon licensing or assignment of the 
institution’s technology for initiation. However, the business was established based on 
the research / knowledge base of the PRO. Although there is no formalised 
technology trans fer, it is possible that the PRO holds equity in these companies. 
Upstill and Symington (1999) made a similar distinction, referring to direct research 
spin-offs and indirect spin-offs, representing companies built on codified knowledge 
(intellectual property) and tacit knowledge, which is embedded in people. 
 
All these definitions show that the relationship between a spin-off and the parent 
company can take on a variety of forms. Carayannis et al. (1998), for example, 
suggested to include the transfer of services to the company (e.g. capital, management 
advice, physical infrastructure, …) or to restrict the spin-off concept to a specific form 
of transfer, so that we can refer to “technology spin-offs”, “founder spin-offs”, 
“venture capital spin-offs”, etc. Franklin et al. (2001) suggested to differentiate 
between spin-offs where the researcher leaves the research organisation and the case 
where the researcher remains active as an academic, suggesting that the first group 
tends to be more successful.  
 
Some academics particularly pointed to internal characteristics of spin-offs, associated 
to the business model of the company. Bullock (1983) already identified two 
categories:  “soft companies”, the technical consultants solving customised problems, 
and “hard companies” that sell standardised products to a general market. In parallel, 
                                                                 
1 http://www.autm.net 
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Stankiewicz (1994) classifies spin-offs according to the way they operate. He 
identifies three different operation modes: consultant and R&D boutique mode, 
product-oriented mode, and technological-asset mode. 
 
Researchers in different countries have used a lot of the aforementioned definitions 
according to their own context and research needs and different terms have been used 
to refer to the same phenomenon. Terms used include (academic) spin-outs, university 
based starts-ups, (academic) spin-offs, firms created by researchers, research-based 
spin-offs, … Indeed, most of the aforementioned definitions leave room for inclusion 
of a variety of firms. The heterogeneity in the interpretation of concepts may partly 
reflect the fact that researchers have observed that research-based spin-offs are not a 
homogeneous group of companies (Mustar, 1997; Druihle and Garsney, 2004).  
 
Given the definitional complexity and the heterogeneity of classifications / typologies, 
it is not surprising that there is no uniform interpretation of what exactly constitutes a 
spin-off company. Initially, we posited that the formal transfer of technology from a 
research organisation is a conditio sine qua non for defining a company as a research-
based spin-off (Moray and Clarysse, 2001; Clarysse and Moray, 2004). However, in 
Belgium as well as in a variety of other European countries we observe that in fact a 
lot of research-based spin-offs did not receive a formal transfer of technology, but in 
fact are still identified as a spin-off company. In Flanders, for example, we have 
identified the total population of research-based spin-offs based on the listings from 
the technology transfer offices (Moray, 2004). From the 93 firms that were set up 
from 1991 to 2002, 40 are companies that started activities without a formal transfer 
of technology. Although we have no exact figures for other European countries, 
researchers in Italy, France and Portugal make similar observations (PRIME Network 
of Excellence, 2004). Different explanations can be given for this observation. First, 
the formal transfer of intellectual property through setting up companies has only 
gained more policy attention since the mid nineties. It is likely that most PROs only 
started to give the establishment of these firms more attention since that era, as 
compared to companies that are set up without the formal transfer of technology. 
Additionally, it is likely that formal transfer of technology into newly established 
companies is a largely evolutionary phenomenon, given the recent upsurge. That is to 
say, firms that used to be set up without formal transfer of technology during the early 
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nineties would today probably be more likely to be established with a formal transfer, 
all else being equal. Secondly, there is a large tendency in promoting the 
‘entrepreneurial university’, stimulating research institutions to set up ‘as many spin-
offs as possible’. As a result, research organisations in general and universities in 
particular will be inclined to ‘list’ the firms that are established from their research 
base in an inclusive way. As a result, in Europe, spin-offs often comprise all the 
ventures that are “listed” or “identified” by researchers and / or techno logy transfer 
officers as having emerged from the research base of Public Research Organisations 
(Moray and Clarysse, 2004a).  
 
In line with the variety of definitions and classifications found in the literature, it is 
not surprising that this PhD research also evolved in the use of definitions. We started 
off our research using the broad definition of ‘research-based spin-off’ (Moray and 
Clarysse, 2001). However, building on this broad definition and focusing on the 
micro- institutional context we found the  distinction as conceptualised by AUTM 
crucial to better understand the heterogeneity among these firms. AUTM succeeded in 
fine-tuning the plethora of definitions that exist regarding spin-offs, by taking into 
account whether or not formal technology transfer took place at time of founding. 
Therefore, we use the term “science-based entrepreneurial firms” in the next two 
articles that comprise this thesis, to denote both the start-ups and the spin-offs that 
emerge from public research organisations. The basic argument for using this 
inclusive definition is that it will prove to be crucial to gain more understanding in the 
similarities and differences that characterise European (samples on) spin-offs. More 
specifically, we posit that it is important to take into account the nature of institutional 
linkage of the company with the PRO at time of founding, in order to arrive at a non-
evolutionary and mutually exclusive categorisation of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. 
 
The remainder of this chapter summarises each of the articles in this PhD thesis, both 
in terms of methodological perspective and main findings 2.  
                                                                 
2 The managerial and potential policy implications of the respective studies are not included in these 
summaries. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
 
2.1. Study 1: A process study of entrepreneurial team formation: the case of a 
research-based spin-off 
 
 
Performing a qualitative process study is an overwhelming task for a junior PhD 
researcher. Doing participant observation and exploratory interviews about a topic and 
in a context that had largely remained unexplored from a process perspective was a 
challenge in itself. How were we to analyse the data? What would be the appropriate 
theoretical framework? When during the process, which was the level of analysis, 
were we to make the decision to hone in on a specific unit of analysis that both 
displays theoretical and practical relevance?  The main goal of this study was to learn 
to understand how a science-based entrepreneurial firm comes into existence. This 
analysis formed the basis to develop other research questions and hypotheses, of 
which some are addressed in the remainder of the thesis. As such, the first paper in 
this thesis describes how a team of entrepreneurs is formed in a research-based spin-
off, how the team copes with crisis situations during the start-up phase, and how both 
the team as a whole and the team members individually learn from these crises. The 
progress of a university spin-off has been followed up from the idea phase onwards. 
Adopting a prospective, qualitative approach, the basic argument of this paper is that 
shocks in the founding team and the position of its champion co-evolve with shocks in 
the development of the business. We summarise the paper’s methodological 
perspective and main findings. 
 
2.1.1. Method and data collection 
 
The aim of this research was to inductively describe and explain the emergence of a 
research-based spin-off. Since processes are involved we adopted a longitudinal 
approach. To track and analyse changes over time, some researchers have adopted 
well-accepted business history approaches (see e.g. Cusumano and Selby, 1995). 
Studying the early phases of a research-based spin-off we could not adopt this given 
the clear absence of track records and archives that document on these particular 
companies’ very early stages. Also, identifying all stakeholders involved during the 
spin-off process post facto is not easy and recall-bias might be introduced when using 
retrospective analysis. For an exploratory study, that formed the basis of further study, 
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we deliberately choose to adopt a prospective qualitative approach (see e.g. Perlow, 
1999), in order to discover more about “how” and “why” a spin-off process in general 
and the entrepreneurial team in particular evolves as it does. We collected real time 
longitudinal, qualitative data and attempted to extract theory from the ground up 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994; Langley, 1999). The total duration of prospectively 
following up this venture amounted to a period of 20 months (2000 - 2001). 
 
Participant observation and semi-structured interviews were used as main data 
collection procedures. During the idea phase and the time during which capital was 
attracted, the process of new venture creation was followed up by having different 
contacts with the researchers of university. We visited the researchers several times at 
university, until formal legislation of the company. The researchers got to know us 
and we agreed that we would come over “on site” of the venture to engage in 
participant observation. The actual time of participant observation ranged from 
August 2000 to June 2001, about 3 days per week, observing the engineers at work, 
during meetings and informal conversations. Further, we interviewed each of the team 
members, the CEO and the research assistant that helped writing the business plan. 
Some broad questions guided us throughout the interviews ensur ing that we would get 
comparative data. Each interview took about two hours. Following the guidelines of 
Miles and Huberman (1984) and Glaser and Strauss (1969) we performed data 
analysis throughout data collection. In order to arrive at a processual view and 
empirically grounded themes, the data were analysed sequentially. Field notes were 
typed out consequently and after a period of participant observation, all issues and 
reflections were condensed in an interim site summary. Analysing the field notes and  
interviews notes, we dotted down the most important issues as perceived by the 
different team members. At the conclusion of the fieldwork, we integrated the analysis 
of the interview transcripts, field notes and the interim site summary in order to 
address the following question: How does the entrepreneurial team get formed and 
evolve in a research-based spin-off? 
 
2.1.2. Main findings 
 
The basic argument of the paper is that shocks in the founding team and the position 
of its champion coexist with shocks in the development of the business, along the life 
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cycle of the new venture. Our analysis shows four distinct phases of development of 
the venture and its entrepreneurial team. A first phase is related to the idea phase. 
Herein, the project team consists of three technical researchers, with one clearly 
delineated project leader. The latter is in charge of planning, follow up and proposal 
writing. The pre-start-up phase is introduced by the actual decision to spin-off from 
university. The project leader proved to be the “champion”, driving the idea, looking 
for business plan coaching and putting a team together: “managing the idea all the 
way through completion”. After formal legislation, introducing the start-up phase, our 
observations and interviews supported the well-accepted view that champions often 
do not make good managers. This paradox can be explained by the fact that the team 
needed time to accept that the initial champion is actually not the appropriate person 
for being the business manager. Triggered by speedy technological evolutions, the 
post-start-up phase is characterised by gaining strategic focus and professionalizing 
the organisation of the team.  
 
Hence, we empirically elaborated the “start-up” phase discussed in the traditional life 
cycle models. Although consistent with the models found elsewhere in the literature, 
our model differs in that it explicitly describes stages as linked to the spin-off process. 
Encompassing four phases, our model adds value by pointing to the process character 
of “founding” a research-based spin-off. Moreover, our case data suggest that shocks 
in the environment precipitate the shift from one stage to another. 
 
Next to the development of the entrepreneurial champion along the evolution of the 
business, this study also provides an initial intuition about the potential role of the 
parent organisation in shaping the events that make up the spin-off trajectory. In this 
perspective, three models were distinguished conceptually: a free market model, a 
Keynesian model and a protective model. Building on these intuitive ideas another 
research project honed in on different incubation strategies employed in public 
research organisations. Empirical evidence was found for these models and the 
authors found that the boundaries of these models are not always clear-cut, especially 
when a particular institution actually wants to be active in a certain model but lacks 
the resources and/or competences to do so (Clarysse et al., 2004). The process study 
described in this paper, together with the results from the research project on 
European incubators, opened up the question whether empirical evidence could be 
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found for structural similarity among firms that emerge from a similar institutional 
environment. The next articles in this thesis build on these intuitions. First, at the level 
of a public research organisation, including all the firms that emerged from its science 
base. Second, at the level of a European sample of PROs and science-based 
entrepreneurial firms.  
 
2.2. Study 2: Institutional change and resource endowments to science-based 
entrepreneurial firms: The case of IMEC 
 
 
This study takes an institutional perspective on spinning off ventures as a venue for 
commercialising research. The central question dealt with is the following: are the 
resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding 
influenced by the way in which technology transfer is organised at the parent 
organisation? We have selected a research institute known for its international 
research excellence and with a track record in spinning off ventures: IMEC (Leuven, 
Belgium). We questioned all senior managers involved in technology transfer and the 
founders of all science-based entrepreneurial ventures set up between 1987 and 2002. 
The basic argument of the research is that changes in the internal institutional 
environment -- and the technology transfer policy in particular – goes together with a 
changing overall tendency in the resources endowed to the science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. More specifically, we identify three generations of IMEC 
ventures. We discuss the paper’s methodological perspective and main findings. 
 
2.2.1. Method and data collection 
 
Investigating how institutional changes influence the resource endowments of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms implies a process approach and a variety of 
informants. Since the value chain of technology transfer by spinning off science-based 
entrepreneurial firms encompasses different parties -- scientists, technology transfer 
personnel, senior administrators and the founders of the companies – we employ a 
dual case study methodology (Leonard-Barton, 1990), combining historical and 
prospective case analysis.  
 
First, we collected data on the rate of establishment of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms from other PROs in the region (Flanders). We found this was crucial since this 
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study is in its pure form “one case”. Although in “single” case studies analytical 
generalisation is of primary importance – instead of statistical generalisation – these 
regional data allow contextualising the findings and discernment about the scope of 
analytical generalisation. We position IMEC to other PROs in Flanders in terms of 
technology transfer indicators, its relative importance in setting up companies from its 
research base and the extent to which start-ups versus spin-offs are generated. Second, 
we have interviewed all senior managers involved in the spin-off policy at IMEC. The 
persons interviewed have significant experience in the organisation in general and in 
business development and technology transfer activities in particular (>10-15 years). 
Third, we interviewed one or more representatives (founders and/or CEO) of the 20 
science-based entrepreneurial firms that emerged from the institute since 1991. Face 
to face interviews at the premises of the venture helped us to understand the 
organisational context. During these 1,5 hour interviews, attention was given to the 
start up history of the firm in terms of technology transfer from IMEC, the inventors 
involved, how capital was attracted and how the company evolved since then. Fifth, 
we performed more detailed process studies of 3 spin-offs, to better understand the 
dynamics of venture formation and development as it is embedded in this particular 
research organisation. One venture was prospectively studied, by interviewing the 3 
founders over a 15-month period. Two ventures (both set up in 1996) were studied 
retrospectively by interviewing the persons involved in the start-up process (see 
appendix 2 for write ups of these cases). We deliberately decided to select one 
successfully exited and one failed company that were established in the same year, to 
control for broader environmental / economic conditions. Finally, in order to 
understand the resource conditions of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of 
founding and how this evolved over time, we surveyed the ventures using a 
structured, standardised instrument. In sum, data consisted of 40 face-to-face 
interviews, 20 standardised questionnaires, archival searches and a database with 
evolutionary financial data about the companies, resulting in a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative data allowing triangulation (Jick, 1979). 
 
 27 
2.2.2. Main findings 
 
IMEC was established in 1984 and is one of the largest Flemish research 
organisations in terms of research expenditure, the size of the technology transfer 
office and the science-based entrepreneurial firms generated from their knowledge 
base. The research institute accounts for almost one fourth of the companies set up 
from PROs in Flanders from 1991 to 2002 (Moray, 2004). Studying the technology 
transfer practices in IMEC as they evolved over time, following the different activities 
of proactive spin-off process as conceptualised by Degroof (2002) and Clarysse et al. 
(2004), we found that IMEC increasingly professionalised and structured its venturing 
process. More specifically, IMEC increasingly evolved towards a centrally led 
technology push model when commercialising research results through setting up 
ventures.  
 
Following the evolution within IMEC regarding the transfer of IP and the investment 
policy, we distinguish “three generations” of science-based entrepreneurial firms at 
IMEC. These “generations” are conceptualised based on their level and source of 
capital at time of founding, the mode in which technology was transferred (start-up vs. 
spin-off), the maturity of the technology at time of founding and some characteristics 
of the human resources. The first generation of starters runs up to 1995. For all the 
companies established up to 1995, IMEC only brought in (a limited amount of) cash. 
The main source of external capital, were incumbent firms. Most of the companies set 
up during this era were based on a clear need from a corporate firm. As a result, most 
of these firms had a working alpha prototype ready at the time they started their 
business activities. Only few IMEC researchers joined the start-up (on average 1,5 full 
time equivalents). The 7 companies established up to 1995 were all “start-ups” at time 
of founding. During the early nineties, IMEC went through some major changes in the 
organisation of its business development activities. There was a significant 
professionalisation trend in industrial liaisons and it clearly affected the way IMEC 
set up ventures: IMEC grows increasingly attentive for bringing in IP in the firms 
from 1996 onwards. However, IMEC does not engage in this effort in a systematic 
way: of the 8 firms established from 1996 to 1998, 3 are spin-offs and received some 
start capital from IMEC. The other 5 companies are start-ups in which IMEC brought 
in some cash. From 1999 onwards, a third generation of IMEC science-based 
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entrepreneurial firms emerges. These firms are characterised by the fact that all but 
one are spin-offs and they are established with a less mature technology at time of 
founding. 
 
Overall, we can conclude that the decisions taken at IMEC to change its venturing 
policies have an effect on the type of companies created:  the starting resources of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms have changed. Companies have become larger, 
start up with more employees and a technology further away from an alpha prototype. 
As a result, they need more coaching and incubation support before they can start up 
and the screening mechanism has become more selective. Although we could 
potentially infer from this that a smaller amount of projects will be started, it seems 
that IMEC wants to upscale its technology push strategy: IMEC wants to realise 3-4 
spin-offs per year. The underlying rationale of IMEC is that in fact the opportunities 
are there but that an increasing pro-active role needs to be played in recognising these 
technological and market opportunities in the labs. 
 
Finally, we asked the question what the socio-economic role is of the companies set 
up from IMEC. We calculated the multiple (and related IRR) realised by the first 
generation science-based entrepreneurial firms and compared it to the multiples found 
in the venture capital literature. The IRR of 11,8% is double the IRR of 5,2% (Murray 
and Mariott, 1998) which was found to be an average for seed investments in high 
technology sectors. Still, this financial performance seems to be considerably below 
the expectations, which VCs had in the mid- and late nineties when they wanted to 
invest in high technology. In Belgium, these expectations were between 30 and 35% 
for seed investments. This means that only few projects seemed attractive enough to 
invest in (Manigart et al., 2002). Moreover, in other European countries, expectations 
were even higher. The conclusion is thus that the IMEC approach seems to work and 
renders more gross profit than an average approach, but the organisational cost to 
realise this is very high and the average IRR is still much lower than the one that is 
expected by VCs. As a result, IMEC seems to have substantial difficulties to convince 
institutional investors to invest in its own fund.  
Further, we observe that from a socio-economic perspective the science-based 
entrepreneurial firms from IMEC create a total employment of about 450 full time 
equivalents (1/1/2004). This is significant, but the total employment of a much less 
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time consuming initiative such as the TOP programme at the university of Twente 
(The Netherlands) to stimulate science-based entrepreneurial firms was about 1200 
people in 2001 (Van der Sijde et al., 2002).  
 
The next article in this thesis builds on the empirical results of this paper in that it 
explicitly analyses the predictive capacity of institutional linkage between a SBEF and 
a PRO at time of founding on the resources endowed to these firms. The final paper 
however approaches this issue, in larger sample of European PRO and SBEF that 
emerged from their research base. 
 
 
2.3. Study 3: Institutional linkage and resource endowments to science-based 
entrepreneurial firms: a European exploration. 
 
 
This paper addresses theoretical and empirical gaps in the relationships between the 
nature of institutional linkage, firm resources and growth in the context of spinning 
off ventures from public research organisations (PROs). Institutional linkage is 
considered a two dimensional construct consisting of the formality of technology 
transfer (formal or informal) and the research specificity of a PRO (generic or 
specific). In this perspective, both categorical variables are hypothesised to predict the 
resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms. Additionally, given the 
widespread attention from academics and policy makers to IP based science based 
entrepreneurial ventures, the formality of technology transfer is expected to be 
associated with growth. Empirical tests of hypotheses derived from this view are 
based on data from 96 science-based entrepreneurial firms, representing 24 public 
research organisations. The research sought to identify how the variables interrelate at 
the multivariate level. Multivariate analysis of variance shows that institutional 
linkage predicts firm resources in general, showing significance levels for start capital 
and the degree in which the technology is embodied in a product. An ordinal 
interaction effect shows that companies established with a formal transfer of 
technology start with higher resource levels when started from a PRO with a specific 
research base. Contrary to expectations, two-stage least squares regression analysis 
indicates that the formality of technology transfer has no single direct effect on 
growth in employees, although it is mediated by start capital. A formal transfer of 
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technology however does affect the propensity to attract additional capital, 
independent of the start capital of the firm. We briefly elaborate on the methods 
employed and the main findings of the study. 
 
2.3.1. Method and data collection 
 
This research is performed in the context of a European collaborative effort between 
researchers from 7 European countries: Belgium (Flanders), France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Hungary. By theoretically sampling a number 
of PROs, we arrive at a research design ensuring maximum variety regarding the 
organisation of R&D in PROs. A three-step approach was utilised for sampling and 
data collection at the PROs and the science-based entrepreneurial firms in the 
respective countries. First, for each country an analysis was performed looking at the 
broader context of the public R&D systems. How is research organised and financed? 
What is the R&D expenditure and patent activity? Since we analyse institutional 
linkage and its potential impact on resource endowments, a variety of contextual 
constellations improves external validity of the findings, i.e. improves the probability 
that the hypotheses at the level of the public research organisation and the firms hold 
true across national contexts. Next, we discussed with the national experts / 
researchers what would be the best way to sample public research organisations and 
the science-based entrepreneurial firms that emerged from their knowledge base 
ensuring ‘real life’ but ‘controlled’ diversity so as to maximise comparison and 
external validity (King et al. 1994). There was a general consensus that the common 
denominator for public research activities across Europe, is that the majority is 
organised in universities or research institutes. In relatively small samples – as 
compared to the total population – this controlled diversity is key in making 
scientifically sound inferences. Thus, the second step involved the selection of a small 
number of PROs in each country that is representative for the way research is 
organised. Moreover, the technology transfer office needed to be at least three years 
old and the PRO needed to have a significant track record in setting up science-based 
entrepreneurial ventures since the mid nineties. Data on each PRO was collected 
through personal interviews with technology transfer managers. Each public research 
organisation in the sample (N = 24) was interviewed using the UNICO-NUBS 
questionnaire specifically designed for collecting quantitative indicators from 
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Technology Transfer Offices of Public Research Organisations (UNICO-NUBS, 
2003). Sampling the PROs first was cruc ial since we are typically interested in micro 
institutional linkage with the research base at time of founding the science-based 
entrepreneurial firm. Third, for each PRO about 4-5 science-based entrepreneurial 
firms were sampled. Companies established since 1991 were included. In some cases 
the national experts / researchers were able to identify the full population of science-
based entrepreneurial ventures and sampled the firms as such that they can be seen as 
representative examples of companies set up from the research base of the particular 
parent. In most cases, populations were unknown and firms were included based on 
the ‘known’ science-based entrepreneurial firms and the willingness to participate in 
the study. Given our research questions, which want to explore the impact of 
institutional linkage on resource endowments and growth, this is appropriate, as we do 
not expect the willingness of founders/CEOs to cooperate or the (lack of) knowledge 
of the population of firms to influence both independent variables representing 
institutional linkage. We developed a standardised survey instrument that was used as 
a road map during face-to-face interviews with the founders and/or CEO’s of the 
companies. During these 1 - 1,5 hour interviews, we questioned the respondents about 
the start-up history of the firm in terms of technology transfer from the PRO, the 
inventors involved, how (much) resources were attracted at time of founding and how 
the company evolved since then. Special attention was given to the resource 
endowments: the human, financial and technology resources. Our final sample 
consists of 24 PROs and 96 science-based entrepreneurial firms that emerged from 
these institutions. 
 
We developed three main hypotheses, of which the first is formulated and tested at the 
level of the public research organisation, so as to validate the conceptualised 
distinction between PROs with a generic and a specific research base. The main unit 
of analysis of this paper is the science-based entrepreneurial firm, i.e. institutional 
linkage of the firm with its parent PRO and the potential effect on the starting 
resources and growth of the created companies. Multivariate analysis techniques are 
employed to address the questions of interest. 
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2.3.2. Main findings 
 
Different analysis techniques were used to test the three principal hypotheses. In order 
to test the distinction between the two conceptualised types of public research 
organisations in technology transfer related indicators, univariate Mann Whitney U 
tests were used.  Although TTOs have in common that they facilitate technological 
diffusion through the licensing to industry of inventions or intellectual property 
resulting from university research, the research organisations seem to differ 
significantly in the magnitude of these activities. Non-parametric analyses supported 
the hypotheses for most indicators: specific PROs score significantly higher on IP 
protection expenditure, invention disclosures, patent applications, active license 
agreements and license income. Additionally, the technology transfer offices seem to 
be somewhat older and they employ significantly more personnel managing the start-
up process of science-based entrepreneurial firms. Looking at the relative productivity 
by comparing some input indicators to output measures, it was apparent that the PROs 
with a specific research base file significantly more US and EU patents relative to the 
disclosed inventions as compared to the generic PROs. Overall, we find that specific 
PROs show clear indicators of a more professionalized TTO staff. Interestingly 
however, they seem to generate about the same amount of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms as the generic PROs. Moreover, if a specific PRO engages in the 
establishment of a SBEF, the data suggest that they put more effort in incubation and 
or coaching of the project.  
 
Hypothesis 2 is tested using a 2X2 factorial design for MANOVA in order to assess 
the predictive power of institutional linkage on the resource endowments of the 
science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding. We found that spin-offs 
clearly display higher capital levels and a more productised technology than the start-
ups in the sample. The fact that the spin-offs are established with higher capital levels 
reflects that PROs want to value their technology by converting it into equity shares. 
In turn, this leads to a higher valuation of the venture at time of founding and, by 
definition, to higher capital levels. In this respect it is interesting to find that the spin-
offs from specific PROs start up at an even larger scale than the spin-offs from the 
generic PROs. Conversely, the start-ups from the PROs with a specific research base 
show the lowest resource levels. This might indicate two interrelated issues. Firstly, 
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setting up start-ups seems to be of less strategic importance for PROs that specialise 
in one or a number of technological domains. Secondly, in a parallel study we found 
that the average starting capital of the science-based entrepreneurial firms from a 
specific PRO has more than quadrupled over the last ten years (Moray and Clarysse, 
2004). This increase in capital went together with the professionalisation of the 
technology transfer office and an increasing focus on transfer of intellectual property 
into new companies. Thus, if PROs want to commercialise their technology using 
spin-offs as a vehicle, this usually means that they need to set up an equity relation 
with the new firm. However, doing so, this boosts the value of the company at time of 
founding and makes external capital a necessity to balance the shareholder structure. 
In order to attract capital, the business plan needs to be more ambitious, more oriented 
on quick return ad growth and more focused on exit related valuation. All this implies 
however, that even more capital is needed while only a few of all invention 
disclosures have the intrinsic potential to establish such a growth path. This seems to 
be what professionalized TTOs at specific PROs are learning: if one wants to create 
spin-offs with the potential to become high growth ventures, scrutinised selection of 
ideas needs to be done, much support will be needed to incubate them and they will 
have to te be established at sufficiently large scale. Ideas that not match these criteria 
are much less likely to receive a formal transfer of technology in terms of equity 
participation, but start up as a small SME. This is much less true for generic PROs 
where also start-ups -- receiving informal know how – tend to be guided towards the 
public / private equity funds and start at a larger scale. A lot of these generic PROs are 
universities that want to meet today’s expectations of being an “entrepreneurial 
university”. Following a second academic revolution (after research had 
complemented their teaching mission), they also want to envision themselves as 
hotbeds of entrepreneurial activity. In this perspective, it is likely that they equally 
want to emphasise spin-offs and start-ups, resulting in a supportive structure for both 
types of firms. This interconnectedness of different objectives may partly explain the 
fact that start-ups and spin-offs from generic PROs do not differ as much in their 
starting resources as spin-offs and start-ups in general. 
 
Finally, without having the ambition of performing an in depth growth ana lysis, we 
looked at whether spin-offs display higher growth as compared to start-ups. This 
analysis is informed by the fact that European public research organisations have been 
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strongly stimulated by policy makers to focus on the commercialisation of intellectual 
property, because of the greater awareness that results of scientific research, in the 
form of IP that can be protected through patents and copyright, contributes to 
technological innovation and economic growth (OECD, 2003, p21). Our hypotheses – 
that spin-offs grow more in terms of employees and capital – receive mixed support. 
The regression results indicate that the formality of technology transfer does not have 
an isolated effect on employee growth; start capital seems to operate as a mediator. In 
practice this means that having a sufficient amount of start capital is a powerful 
predictor of employment growth in the subsequent years, irrespective of whether or 
not the company received a formal transfer of technology. Being a spin-off as 
opposed to a start-up however, has a single direct effect on the propensity to attract 
additional capital. In other words, receiving a formal transfer of technology does not 
only impact the start capital but also the capital that can be attracted in the years to 
come. This reinforces our finding that these ventures are under scrutinised selection 
procedures since most ideas have not the intrinsic potential to justify a large capital 
basis and subsequent capital injections. Further, these companies need be incubated or 
embedded in a supportive entrepreneurial / business development network, to raise 
their chance on success. 
 
These results open the perspective for policy makers to be cautious for focusing their 
measures solely to (IP based) spin-off companies, which are argued to have most 
potential to become high growth ventures, given the breadth of their technology 
platform, the possibility of mass production of a revolutionary product / new material 
and / or the scope of their market. Technology transfer offices have often been 
established or re-structured exactly to serve this type of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. Start-ups however, embody tacit know how and often do not require a full-
fledged organisational structure to support the start-up process. However, in some 
cases we observe that companies that could potentially start without formal transfer of 
technology from the PRO, are expected to do so given the upsurge of the phenomenon 
since the mid nineties, resulting in high valuations and necessary capitalisations. From 
a purely economic development perspective, stimulating start-ups could be argued to 
be equally important, especially given the lower costs involved in setting up these 
ventures. 
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In sum, the research has shown that institutional linkage matters and therefore needs 
to be taken into account by technology transfer managers as well as potential, 
(academic) entrepreneurs when commercialising research results through setting up 
new ventures. Traditionally, researchers have looked at broader environmental 
circumstances in understanding the resource constraints and opportunities for new 
ventures. For example, the availability of venture capital or public capital in a region 
and a network of entrepreneurs / experienced managers have traditionally been argued 
to be important for the successful establishment of the resource base of a firm 
(Roberts, 1991). This study substantially adds to these research endeavours by taking 
another lens: the parent organisation in general and the nature of the knowledge base, 
including varying emphases on respective transfer modalities seem to be equally 
important to take into account when assessing the founding resources and growth of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms.  
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II. A PROCESS STUDY OF EN TREPRENEURIAL TEAM FORMATION: THE CASE OF A 
RESEARCH-BASED SPIN-OFF3 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes how a team of entrepreneurs is formed in a research-based spin-
off, how the team copes with crisis situations during the start-up phase, and how both 
the team as a whole and the team members individually learn from these crises. The 
progress of a university spin-off has been followed up from the idea phase onwards. 
Adopting a prospective, qualitative approach, the basic argument of this paper is that 
shocks in the founding team and the position of its champion co-evolve with shocks in 
the development of the business. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of spinning of a venture from a parent organisation, and from a university 
in particular, has received increasing attention during the past few years both in the 
academic literature (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Mustar, 1997; Carayannis et al., 
1998; Smilor et al., 1998; Steffenson et al., 1999) and in practice (Clarysse et al, 
2001). Governments and universities do increasingly consider the creation of spin-offs 
as a way of commercialising their internal research results. In addition, the financial 
investors’ community, licking its wounds after the dot-com debacle, has shown a 
renewed interest in academic spin-offs as investment opportunity (International 
Herald Tribune, 2001). However, research-based spin-offs show some peculiarities, 
which make them distinct from other high tech start-ups. Usually, most of the 
founding team members know each other from university work and often there is a 
lead entrepreneur who was the technical project manager before start-up. Moreover, 
the founding members have little contacts with non-technical people when they start 
up the venture and show limited industry experience (Cooper en Daily, 1996). As a 
response, investors were traditionally very sceptic about these start-ups and only 
participated when they could recruit a functionally balanced professiona l team that 
almost replaced the original founding team at the managerial level (e.g. Roure and 
Keeley, 1990; Cyr et al., 2000). 
 
                                                                 
3 We wish to thank the founders of the company for their participation in this research. Thanks also to 
the CEO for allowing a follow up interview two years after we finished the actual research that led to 
this article. 
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Till recently, this was a possible strategy since competition for good spin-off deals 
was nearly non-existent among investors, nor were universities themselves interested 
to invest. Equally, there was little interest among the researchers to get actively 
involved in the spin-off. Thus, if spin-offs were created, the lead technical 
entrepreneur before start-up either played a role as member of the board or as a Chief 
Technical Officer, at most. Today, an intense competition has developed among 
universities to maximise the number of growth-oriented spin-offs. Investors jump on 
the bandwagon to provide start capital through university funds, university related 
business angel networks or semi public seed capital funds. This change in 
environmental conditions has resulted in the fact that growth oriented spin-offs are 
increasingly started with the technical intrapreneurs in charge of the start-up. They 
receive managerial support from the financial investors, specialised service providers, 
incubators or venture accelerators with whom they collaborate or by whom they are 
nurtured (Smilor et al., 1990, p. 65; Feeser and Willard, 1998).  
 
Despite the fact that the venture capital literature consistently points to the 
entrepreneurial team as one of the most important factors which makes professional 
investors decide to enter a company (e.g. Cyr et al., 2000), very little insights exist 
about how entrepreneurial teams are formed in these research environments, how 
these teams evolve in the pre-start or incubation phase and how they eventually gain, 
both through influx of new members and through learning by experience, enough 
maturity to attract a professional financial investor. To tackle these issues, we 
followed up a research-based spin-off from its idea phase through the start-up up to its 
first planned capital increase using participant observation as a main data collection 
procedure. The total period of observation lasted over a period of 20 months. In this 
period both authors followed closely the intrapreneur and the founding team, and took 
part in different founding team activities.  
 
This paper unfolds along the following lines. First, we point to the relevance of 
studying the start-up process of research-based spin-offs, taking the perspective of 
entrepreneurial team formation and development. Second, we explain the research 
method that guided our data collection and analysis, in order to gain insight into the as 
yet incomplete documented phenomenon. Third, we provide a discussion of the main 
findings and how these contribute to theory building in the field of new venture 
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creation in general, and more specifically, in the area of championing and 
entrepreneurial team development. We conclude with some managerial implications 
and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. RESEARCH-BASED SPIN-OFFS AND TEAMS  
 
‘High tech start-ups’ or ‘new technology based firms’ play a prominent role in the 
current economy (e.g. Mandel, 1998; Hendry, 1999; Storey and Tether, 1998 for a 
review of the literature). They are a very heterogeneous category of firms including 
different types ranging from technology developers to technology adopters (Hellman 
and Puri, 2000). Technology adopters use new technologies to enter new markets or to 
launch new ways of doing business, but do not develop technologies themselves. The 
entrepreneurs launching technology-adopting companies normally tend to fulfill or 
serve a short-term market opportunity. The so-called dot-com companies are a recent 
example of this kind of firms. At the other end of the continuum, we find the 
technology developers, which act as R&D boutiques (Pisano, 1990). Expected product 
revenues seem to be much further away in these companies, where the technical 
people play a leading role. The literature on high tech start-ups is rather inconclusive 
about the way these ventures get established, their internal dynamics and growth. 
Much of the confusion seems to be related to the heterogeneity of the population of 
high tech firms. To tackle this heterogeneity problem, we follow previous research 
focusing on a particular sub-population of high tech start-ups: research-based spin-
offs (Mustar, 1995 & 1997; Smilor et al., 1990; Steffenson et al., 1999).  
 
Research based spin-offs have become increasingly popular as a way of 
commercialising the research results of a public / private laboratory or a university 
(Chiese and Piccaluga, 2000; Mustar, 1997; Clarysse et al, 2001). A common two-
dimensional definition of a research-based spin-off (RBSO hereafter) is: a new 
company that is formed (1) by a faculty member, staff member or student who left 
university to found the company or started the company while still affiliated with the 
university, and/or (2) a core technology (or idea) that is transferred from the parent 
organisation (e.g. Roberts and Malone, 1996; Smilor et al., 1990; Steffenson et al., 
1999). According to this definition, a spin-off can be seen as a technology transfer 
mechanism for the commercialisation of a technology developed at an R&D 
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institution or university. However, the actual relationship between the spin-off and the 
parent company seems to be much more complex than this definition assumes. 
Carayannis et al. (1998), for example, suggested to extend this definition to include 
the transfer of other services of the company (e.g. capital, management advice, 
premises, …) or to restrict the spin-off concept to specific transfer, so that we can 
refer to “technology spin-offs”, “founder spin-offs”, “venture capital spin-offs”, … 
Given the unique circumstances in which spin-offs can be set up, it is not surprising 
that there is no uniform definition of the phenomenon. In our research, we posit a 
transfer of technology from a research organisation as a conditio sine qua non for 
defining a company as a research-based spin-off.  
 
It is important to note that research-based spin-offs may have very different 
organisations as parent institutes. Universities, publicly or privately funded research 
institutes (excluding corporate R&D departments) and technical schools are examples 
of parents. A common feature of these organisations is that they have 
commercialisable ideas in their research portfolio but they differ significantly in the 
extent to which they actively search for these business opportunities as well as in the 
extent to which the trajectory of business development is guided and supported. 
Ideally, the endpoint of that trajectory consists of a defined market opportunity around 
which a well-balanced start-up team is composed. Depending upon the intensity of the 
management of the potential spin-off’s trajectory, three different modes seem to 
emerge: a protected mode, a free market mode and a “keynesian” mode. In the 
protected mode, the engineers / researchers that are interested and found eligible to 
get together in the potential spin-off are protected from the external environment until 
formal venture capital can be invested. This type of starter typically gets a small 
amount of finance to overcome a certain incubation period and remain on the 
premises of the research institute. During that time, venture capital is negotiated and a 
professional start-up team is built. In the free market mode, the researchers start with 
no money or at most a small amount of financing (usually a subsidy) without real due 
diligence. Hence, not being embedded in the parent organisation during the early 
stages, the venture has to find its own way in the market. Finally, the keynesian mode 
is in fact a variation on the free market mode in which the research team receives 
some start capital (often from the university seed capital fund), spins off and gets 
coaching from the network during its first phase. 
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There is a general consensus that high tech start-ups are more often created by a team 
than by a single entrepreneur (Roberts, 1991). Moreover, team started business 
account for a disproportionately greater number of high-growth firms (Kamm et al. 
1990). It is not surprising then that investors often emphasise the quality of the 
management team more than any other single factor as they make investment 
decisions (e.g. Kamm et al. 1990; Cyr et al., 2000). Having identified the initial 
venture opportunity, they make up the intangible assets of the firm (Cooper and Daily, 
1996). Although mainstream entrepreneurship journals have not handled extensively 
the impact of teams on company growth, very elaborated bodies of research in such 
fields as organisational behaviour, strategic management and social psychology have 
examined team issues in some detail (Birley and Stockley, 2001). We would basically 
distinguish between two main currents. The social psychology stream has focused 
primarily on processes and outcomes within the boundaries of the group, for example, 
consensus, conflict, problem solving and decision making (Ancona, 1987). The basic 
argument of the second current -- the demographic approach -- is that, instead of 
looking at processes, which cannot be measured reliably, we should look for proxies 
that can be measured (e.g. age and tenure as indicators for experience and maturity). 
The demographic stream reached a high in the “upper echelons perspective”, where 
demographics are applied to top management teams. Although the demographic 
approaches implicitly acknowledge that (behavioural) processes form the link 
between demographic characteristics and performance, they largely treat these 
processes as a black box. The need to open this box and study the underlying 
processes has been stressed by many researchers (see Birley and Stockley, 2001) but 
to date relatively few studies have attempted to do this (e.g. Smith et al., 1994). It is 
clear that very little research has focused on how founding teams form and evolve 
during the first critical stages of a venture. This research is one of the first attempts we 
know of to fill this gap in the literature, following up longitudinally a research- based 
spin-off over a period of 20 months, taking an entrepreneurial team perspective.  
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3. RESEARCH SETTING  
 
Our research site is a spin-off from the Université Catholique de Louvain la Neuve 
(UCL): “CINE” (pseudonym). UCL is the largest French-speaking university in 
Belgium and the number of students has increased with 7% between 1997-1998 and 
2000-2001. The university has ten faculties, comprising 50 departments and 200 
research groups. The annual research budget is 85.106 EURO, of which 12.106 EURO 
is provided by companies. In 1985, a technology transfer office was created: 
SOPARTEC SA. This is a limited liability company, which is majority owned by the 
UCL. Its main corporate purpose is to promote the transfer of technology from UCL 
by several intertwined means: (1) provision of seed capital for innovative 
developments based on UCL research (2) the provision of equity financing to start-up 
companies using university technology (3) filing, prosecution and maintenance of 
patents and (4) licensing patents and related technology. The technology transfer and 
seed capital company has 12 companies in its portfolio, of which 2 are pub lic. The 
size of the fund today (2001) is € 12.5 million and the value of their portfolio amounts 
to € 35 million. SOPARTEC actively plans to build an incubator in the Science Park 
of Louvain- la-Neuve (planned operation: 2003). From 1998 up to 2001 the university 
has spun off 6 ventures. 
  
CINE was initiated in the telecommunications and microelectronics department of the 
UCL. Different European projects4 are at the basis of the development of the spin-off, 
starting as of 1994. In 1997 the CINE project started, focusing on datacasting and 
protection of authors' rights. The emphasis of the project was clearly on 
commercialising the research results, more specifically by means of creating a spin-
off company. “CINE” was formally incorporated in June 2000, with 200 K EURO 
start-capital and 150K EURO deferred loan. The main characteristics of the 
technology transfer office and the spin-off are presented in Table 1. 
                                                                 
4 European funded projects are a common feature in the Belgian University research landscape. Since 
universities have suffered from budgetary cuts, research has increasingly become financed by external 
sources on a contract research basis. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of UCL and CINE (2000) 
 
 
The spin-off reflects the aforementioned “keynesian mode” of trajectory coaching 
intensity, in which the university exerts control to a certain extent via representation 
in the Board of Directors and via the appointment of a Company Coach, which was 
officially delegated with the responsibilities of a CEO. This function included the 
structuring of the team in which everybody gets a role and the attraction of 
competencies into the team if they were not yet available (e.g. Business developer or 
CEO). In fact, the fund did not have enough manpower at the time to invest in 
different young start-ups, which need a lot more coaching than companies further 
along the line. So, having a person in whom they had confidence was a prerequisite 
for them before they wanted to invest. Another consideration that informed the 
decision for having an external coach was related to the fact that the investor did not 
believe in the management capabilities of the project leader. In the next section we 
will discuss the method we employed for studying this venture in depth.  
  
4. METHOD 
 
The aim of this research is to inductively describe and explain the nature of new 
venture team formation and development in a research-based spin-off. Since processes 
are involved a longitudinal approach is required. To track and analyse changes over 
time, some researchers have adopted well-accepted business history approaches (see 
e.g. Cusumano et al., 1992; Cusumano and Selby, 1995). Herein, the tracing of 
historic company documents and project data is central, often complemented with 
extensive interviews about the company’s history and current operations. Studying the 
UCL CINE
Total research budget 85.106 EURO Capital 200K EURO
Research funded by companies 12.106 EURO Deferred loan 150K EURO
FTE* researchers 2151 No. founders 6
FTE technicians 1648 Total employees 7
Spin offs generated since 1998 4 Sector Telecom
Reported invention disclosures 31
Filed patent applications 25
Total license income** 0.2.106
* Full time equivalents
** Not including capital gains
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early phases of a research-based spin-off we could not adopt this methodology for at 
least two reasons. First, there is a clear absence of track records and archives that 
document on these particular companies’ very early stages. Second, since we are 
interested in team formation and development, it is important to get information from 
the original founding team and from relevant stakeholders in the parent organisation 
and environment. It is very difficult to identify these individuals or to get the relevant 
information post facto.  
 
As a result, we decided to adopt a prospective qualitative approach (see e.g. Perlow, 
1998, 1999), in order to discover more about “how” and “why” teams affect 
performance and growth (Birley and Stockley, 2001. We collected real time 
longitudinal, qualitative data and attempted to extract theory from the ground up 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994; Langley, 1999). The total time we closely followed up 
the venture amounted to a period of 20 months (0ctober 1999–May 2001). 
 
5. DATA SOURCES 
 
The two authors followed up the development of the venture closely. The progress 
was observed and recorded from the idea phase through start-up until the planning of 
the second round of financing. As described below, multiple methods of data 
collection procedures were used to address these issues, enabling to cross check 
results obtained from observations and recorded field no tes. 
 
5.1. Participant observation  
 
During the idea phase and the time during which capital was attracted, having 
different contacts with the researchers of university followed up the process of new 
venture creation. We visited the researchers several times at university, until formal 
legislation of the company. The researchers got to know us and we agreed that we 
would come over “on site” of the venture to engage in participant observation. The 
actual time of participant observation ranged from August 2000 to June 2001, about 3 
days per week, observing the engineers at work, during meetings and informal 
conversations. As time permitted, we typed out field notes throughout the day. Where 
possible, we engaged in social activities with the team members: every now and then 
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we had lunch with them and travelled with them for a socialising weekend. Early in 
the research process, it was very important to make ourselves useful for the team, in 
order to gain confidence and a "raison d' être" at the site. Helping out with proof 
reading documents enabled more personal contacts with the team members. Although 
the team was rather small, the degree of our involvement with the different team 
members varied still, adopting alternately an "active-member-researcher" and a 
"peripheral-member-researcher" profile (Schultze, 2000). We attended most of the 
company’s internal meetings. In CINE, two formal meetings per week were held: a 
week planning for discussing the objectives to be reached and a technical meeting to 
discuss particular technical problems and developments. The meetings were prepared 
and led by the business manager. Attending these meetings was crucial to provide us a 
clear insight in what is perceived as relevant by the team.  
 
5.2. Interviews  
 
We interviewed each of the seven team members, the CEO, and the research assistant 
that helped with the preparation of the business plan. Some broad questions guided us 
throughout the interviews ensuring that we would get comparative data. Each 
interview took about two hours. The interviews provided us with background 
information about the group (who initiated the business, how they got together, why 
they wanted to start a spin-off,…). Additionally, we questioned the team about how 
they perceived the role of the business manager, the Coach (officially delegated with 
CEO responsibilities) and the Board of Directors, and probed in such a way that they 
would prevail the most prevalent difficulties -- if any -- they were experiencing. There 
was a weekly discussion with the Coach-CEO, communicating his perceptions about 
how the venture and its team evolved.  
 
6. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Following the guidelines of Miles and Huberman (1984) and Glaser and Strauss 
(1969) we performed data analysis throughout data collection. In order to arrive at a 
processual view and empirically grounded themes, the data were analysed 
sequentially. First, field notes were typed out consequently and after a period of 
participant observation, all issues and reflections were condensed in an interim site 
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summary. This draft provided a general picture of what was going on in the venture 
and helped to focus the interviews. The interview notes were used in order to abstract 
issues raised by the different team members. Second, analyzing the field notes and 
interviews notes, we dotted down the most important issues as perceived by the 
different team members. The first order issues and events that emerged from this 
exercise (Table 2) were then grouped in second order issues (Table 3) for some 
important themes). 
 
Table 2: Sequence of venture development - first order issues5 
 
Date Issues Data source 
1997 – 
Spring 
1999 
Path dependency: availability of FIRST subsidies and 
creation of other spin-off 
 
Three technical researchers, of which one decides not to 
get involved in kick off of the spin-off 
 
University department head has not been very supportive  
 
Once the business idea really became concrete, colleagues 
at university became rather envious 
 
Looking for business plan coaching and start capital 
Interview John1 and 
Company Coach 
 
 
 
 
Interviews with team 
members 
 
Spring 
1999 – 
June 2000 
 
 
First draft of business plan 
 
Two technical researchers (John1 and John2, 
complemented with Daniel, John3 and Jésus) 
 
Pedro and May were attracted externally 
 
Interviews with team 
members 
 
June 2000 
 
 
Formal legislation of the company 
 
Formal company documents 
 
July – 
August 
 
Installation of office space 
 
Prepare IBC: brochure, technical specifications 
(International Broadcasting Conference): great 
expectations 
 
Opportunities in security 
 
Interviews 
 
September 
2000 
 
 
Daniel and Pedro become officially “employees” of the 
company (i.e. on the pay roll of the spin-off) 
 
IBC 
 
No consensus about hierarchical structuring 
 
 
Start participant observation 
(2 days per week) 
 
Participant observation 
 
Interviews 
 
                                                                 
5 The issues are categorized in the period during which they first became prevalent. It does not mean 
necessarily that their importance vanished later on. 
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Everybody needs to find a role in the venture Interviews and meetings 
 
October 
2000 
 
 
Company Coach appointed Daniel as responsible for 
following up the projects 
 
In deciding for a responsible for project follow up, human 
factors should not be neglected 
 
 
Daniel is convinced that john1 has not the appropriate 
profile to be the business manager, neither to represent the 
team in the Board of Directors 
 
John1 is crucial regarding team spirit and team motivation 
 
 
 
Construction of website is considered as very urgent, 
including internal documentation system and shared 
calendar 
 
Disagreement about whether or not a new employee 
should be attracted with graphical competence for 
developing the website, proofreading English documents, 
…  
 
Work hours (disagreement about whether or not 
everybody should be present in the company between 
12am and 5pm) 
 
Strategic re -orientation of projects: 1 FTE is re-allocated 
to security, given market opportunity 
 
Lack of human resources for the Broadcasting project  
 
Commercialisation /marketing of broadcasting project 
should be first priority 
 
Participant observation 
 
 
Informal talk with Daniel, 
presence during discussions 
between team members 
 
Informal talk with Daniel 
 
 
 
Informal talks with team 
members, including Daniel 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
 
 
Meetings, informal talks 
 
 
 
Meetings 
 
 
Meeting John1, John2, May 
and company coach 
 
 
November 
2000 
 
Strategic discussions regarding broadcasting project, 
within the coming weeks a whole range of questions needs 
to be clarified: is the market ready? What about 
partnerships? 
 
Putting in place a discussion scheme for the broadcasting 
project (to speak a “uniform” language) 
 
John1 seem to monopolise external information from 
potential customers: he has to communicate more what is 
really going on 
 
Participant observation,  
Meetings, informal talks 
 
 
 
Observation, informal talks, 
meetings 
 
May, meetings 
 
December 
2000 
 
 
John1 still takes care of most external communication, he 
has all the relevant contacts  
 
 
John1 realises that the broadcasting project can not be 
commercialised within the coming two-three years (after 
meeting with stakeholder from the Broadcasting Industry) 
 
Preparation of a meeting of the Board of Directors 
Preparation of a demand for capital increase (permission 
 
Observation, interview 
research assistant, interviews 
team members 
 
Briefing after trip of John1 to 
Geneva 
 
 
Strategic team meeting 
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is obtained, capital needs to be attracted externally, the 
university seed capital fund is not willing to invest) 
 
January 
2001 
 
 
The business manager starts questioning his role and 
position in the venture. Therefore he wants a talk with the 
company coach. 
 
John1 
 
March 
2001 
 
Internal communication problems are reaching a high 
 
Demo Datacasting flops 
 
Company Coach 
May 
 
April 
2001 
 
Prototype Digital Cinema to main partner 
 
Start discussing internal organisation of the venture: job 
descriptions, organizational flow chart 
 
Daniel re -allocated to security 
 
Company Coach, 
May 
 
May 
2001 
 
 
Decision of Board of Directors to stop all developments in 
datacasting: firm focuses on security  
 
John2 starts looking how parts of developments for 
datacasting project can be commercialised (three months) 
 
Pedro re-allocated to security 
 
Company Coach 
 
 
Summer 
2001 
 
Daniel becomes CEO  
 
Company Coach exits company 
 
Internal company document 
with organization structure 
 
 
Finally, at the conclusion of the field work, we integrated the analysis of the interview 
transcripts, field notes and the interim site summary in order to address the following 
question: How does the entrepreneurial team get formed and evolve in a research-
based spin-off? 
Table 3: Team related second order issues  
 
SECOND ORDER ISSUES DESCRIPTION
The venture champion The importance of the role of the business manager, being here
the venture champion
Role development All team members communicated that “finding their roles in the
company” was crucial in this start-up phase
Work Time flexibility Different issues were communicated related to work hours and
whether or not they should be controlled: source of conflict
Project management and
technological evolutions
Groups the issues related to the projects and the way they
evolved. The data are indicative to prone that the way the team
developed is inherent to the strategic evolution of the projects
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The basic argument of this paper is that shocks in the founding team and the position 
of its champion coexist with shocks in the development of the business, along the life 
cycle of the new venture. Our analysis shows four distinct phases of development of 
the venture and its entrepreneurial team (see Figure 1). A first phase is related to the 
idea phase. Herein, the CINE project team consists of three technical researchers, 
with one clearly delineated project leader. The latter is in charge of planning, follow 
up and proposal writing. The pre-start-up phase is introduced by the actual decision to 
spin-off from university. The project leader proved to be the “champion”, driving the 
idea, looking for business plan coaching and putting a team together: “managing the 
idea all the way through completion”. After formal legislation, introducing the start-
up phase, our observations and interviews supported the well-accepted view that 
champions often do not make good managers. This paradox can be explained by the 
fact that the team needed time to accept that the initial champion is actually not the 
appropriate person for being the business manager. Triggered by speedy technological 
evolutions, the post-start-up phase is characterised by gaining strategic focus and 
professionalising the organisation of the team. In the next section, we discuss these 
empirically derived phases in more depth. 
Figure 1: Development of the venture along the organisational life cycle 
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6.1. THE PROJECT PHASE : a project team at university 
 
The spin-off that we followed up was built on a project that started in 1997 for the 
planned duration of 3 years. Within the project requirements, there was a clear 
objective of research commercialisation in general and the creation of a spin-off in 
particular. At the same time, there was a policy shift at university, urging researchers 
to commercialise their research results. This change in policy was informed both by 
international trends as by recent success stories in the Walloon region (e.g. IPO of 
IBA in 1997).   
 
The project manager from the department since 1996, became the project leader of the 
CINE project. He was not only responsible for planning and follow up, but also for 
establishing and maintaining contacts with industry. Two other technical engineers 
were working on this particular project. When the project was half way (spring 1999), 
two situations stimulated the actual development of the spin-off. Firstly, there was the 
availability of a FIRST SPIN-OFF scholarship. “First spin-off” was created in 1998 as 
a part of the ‘FIRST’ PROGRAMME, established by the Walloon government in 1989. It 
has an operating budget for providing 20 grants, offering researchers the possibility to 
work during 2 years on the completion of a product, a procedure or an innovative 
service concept, to carry out an economical and technical feasibility study, and to 
write a business plan for the creation of a spin-off. It is a measure initiated by 
government for providing pre-seed capital to academic entrepreneurs. Secondly, the 
creation of another spin-off from the premises of the university (April 1999) also led 
to the final decision and preparations to start up CINE. Thus, a new phase in the spin-
off process is introduced: the pre-start-up phase, in which the business opportunity 
needs to be further validated. Moreover, the business plan is developed, start capital is 
negotiated and the entrepreneurial team is formed.  
 
6.2. THE  PRE START-UP PHASE: Championing the business idea into a new venture 
 
Early 1999 the three technical researchers working on the CINE project started 
looking for business plan coaching, as none of them had any business experience. 
After having established different contacts they got business coaching from a 
University professor, who would eventually become the company coach with CEO 
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responsibilities (see Research Setting). Between September 1999 and April 2000 also 
recruiting started on the premises of university. From October 1999 onwards we 
started to follow up the venture, gaining insight in recruiting decisions. The 
technology platform of the future spin-off would be datacasting (CINE project) and 
during the project, contacts had been established with two local companies 
(NEWTEC en EVS) that had made explicit their interest to co-operate. Since EVS had 
communicated that a security module was necessary in datacasting, John3 was 
involved in the start-up effort. Jésus, sharing the office with the three original project 
researchers and John3, joined the team as well. Next to the skills that were developed 
in the CINE project by the three technical project-researchers, there was a need for a 
hardware specialist for enabling the co-operation with NEWTEC. Daniel was 
attracted to serve this purpose and a concrete project was started with NEWTEC. 
Although the team members communicated that “matching personalities” are 
important for getting together in the business, the composition of the team was mainly 
technologically driven. After a while an engineer with some industry experience was 
attracted. 
 
During the pre-start, the project leader (John1) was the driving force behind the spin-
off process. Without him, start-up would probably not have taken place. This supports 
the well- accepted notion that an “idea either has a champion or dies”. Identifying 
John1 as the champion of the venture resulted from different accounts. First, we came 
to this conclusion observing his position as a project leader and looking at how he 
profiled himself in the team along the development of the business idea. He put 
himself automatically into the role of the one who steered the idea and motivated 
others to join. Second, the other team members clearly pointed to John1 as the one 
who "started it all". He inspired the idea, motivated people to join and put in a lot of 
energy in order to arrive at start-up of CINE. Third, although we did not specifically 
test John1 for the champion related characteristics described by Howell and Higgins 
(1990), his personality, charisma and early and ongoing informal leadership role in 
the spin-off process was obvious.  
 
In April 2000, the first draft of the business plan was provided at the university's seed 
capital fund. Because of personal (family) issues, one of the project researchers 
decided not to engage in the kick off of the business, and left the department late 
1999. The spin-off was formally legislated in June 2000, with six founders. Peer 
nomination and the distribution of the founders' shares reflect that the six engineers 
are all considered as founders. However, two of them only got on the pay roll of 
CINE in September 2000. Support from university consisted of the use of PC material 
and the fact that two other engineers remained on the pay roll of the university. At the 
time of writing (summer 2001) CINE employs seven individuals, of which one part 
time function is still paid by university and two full time engineers are financed by the 
FIRST Program. The operations manager was attracted externally and started working 
for the company in July 2000. At start-up, the team members are not organised 
hierarchically and each had a high degree of control over his work. In Table  4, we 
provide an overview of some demographic characteristics of the founders/ employees.  
Table 4: Founder and employee characteristics at time of start-up 
 
 
The formal legislation of the company introduces a new era: the champion 
automatically becomes the business manager and the team members need to find their 
place in the newly formed company. Although the investor put in place a company 
coach formally delegated with CEO responsibilities, the business manager / champion 
seemed to negatively affect the speed at which the strategic technological focus was 
Team 
members 
Founder  Nationality Education Age  Academic 
experience 
Industry 
experience 
 
John1 
 
 
 
John2 
 
 
Pedro 
 
 
John3 
 
Jésus 
 
 
Daniel 
 
 
May (F) 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
Belgian 
 
 
 
Belgian 
 
 
Spanish 
 
 
Spanish 
 
Spanish 
 
 
Belgian 
 
 
Belgian 
 
 
Civil Engineer, 
telecommunication 
specialist 
 
Licentiate in 
Sciences 
 
Civil engineer 
 
 
Civil engineer 
 
Ph.D., Civil 
engineer 
 
Ph.D., micro-
electronics 
 
Economist 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
27 
 
 
26 
 
28 
 
 
29 
 
 
28 
 
6 yrs. 
 
 
 
3 yrs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 yrs. 
 
 
3 yrs. 
 
No 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
4 yrs in 
multinational 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
2 yrs fiscal 
consulting 
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adapted to the actual needs of the venture. In the following paragraphs we discuss 
these issues in more depth. 
 
6.3. THE START-UP PHASE: The champion as business manager and inducer of 
strategic inertia 
 
 
During the start-up phase the business manager keeps “championing” the new 
venture, arranges the physical infrastructure and related operational matters, makes 
sure internal agreements are made and held by all team members, and manages -- in 
co-operation with others -- the development of a certain communication structure. 
Although the investment fund did not want the “champion” to be the formal CEO, 
they did not question his role as business manager, nor did the team members. Every 
team member clearly agreed about the fact that the project leader and inspirer of the 
research lab at university would become the business manager of the spin-off. All 
team members clearly accepted the champion as the informal leader of the venture.  
 
The automatic evolution of the champion role into that of the business manager is in 
line with Burgelman’s (1983) longitudinal study of internal corporate venturing 
projects, where it is noted that the transformation process from product champion to 
the venture manager occurred almost naturally and automatically. Although normative 
theory might question this practice, there seem to be very strong pressures to let the 
technically oriented product champion become the venture manager. In this study, the 
pressures were in part motivational, because the champion was attracted by the 
opportunity to become a general manager, but it also resulted from the fact that 
apparently there was nobody else around who could do the job.  
 
Although the company was formed on one core technology platform (datacasting), the 
work of the engineers was organised around three "projects", resulting in three work 
groups: one for the broadcasting project (three persons), one for security (one person) 
and a hardware project (one person). The business manager (although intrinsically 
connected to the Broadcasting project) is not included in these work groups, neither is 
the operations manager. The goal was to commercialise the datacasting system, in 
which first the International Broadcasting Conference (IBC) (September 2000) and 
then an industry demo planned in March 2001 were expected to play a crucial role in 
 58 
the commercialisation of the system. Next to this, a security module would be 
developed and introduced in the system "on the way". However, shortly after start-up 
a large firm and potential customer requested a security module, which was 
technologically not linked to the datacasting activity. This market opportunity was 
based on the Ph.D. of John3 and accepting it would possibly allow CINE to enter the 
security market. Moreover, developing a prototype for a third party would generate 
revenues. This was an unexpected evolution for the team. Changing -- or broadening -
- the focus was very difficult for the group. First, because a priori, changing an initial 
business idea "does not seem to fit with human nature". Second, because of the 
“security” opportunity, the available manpower for the broadcasting project 
diminished6, which had implications for the throughput time needed for the 
development of the broadcasting project. Third, not having a very clear idea about the 
market for security made things even more complicated. Concurrently, the insight 
grew that the market segments for which the broadcasting prototype was developed 
are actually not ready to adopt the technology. The expectation that after the IBC the 
venture would be able to sell the datacasting technology, was not met. Conversely, 
people seemed to be interested in the technology but stated that it would be something 
to acquire, say, in a few years time. Moreover, with regard to their ONLY potential 
client, decision making is too slow and bureaucratic, adopting the technology would 
require a substantial mentality change,…  
It was not before the champion visited the main potential customer group (December 
2000) that he finally came up with the conclusion that "our broadcasting technology 
cannot be commercialised before three years time…". However, the team was 
convinced that it would be possible to commercialise parts of the system (e.g. router, 
IP/TCP gateway, …) after a successful demonstration of the fully integrated system in 
March 2001. Hence, the venture remained active in datacasting . 
  
As a result, a time lag occurred before the technological focus of the venture was 
adapted to the actual needs and realities of the market. One of the engineers stated that 
one of the most difficult things in CINE relates to the fact that they are not 
specialising in one single technology. Ideally, he goes on, we should have two 
independent structures, but still belonging to the same company. The broadcasting 
                                                                 
6 One engineer was re-allocated to the security team and an additional developer was hired. 
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market s not expected to generate huge revenues, but it seems a secure market. 
Conversely, as for security, the market is much more uncertain but potential revenue 
streams are expected to be substantially higher. Hence, it is argued that having both in 
one company is good to spread the risk. We checked this view with other team 
members, and the opinions seem to converge in this respect. During this period, the 
work groups are divided in such a way that three persons are working on the security 
project and two persons are developing for the broadcasting project. The hardware 
specialist (Daniel) is involved in hardware projects that are rather distinct from the 
others, but which are generating cash flow.  
The business manager also seemed to be too much occupied with operational matters 
and did not communicate efficiently with the operational manager (May). Since she is 
a non-technical person, it was very important that she and John1 would team up, to 
follow up on commercial contacts. This seemed to be impossible. Moreover, when the 
Coach asked him to make a planning, or to get in touch with potential customers, 
other practical things always came first. Next to these practical worries, the business 
manager adapted the technical requirements continuously without consulting his 
fellow workers involved in the Broadcasting project. Consequently, the other 
engineers developed certain aspects “because John1 told them to”. Often this need for 
“sudden and urgent” adaptations was initiated by a phone call of a contact in the 
Broadcasting industry. What is clear from these examples is that John1 monopolised 
the information that came into the venture, thus trying to put himself into the position 
of CEO.  
 
Thus, the venture champion did not function adequately as business manager and 
slowed down strategic decision-making, by monopolising essential information and 
by sticking too long to the original, commercially non-viable business idea. At first, 
the lack of managerial -- and more specifically, strategic and commercial -- 
competencies of the venture champion were only observed by the Coach. As a result, 
the Coach got so fed up with the situation that he decided to put Daniel in charge as a 
project manager and to help with establishing commercial contacts (mid September 
2000). Moreover, the Coach wanted him in the Board of Directors. John1 did not 
agree, resulting in a conflict with the Coach. Eventually the team decided 
democratically that every Friday, each individual would present his project in a 
technical meeting, without one person being "in control". The underlying assumption 
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was that the "social control" mechanism would work to follow up project planning as 
strictly as possible. In an informal conversation with Daniel, he stated that human 
aspects should not be neglected in issues like this:  
 
"In totally new teams -- where members are unfamiliar with each other before start-up 
-- you can move responsibilities easily. However, when team members know each 
other for a longer time, personal aspects matter too much. Although I still believe that 
John1 is not the most appropriate person to be in the Board, it is the only option at 
this time. John1 is too important a person regarding team spirit and motivation. If this 
conflict would not have been solved like this 7, John1 would definitely become de-
motivated, with clear negative consequences for the team and on the company in 
general." 
 
In the meanwhile the preparation and developments for the demo in March continued 
and the security project was on scheme. From December 2000 onwards, Daniel 
helped out with the Broadcasting project, especially from a strategic perspective. For 
example, Daniel took up the initiative to construct a general overview of the stages of 
development of the broadcasting project. Because of the complexity of the project, 
everybody seemed to interpret things differently and -- he argued -- a roadmap was 
necessary to ensure that "we all speak the same language". Daniel, the only engineer 
in the team who had according to the Coach the capacity to become a future CEO, had 
become increasingly accepted as a business developer. His lack of industry and 
management experience however, does not make him the most suitable CEO 
candidate. As for John1, although he had lost most of his champion and business 
manager appeal, the coach believes him to be valuable in the company as a 
technological gatekeeper. Among the engineers, he is the only one who professionally 
scans the “technological popular literature”, he is very aware of all movements in the 
Walloon IT sector. In addition, he likes to go for lunches and dinners with technical 
people of different associations, universities and administrations… 
 
In conclusion, although the investor and the Company Coach did not believe in the 
managerial competencies of John1 from the onset, the team needed time to realise 
this. A dual tension emerged. On one hand, he is their friend … On the other hand, 
team members realised that he is not capable for leading the company. Since his role 
became increasingly unaccepted by the fellow team members, it was only during that 
time that the team members were ready to accept the necessity for a full time CEO. 
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The Coach himself had no interest to fulfil this function. His objective is to leave the 
venture after a full time CEO can be put in place …  
 
As we mentioned earlier, the company remained active in datacasting and prepared 
for the March 2001 demo. This datacasting demo turned out to be a flop: the system 
was not stable and too slow. From a business point of view, the system seemed to be 
of little value. In the entrepreneurial team, the feeling arose that John2 was consuming 
the capital of the company while security booked successes both financially (pre-
royalty revenues from a co-development partner and a subsidy of 500 000 EURO) and 
in terms of business opportunities.  
 
As a result of the increased and successful security activity, the Company Coach 
suggested that Daniel would be involved in the business development part, which 
included time-consuming interviews in the US. Therefore, Daniel needed to scale 
down his hardware activities and his supporting activities for datacasting. Since John1 
was still spending a large amount of time on datacasting relations, he could not do 
this. Hence, Daniel built a network in security, which decreased the power of John1. 
Also Pedro was reallocated to the security activities. Next to this, mid May the Board 
of directors decided to stop the datacasting developments and requested that John2 
would look for opportunities to commercialise existing components of the system. As 
a result of this, John1 had become in practice the business manager of a terminated 
activity.  
 
Successful demonstration of the security system in digital cinema in June, July and 
September resulted into letters of intent of potential clients and co-development 
parties. Although no revenues were generated yet, the business risk had decreased 
significantly. CINE had become a “name” in the world of digital cinema and potential 
clients in related businesses were asking CINE to make a proposition for their security 
problems; However, since real revenues were not to be expected in the first year and 
since the business development efforts, including different contracts with lead users, 
had to be intensified, the board of CINE decided that a capital increase was needed. 
The search for new capital could be accompanied by a major restructuring of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 John1 in the Board and using the social control mechanism for ensuring project follow up. 
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company’s internal organisation. Since the team considered Daniel as a successful 
business developer for the security module, he was accepted as the CEO of the only 
business that remained in life: security. Also the financial investor was convinced this 
was the best choice since Daniel had established all contacts with the potential clients. 
Once revenues were generated, he could be assisted by an experienced COO to 
manage the internal operations of the company. 
 
In conclusion, the external shocks facilitated the internal reorganisation of the 
company. Only after the flop and the subsequent abandoning of the datacasting 
activity and after the successful demonstrations in security, the organisation and the 
external parties that control this organisation were ready to appoint a new CEO and 
re-organise the team. 
 
6.4. THE POST START-UP PHASE: Technological evolution as trigger for strategic 
focus and professionalising the organisation of the team 
 
 
Clearly, the technological evolution in the company -- successful developments in 
security and flopped datacasting -- take CINE to another level of business functioning. 
The most important focus is now to further develop and follow up (existing) business 
opportunities in security, whereas until now the venture had been active in convincing 
potential customers of the datacasting technology. Different interested customers and 
partners need to be contacted and related businesses further developed.  
 
Although we have noted that Daniel might not the best CEO candidate, finding an 
external, experienced CEO for a high tech start-up like this is extremely difficult. A 
person like this needs the skills to negotiate at a very high level (middle or senior 
management of big companies), needs international contacts, needs experience with 
international VC investors. Thus, it is more likely to look for a professional 
management / coaching organisation of a small team of persons, which unite this 
experience to back up a CEO like Daniel, who is internally the best option.  
 
In conclusion, during the post start-up phase the emphasis is on business development 
and CINE’s strategy and structure is clearly agreed upon. The core business of CINE 
is SECURITY with two strategic lines: conditional access systems for business to 
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business and the implementation of cryptographic modules. Consulting activities are 
only accepted if these are in line with the strategic objectives. Figure 2 shows the  
organisational structure in September 2001. 
Figure 2: Structure of the new venture team 
 
 
 
7. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEO RY 
 
In the remainder of the paper we point to the relevance of the research for theory.  
 
7.1. Unfolding the paradox of the entrepreneurial champion: enabling experiential 
team learning  
 
 
As aforementioned, the champion is a crucial person during the pre-start period and a 
part of the start-up period of the venture. It has been argued -- empirically as well as 
theoretically -- that the "champion role" is absolutely necessary for organisations to 
develop successfully new products (Chakrabarti, 1974), new technologies (Howell 
and Higgins, 1990; Lawless and Price, 1992), and new businesses (Burgelman, 1983; 
Day, 1994). Without champions, product innovations and corporate venturing are 
unlikely to occur. It is interesting to note, however, that in this context we are not 
focusing on the typical engineer in an R&D department that cannot be promoted 
vertically given his lack of managerial interest and / or competence8. The technical 
                                                                 
8 To overcome motivational problems related to this, organizations have been implementing “dual 
career paths”, promising equal rewards to equivalent levels in two parallel hierarchies: one provides 
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person we are talking about, clearly distinguishes himself by acting as a “champion”, 
demonstrating typical personality characteristics, transformational leadership 
behaviours and influence tactics (Howell and Higgins, 1990). Next to the focus of 
researchers on (personality - behavioural) characteristics distinguishing champions 
from non-champions (see also Shane, 1994), other emphases include political 
processes at stake in the championing process (Frost and Egri, 1991; Markham, 2000) 
and cultural differences in innovation strategies (Shane et al., 1995). Moreover, 
Maidique (1980) states that the entrepreneur is important as a champion of the new 
technology, as vigorous promotion is needed to overcome resistance to the idea and 
the creation of the new venture. 
 
Although the entrepreneurial champion plays an essential and valuable role in creating 
the new venture, he is often considered unsuited to providing the stable base needed 
for long term growth (Burge lman, 1984). Conventional wisdom and small business 
literature hold that new firms rapidly outgrow the founder's managerial capacity. It is 
argued that unless the founder is replaced or supplemented by professional 
management, performance is predicted to stagnate or decline. A similar observation 
has been made when it comes to technological champions: they as well do not seem to 
make good managers. Therefore, companies have tried to establish career tracks for 
those technical people who see themselves or are viewed by others as less interested 
or less capable of carrying out managerial responsibilities. Thus, dual ladder 
promotional settings have been implemented.  
 
The literature does provide some insight on how champions / entrepreneurs relate to 
other individuals part of their team. However, the group contexts in which champions 
(intrapreneurs) and entrepreneurs are embedded represent separate streams of inquiry 
with their own particular emphases (new product development teams versus 
entrepreneurial teams). In practice, however, these streams and their corresponding 
managerial relevance go hand in hand. Other innovation roles -- next to the champion 
-- include a "technical expert", a "sponsor", a "projectleader" and a "gatekeeper" 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
managerial progression while the other provides opportunity for professional advancement. By 
rewarding highly innovative scientists and engineers with prestige, freedom and appropriate job 
requisites, companies trying to maintain productivity (See e.g. Katz and Tushman, 1981; Katz et al., 
1995). 
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(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Frohman, 1978; Katz and Tushman, 1981; Markham, 
1998) -- all considered as important additional roles in managing projects 
successfully. Each from diverse methodological and theoretical stances, different 
streams in the New Product Development9 (NPD) literature have clearly indicated that 
the project team is at the heart of the product development process. Team factors such 
as team composition (functional heterogeneity, team tenure and size), team group 
processes, including the team’s actions and behaviors (internal and external 
communication) and psychological dimensions, and finally, problem solving styles, 
have received considerable attention (e.g.: Ancona, 1990, Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992; Smith et al., 1994; Jehn, 1997). Recently, attention has shifted from the lone 
entrepreneur / founder to the whole entrepreneurial team (e.g. Cooper and Daily, 
1996). 
 
An apparent paradox thus emerges: Although "founders" of organisations as well as 
champions of technological innovation are often perceived as being no good 
managers, in practice these individuals often do function in one of the key 
management positions. Our data suggest that the champion’s paradox can be 
explained by the fact that the team needed time to come to the insight that the 
champion is actually not the appropriate business manager. Initially, John1 is accepted 
as an informal leader. The CEO -- who is functioning as a company coach -- is 
accepted as well but experiences opposition from the business manager, in order to 
gain formal authority. Actions on behalf of the coach could not be undertaken before 
this “learning” occurred. It is clear that this process can’t be forced. Learning by 
doing seems to be essential in order for the team to understand the need for external 
formal leadership. Unfortunately, the business manager seems to need even more time 
to accept his role. His beliefs about becoming the CEO remain very strong. Collective 
team learning seems to precede individual learning of the champion.  
 
                                                                 
9 Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) distinguish between three particular streams: NPD as rational plan, 
NPD as disciplined problem solving and NPD as communication web.  
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7.2. Toward a midrange theory: entrepreneurial team formation as a process of 
self-organising punctuated equilibria 
 
  
Numerous researchers have described life cycle stages ranging from three to ten 
phases (Kazanjian 1988; Hanks et al. 1993). However, for new ventures the 
organisation’s life cycle has traditionally been divided in three stages (Van de Ven et 
al., 1995; Roberts, 1991, p.126). Roberts, for example studied the life cycle of MIT 
spin-offs and labelled the three stages in their growth path as: (1) start-up, (2) initial 
growth and (3) sustained growth.  
 
However, looking at entrepreneurial team formation during the spin-off process of a 
research-based spin-off, we empirically elaborated the “start-up” phase discussed in 
the traditional life cycle models. Although consistent with the models found 
elsewhere in the literature, our model, grounded in one in depth case study, differs in 
that it explicitly describes stages as linked to the spin-off process. Encompassing an 
idea phase, a pre start phase, a start-up phase and a post start-up phase, our model 
adds value by pointing to the process character of “founding” a research-based spin-
off. However, our case data suggest that shocks in the environment precipitate the 
shift from one stage to another. More specifically, entrepreneurial team formation 
seems to evolve through the alternation of periods of equilibrium, in which underlying 
structures permit only incremental change, and periods of revolution, in which these 
underlying structures are fundamentally altered (Gersick, 1991). Although 
organisational stage models postulate a set of distinct and historically sequenced 
stages, we integrate Romanelli and Tushman’s (1984) view, stating that organisations 
may reach their respective strategic orientations through systematically different 
patterns of convergence and reorientation, with a life cycle perspective of the spin-off 
process. 
 
The first period of equilibrium that emerged form the data, represents the idea and pre 
start-up phase, in which the different founding team members and the business idea 
converge steadily towards the formal legislation of the venture. During that time the 
level playing field and the rules of the game get designed. The formal start-up of the 
company can be viewed as a first “revolution”, implying a whole new context and 
changing expectations towards the team members. The champion becomes business 
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manager, each engineer is assigned to a particular project with distinct 
responsibilities, … People try to find their respective places in the company. Although 
during this equilibrium period team learning is crucial, it comes to an end when a 
capital increase is decided upon after a reorientation of the company strategy. From 
then on, professionalising the management structure becomes a key element.  
 
This process however, can not be forced to quicken its pace, since the team needs a 
sufficient amount of time to understand the team related implications of strategic 
orientations and vice versa.  
 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
We have provided a processual, empirically grounded view on how entrepreneurial 
team members, including the “champion”, evolve within a new venture. Although 
empirical research has focused on entrepreneurial characteristics from different 
perspectives10, we did not find that researchers looked at how entrepreneurs or 
founders of companies outgrew their champion roles and how such teams are formed 
and develop during the spin-off process. Our data support the view that champions / 
entrepreneurs often do not make good managers, but we extend the theoretical and 
managerial relevance by pointing to the necessity of managing this individual 
effectively, in order to keep a motivated entrepreneurial team and to increase the 
likelihood of survival of the company. The basic argument of this research is that the 
development of the champion role and the entrepreneurial team as a whole clearly 
interrelates with life cycle stages of the venture and that it takes time before a 
founding team finds its role and accepts the need for an experienced CEO. Changes in 
the team go hand in hand with shocks in the emerging business, pointing to a self-
organising process of punctuated equilibria. 
 
                                                                 
10 Empirical research focusing on entrepreneurial characteristics generally falls into one of two generic 
types. (1) Those that attempt to associate various characteristics with the state of entrepreneurship 
(individual characteristics separating entrepreneurs from non-entrepreneurs) (Herron and Robinson, 
1993). (2) Those that attempt to use characteristics to predict performance among entrepreneurs or the 
businesses they run (e.g. Roure and Keeley, 1990). Despite the large number of studies of both types, it 
is notable that neither has had much success in achieving statistical associations that are of practical 
and replicable significance.  
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The data show further that the “learning” processes, which take place in the team, are 
very important. In an environment, which is not very well developed in terms of 
entrepreneurial activity such as the one in which our research site is located, the 
collective knowledge of the environment is not sufficient to facilitate learning 
processes. Instead, experiential learning seems to take place. Interestingly, the team 
learns faster than the individual champion himself. However, real changes seem only 
to be possible when external factors cumulate and cause a shift in the organisation 
structure.      
 
Gaining understanding in entrepreneurial team formation during the spin-off process 
is particularly relevant for investors as well as technology transfer officers.  Research 
has shown that venture capitalists state that the quality of the founding team is one of 
the most important criteria when they decide to invest in a start-up. High tech spin-
offs, especially academic spin-offs, tend to be founded mostly by homogenous teams 
including only engineers. Often, one of these engineers is acting as a champion and 
perceives himself as a future CEO of the company. CINE’s team clearly coalesced 
around technical competence and interest. "Getting along" was very important. 
Venture capitalists tend to react against these start-ups in two ways: either they look 
for a CEO themselves and change the founding team drastically before investing or 
they do not invest at all. The second solution results in a number of valuable, potential 
business proposals that are lost. The first measure often results into harsh tensions 
between the newcomers and the initial team, and is thus seldom easily accepted by the 
original founders. Moreover, most CEO’s with business experience do not establish 
the “technical authority” needed to run a team of engineers. The most straightforward 
solution for venture capitalists seems to be the most exceptional one: someone in the 
entrepreneurial team has management capacities and becomes a CEO of the company. 
As shown in the paper, this is not necessarily the champion of the business plan. It can 
even be an engineer added to the team upon suggestion of the financial investor. The 
major lesson here is that the new individual has a technical role in the start-up and 
does not act as a CEO since the initial team only accepts the idea of a newcomer as a 
CEO once they clearly experienced the incapability of their “friend” as a “boss”. It 
seems thus a good idea, from a team efficiency perspective, to start a company – with 
a small amount of capital – in order to let the team members find their respective roles 
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in the independent company. Once everyone accepts his strengths and weaknesses and 
agrees with the structure, the company is ready for a capital increase. 
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III. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS OF SCIENCE-
BASED ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS: THE CASE OF IMEC11 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study takes an institutional perspective on spinning off ventures as a venue for 
commercialising research. The central question dealt with is the following: are the 
resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding 
influenced by the way in which technology transfer is organised at the parent 
organisation? We have selected a research institute known for its international 
research excellence and with a track record in spinning off ventures: IMEC (Leuven, 
Belgium). We questioned all senior managers involved in technology transfe r and the 
founders of all science-based entrepreneurial ventures set up between 1987 and 2002. 
The basic argument of the research is that changes in the internal institutional 
environment -- and the technology transfer policy in particular – goes together with a 
changing overall tendency in the amount of resources endowed to the science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. More specifically, we identify three generations of IMEC 
ventures displaying the main organisational changes in technology transfer policies 
and showing distinct resource characteristics at time of founding. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
How do institutional practices change? Researchers from different perspectives on 
organisations have directly or indirectly addressed this aspect of organisational reality. 
The question is important because it points to whether and how organisational order is 
maintained. The primary objective of this paper is to address this issue at the 
organisational level, in the context of a research institute’s technology transfer 
policies with regard to new science-based entrepreneurial firms (SBEF). More 
specifically, we investigate the interplay between changes in the micro institutional 
technology transfer policies regarding SBEF and the resources endowed to these 
companies. We also reflect to what extent this matters in terms of the social - 
economic role these companies play today.  
Although different authors have proposed stage models providing insight in the 
dynamically interrelated activities connected to spinning off ventures (Vohora, Wright 
and Lockett, 2004; Clarysse and Moray, 2004), only few have looked into the 
                                                                 
11 We want to gratefully acknowledge the help and support of numerous persons during this research. We thank 
Johan Van Helleputte, Ludo Deferm, André Vinck, Herman Maes, Bénédicte Haven and Bart Van Bael for sharing 
their knowledge about IMEC, the spin out policies and disclosing the evolution of the capitalization of the IMEC 
starters. Without sharing their experience and reflections about past, present and future this study would not have 
been possible. Thanks to Els Van De Velde for her help in collecting the survey data from the IMEC start-ups. 
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specifics of internal strategies enacted by the research institute and how this 
influences the commercialisation of research results by setting up ventures (Markman, 
2003; see for example Clarysse, Wright, Lockett et al., forthcoming). Through an 
historical process analysis, this study extensively documents the organisational level 
institutional changes regarding the spin-off policies of one research institute, IMEC, 
since its inception in 1984 up to 2003. Although these changes need to be partly 
understood in their broader environmental context, our objective is specifically to 
investigate the link between these organisational changes and the resources endowed 
to new SBEF.  
IMEC, the Inter University Micro Electronics Centre (Leuven, Belgium) has evolved 
significantly in its technology transfer policies over the years and has set up 23 new 
ventures up to 2002. Selecting one case for this topic is appropriate because tackling 
the question of interest requires a detailed intra organisational understanding of the 
processes involved. Moreover, researchers have successfully used single sites studies 
to increase understanding about particular issues related to technology transfer and 
spinning out ventures (e.g.: Shane and Stuart, 2002, studying MIT spin-offs and Jacob 
et al., 2003, studying Chalmers University of Technology). IMEC has evolved to 
Europe's leading independent research centre in the field of microelectronics, nano-
technology, enabling design methods and technologies for ICT systems. Studying a 
centre of excellence is particularly useful because several researchers have argued that 
the successful commercialisation of technology and the emergence of new firms very 
often happens in close co-operation with organisations where top science is being 
performed (see for example the work of Zucker and Darby, 1996, 1998). 
In the realm of spinning off ventures from research results two institutional templates 
coexist. The public research sector – which is an important source of research and 
technological opportunities – is largely taken for granted, and often largely mindlessly 
enacted. However, the private sector template, and the entrepreneurial process 
entailing the emergence of new ventures is often argued to function as an efficient 
market model, leading to the rational acquisition of sets of resources. This study 
attempt brings together these two realms in the context of creating SBEF. More 
specifically, we want to increase understanding as to how changes in institutional 
technology transfer policies co-shape the resources going to firms established to 
exploit research results.  
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To anchor the scope of our investigation, we frame questions from three perspectives, 
each representing subsequent steps in addressing the problem of interest: How is the  
process of spinning off ventures organised within a public research institute? How did 
this process change over time? Do the nature and the origin of resources going to the 
science-based entrepreneurial firms co-evolve with changes in technology transfer 
policies made by the parent institute? Using interviews and secondary data sources we 
reconstructed the life history of the institute’s commercialisation trajectory. Several 
researchers have used historical analysis successfully in the study of institutions and 
institutional change (Cusumano, 1995; Leblebici, 1991; Sini and David, 2003).  
 
The remainder of the paper unfolds along the following lines. First, we discuss the 
context of science-based entrepreneurial firms from public research institutions in 
Europe and point to the importance of studying the interplay between the micro-
institutional environment and the ventures that emerged from these. Second, we 
discuss the research and methodology of the study. Third, we present the data and 
findings. We position IMEC in the Flemish landscape of public research 
organisations, describe in detail the spin-off process as it is organised in IMEC and 
argue that three generations of science-based entrepreneurial ventures can be 
distinguished according to different eras in the management of technology transfer. 
 
2. CONTEXT: SCIENCE-BASED ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS FROM EUROPEAN PROS 
 
Since the mid-nineties, European public research organisations have been increasingly 
involved in commercialising their research results and spinning off new ventures 
(OECD, 1998; Purvis, 2002). More specifically, generating new companies has been 
viewed as an alternative to licensing and contract research. However, one caveat in 
many studies on science-based entrepreneurial firms has been the lack of a clear 
definition. In practice, science-based entrepreneurial firms often denote all the 
ventures that are “listed” as having emerged from public research organisations. 
However, these listings often include firms with different types of links with 
university or the research institute at time of setting up the firm. Roberts (1991, 103-
107) already described the large variety in the high technology entrepreneurial firms 
that emerged from MIT. More specifically, he rated the importance of technology 
transferred to the new firm, representing the degree of dependence on source 
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technologies: direct, partial and vague 12. In these categories learned technology is 
unquestionably important; the difference is only in degree. In the first two categories, 
the company would not have been started without the formal transfer of Intellectual 
Property Rights; either from the parent institute or from another source of know-how. 
These categories represent the (IP based) spin-offs. These companies received a 
formal transfer of technology by means of a license agreement in return for royalties 
or IP in return for equity. The category “vague” represents those companies that are 
categorised as spin-off by the parent institute for other reasons than transferred 
technology. Following the UNICO/NUBS (2003) classification we label the latter 
category of firms academic “start-ups”: the firms based on know how developed at the 
PRO without formal transfer of technology. It is possible however, that the PRO has 
an equity stake through the provision of capital. The start-ups clearly use source 
learned (but often non protected and non formally transferable) knowledge and/or 
technologies. 
We can find at least two major reasons why the formation of new companies – start-
ups and spin-offs alike -- has become much more central to the mission of PROs. 
First, the creation of new enterprises is increasingly being used as a performance 
indicator for evaluating public investment in PROs. Second, the ‘hausse’ in the stock 
markets at the end of the nineties and, related, a number of extremely successful trade 
sales has attracted the attention of the management of these public research 
organisations. Professional organisations such as ASTP 13 have repeatedly presented 
best practice examples of spin-offs as significant sources of income for public 
research organisations. 
Because of the perceived increase in importance to commercialise technology, 
universities, national laboratories and other research organisations receiving 
significant public research funds started to develop internal systems to support this. 
These systems comprise activities such as the management of contract research, the 
protection of intellectual property, the negotiation of licenses and the support of 
independent start-ups. The development of procedures and systems to support and 
stimulate the creation of independent start-ups is in line with the contemporary notion 
                                                                 
12 Since Roberts (1991) studied high technology entrepreneurship generically, he also included a category “none” 
to capture the firms that were set up apart from knowledge acquired during a research process in the context of the 
university (e.g. MIT graduates that started a car repair shop). 
13 ASTP = Association of European science and technology transfer professionals. See 
http://www.astp.net 
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of science-based entrepreneurship, which is shifting from serendipitous and individual 
to being perceived as social and organised (Jacob et al., 2003). At the same time, the 
development of such procedures evokes the question of imprinting, dealt with in 
institutional theory. New firms founded to exploit intellectual property emerging from 
science are typically embedded in a parent organisation, bringing about its own 
culture, rules and procedures. In this perspective, institutional theorists argue that 
emerging firms build internal consistencies that are in alignment with their 
institutional context (Dacin, 1997). Intuitively, isomorphic forces might even be 
especially true in new ventures, which typically have a limited resource base: science-
based entrepreneurial firms may incorporate legitimating structural elements in order 
to gain the legitimacy needed and to attract the necessary resources.  
 
Concurrently to the development of this stream of thought, researchers have also 
urged to depart from their focus on organisations as tightly bounded entities, shifting 
their attention to the surrounding environment. However, ever since, a long debate has 
been going on among researchers whether it is strategic choice or environmental 
forces alone that are most important in creating new businesses (Venkataraman, 
1997). Increasingly, researchers have viewed the degree of fit between the 
entrepreneurial efforts and environmental forces as crucial in the successful 
development of new businesses. Authors have suggested that these two perspectives 
are two ends of a continuum, which are interdependent and interacting, and theoretical 
and empir ical work has been performed in this direction (e.g. Goodstein, 1994).  
Similar efforts have also been applied to the study of new ventures (e.g. Gersick 1994; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990).  
 
Some researchers have undertaken some steps in studying the organisational 
institutional context in which technology transfer activities take place. For instance, 
Bercovitz et al (2000) looked at the effect of institutional structures and policies on 
the patenting and licensing behaviour. Di Gregorio and Shane (2002) related the 
institutional determinants with the spin out rate of (public) research organisations. 
These institutional determinants include, among others, characteristics relating to 
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reward systems, entrepreneurial / academic culture, IP policies and the overall 
organisational structure of the research organisation.  
 
In this paper, we want to go one step further and look at how institutional changes 
influence the resource endowments of ventures that are set up to exploit research 
results. Since the value chain of technology transfer by spinning off science-based 
entrepreneurial firms encompasses different parties -- scientists, technology transfer 
personnel, senior administrators and the founders of the companies – we employ a 
dual case study methodology (Leonard-Barton, 1990), combining historical and 
prospective case analysis. Based on 40 face-to-face interviews, 20 standardised 
questionnaires, archival searches and a database with evolutionary financial data 
about the companies, we analyse three interrelated issues. How the spin-off process is 
organised, how this changed over time, and finally, if these institutional changes have 
an impact on the resources endowed to the science-based entrepreneurial firms at time 
of founding.  
The remainder of the paper discusses subsequently the research design and methods 
employed and the data and the findings of the study. We also point to the implications 
of the study. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
We have selected a research institute known for its research excellence and with a 
well-established track record in spinning out ventures: The Interuniversity Institute for 
Microelectronics (IMEC, (Leuven, Belgium). Over the years, IMEC has developed a 
pro-active and professional technology transfer and spin-off policy. It has been shown 
that new science-based entrepreneurial firms are most often started in the proximity of 
or from within research institutes with an excellent research base (e.g. Zucker et al., 
1998). Therefore, it makes most sense to select an institute with sufficient critical 
mass regarding the issue of interest. Data collection is performed at different levels 
and using a mix of techniques, avoiding common method bias. Using archival data 
sources, standardised questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, we collected 
regional data on spin out activity, data about technology transfer policies and data 
about the science-based entrepreneurial ventures that emerged from the institute since 
1991. These data collection efforts resulted in a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative data, allowing triangulation (Jick, 1979). Our overall methodological 
perspective is a dual case study method (Leonard-Barton, 1990) focusing at the data 
level on historical analysis. The remainder of this section elaborates on the research 
site and the methods employed. 
 
3.1. Research site 
In 1982 the Flemish Government set up a comprehensive program in the field of 
microelectronics to strengthen the microelectronics industry in Flanders (Belgium). 
This program included the establishment of a laboratory for advanced research in 
microelectronics (IMEC), the establishment of a semiconductor foundry and the 
organisation of a training program (now INVOMEC & MTC). IMEC was founded in 
1984 as a non-profit organisation led by Prof. R. Van Overstraeten and under the 
supervision of a Board of Directors, with delegates from industry, Flemish 
universities and the Flemish Government. Today, IMEC is Europe's leading 
independent research centre in the field of microelectronics, nanotechnology, enabling 
design methods and technologies for ICT systems14. The research organisation’s 
principal mission is "to perform R&D, ahead of industrial needs by 3 to 10 years”.  
The research budget of a research institute as well as the patent activity, are two 
important indicators to position the magnitude of technology transfer. Despite the 
weak economical situation and the severe downturn of the telecom and semi-
conductor industry since 200115, IMEC’s self generated income in 2002 increased by 
15% up to € 105 million or 76% of the institution’s total budget (€ 138 million). 
Almost half of this research happens with International Industrial Partners and about a 
third with Flemish Industrial Partners. The remaining 24% of the total budget comes 
as a subsidy from the Flemish Government. 
                                                                 
14 www.imec.be 
15 www.imec.be/wwwinter/mediacenter/en/generalassembly2002.shtml; accessed May 2003. 
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Figure 3 shows that the patent activity has increased significantly since the mid-
nineties. Research in an “IP mode” has increasingly become the core of IMEC’s 
activities. 
Figure 3: Patent Activity at IMEC 
Source: Robeyns and Van helleputte (2003) 
 
From its inception in 1984, IMEC pursued being an internationally recognised centre 
of excellence in microelectronics. To achieve this goal, the institute has been 
participating in a multitude of collaborative efforts, including European R&D 
programs, European Networks and collaboration with leading-edge companies and 
R&D organisations in Flanders and internationally. In 1991, a new business model 
was introduced to manage R&D partnerships: IMEC’s Industrial Affiliation Program 
(IIAP). This model of joint R&D partnerships is based on shared costs and risks while 
expertise, talent and IP are brought together. This concept is now recognised world-
wide, as one of the most successful international partnership models for research on 
next generation technologies addressing generic industrial problems in fields of rapid 
technological change. 
With 85% of IMEC’s 1263 staff members actively involved in R&D, IMEC has 
developed strategic know-how ("background information"), a unique business model 
of managing industrial relations (intellectual property), visionary research programs 
and world-wide networking (Jaarverslag, 2002). Over the years, this centre has 
developed a professional technology transfer policy, including rules and procedures 
for establishing SBEF. Up to 2002, IMEC has set up 23 ventures, of which 20 since 
1991.  
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3.2. Data collection and methods 
We deliberately choose to use a wide range of data collection methods because 
looking at the interaction between institutional changes in spin-off policies and the 
SBEF generated from the PRO involves a multitude of actors, inherently requiring a 
combination of different data sources and methods. First, we collected data on the rate 
of establishment of SBEF from other PROs in the region16. We found this was crucial 
since this study is in its pure form “one case”. Although in “single” case studies 
analytical generalisation is of primary importance – instead of statistical 
generalisation – these regional data allow contextualising the findings and 
discernment about the scope of analytical generalisation. We position IMEC to other 
PROs in Flanders in terms of its relative importance in technology transfer indicators, 
setting up ventures from their research base and the extent to which start-ups versus 
spin-offs are generated. Second, we have interviewed all senior managers involved in 
technology transfer policies at IMEC. The interviews took place in 2002 and 2003 and 
the persons interviewed have significant experience in the organisation in general and 
in business development and technology transfer activities in particular (>10-15 
years). Key issue in these interviews was to gain insight in the magnitude of 
technology transfer activities and how the spin out trajectory is positioned in the 
broader research commercialisation strategy. We also asked the respondents to 
explain how this strategy evolved over time. Third, we collected some numeric 
institutional data that have been widely recognised as informative when drawing 
inferences about the nature and the magnitude of technology transfer related activities. 
Different indicators are of particular interest: research budget, patent applications, 
revenues generated from license agreements, amount of companies set up from 
research results, …  
Fourth, we interviewed one or more representatives (founder and/or CEO) of the 20 
science-based entrepreneurial firms that emerged from the institute since 1991. Face 
to face interviews at the premises of the venture helped us to understand the 
organisational context. During these 1,5 hour interviews, attention was given to the 
start-up history of the firm in terms of technology transfer from IMEC, the inventors 
involved, how capital was attracted and how the company evolved since then. Fifth, 
                                                                 
16 We updated data collected by Clarysse et al. (2003) in a study on Spin outs in Flanders. We add to this effort by 
complementing the list of academic starters, distinguishing between academic start-ups and academic spin-outs 
and complementing the data on the capital these companies attracted at time of start up. 
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we performed more detailed process studies of 3 spin-offs, to better understand the 
dynamics of venture formation and development as it is embedded in this particular 
research organisation. One venture was prospectively studied over a period of 20 
months, by interviewing the 3 founders over a 15-month period. The company entered 
the incubation phase in December 2001 and was formally set up in February 2002. 
Two ventures (both set up in 1996) were studied retrospectively by interviewing the 
persons involved in the start-up process17. We deliberately decided to select a 
successful exit and a failed company that were established in the same year, to control 
for broader environmental / economic conditions. Finally, in order to understand the 
resource conditions of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding and 
how this evolved over time, we surveyed the ventures using a structured, standardised 
instrument. Data on the financial resources at time of founding and evolution of the 
capitalisation, the human resources in the firm and the maturity of the technology are 
collected.  
 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the different data sources and the respective methods. 
 
 
Table 5: Overview of Data Collection at IMEC 
 Face to Face Interviews  
(N = 40) 
Standardized 
Survey 
(N=20) 
 
Secondary sources 
PRO 
IMEC Management 
9 UNICO/NUBS 
TTO survey 
Press releases, Year 
reports, IMEC website 
Science-based 
entrepreneurial firms 
(20 since 1991) 
Total: 31 Total: 20 Longitudinal 
database of financial 
data of 23 companies 
2 spin-offs set up in 1996 8 Standardized 
survey 
Press releases, Year 
reports, company 
website 
1 spin-off set up in 2002  6 Standardized 
survey 
Press releases, 
Company website 
17 other SBEF 17 Brief phone survey 
and standardized 
survey 
Press releases, 
Company websites, 
Year reports 
 
 
                                                                 
17 One of those companies achieved a successful trade sale to a large corporate technology company in 2001. The 
other company failed in 1999, after it did not succeed attracting Venture Capital. 
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4. DATA AND FINDINGS 
 
This section presents the data and the main findings of the study. First, we briefly 
position IMEC to other PROs in Flanders. Second, we hone in on how IMEC’s spin 
out trajectory is structured and how it evolved over time. Third, we compare the 
IMEC starters with other science-based entrepreneurial firms and high tech start-ups 
in Flanders, in terms of start capital, founding team and technology development at 
time of founding. Fourth, we argue that three generations of IMEC ventures can be 
distinguished, mirroring the way organisational technology transfer policies evolved. 
 
4.1.  Science-based entrepreneurial firms in Flanders 
 
The budget for Science, Technology and Innovation in Flanders amounts to 1322 
million € in 2003, 57% of which is geared towards R&D activities (compared to 49% 
in 1996). The Flemish PROs – the universities and research institutes -- rely 
significantly on government financing for their activities either directly through 
subsidies or contract research. Moreover, since the mid-nineties there is an increasing 
attention for technology transfer activities. This trend was formalised in a number of 
university decrees that put the return and services to society equally high on the 
agenda of universities as education and research18. Moreover, since 1998 the PRO 
legally owns the IP generated from research19 and government started subsidising the 
interface services. In this context, PROs set up seed capital funds to facilitate 
investments in science-based entrepreneurial firms and interface services worked 
towards professionalising their activities. In Flanders, there are 9 Public Research 
Organisations, of which 3 are research institutes and 6 are universities. Siegel et al. 
(2003), identified a number of input indicators related to university – industry 
technology transfer, internal to the research organisation: invention disclosures (a 
proxy for the set of available technologies), labour employed by the Technology 
Transfer Office (TTO), and the legal fees incurred to protect the university’s IP. Table 
6 gives an overview of these input indicators for all the Flemish PROs. 
                                                                 
18 Decree of February, 22,  1995 (B.S. 19 juli 1995) 
19 University decree of August, 29, 1998,  art 103 (B.S. 29 augustus 1998); Cfr. Bayh-Dole Act in the US in 1980 
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Table 6: Characteristics of Research-Industry Technology Transfer in Flemish Public Research 
Organisations 
 
The Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) and IMEC are the largest research 
organisations in terms of research expenditure, the size of the technology transfer 
office and the science-based entrepreneurial firms generated from their knowledge 
base. Together, they account for 54% of the science-based entrepreneurial firms 
generated in Flanders between 1991 and 2002. Not surprisingly, it are exactly these 
two institutions that set the professionalisation trend among the interface services in 
Flanders. In total, 93 science-based entrepreneurial firms emerged from Flemish 
universities and  research institutes from 1991 to 2002. The majority of these firms are 
spin-offs (56% or 52 companies). Given IMEC’s importance as a research institute in 
terms of research budget, liaisons with local as well as international industry, 
researchers employed and spin outs generated, IMEC is of high interest to the region 
as well as internationally.  
 
Different authors have suggested that public research organisations differ significantly 
in relative productivity in transferring technology to industry and tha t studying the 
organisational practices in PROs management of IP would be a useful complement to 
studies focusing on numeric variation amongst institutes (Siegel et el. 2003; Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2002). The next section elaborates in detail on the techno logy 
transfer practices related to spinning out new ventures in IMEC. 
 
Age of
TTO
(years)
Research
Expenditure,
K€
N TTO
employees (new
ventures)
External legal
fees for IP
protection, K€
Invention
Disclosures
N academic
ventures 1991 - 2002
Research
Institutes
Spin offs / Start Ups
IMEC 9 136707 42 (12) 1600 103 14 / 6
VIB 7 52000 10 (1) 3 / 0
VITO 8 45000 19 (0) 180 0 0 / 1
Universities
KUL 32 183000 23 (3,5) 9 21 / 17
UGent 4 75902 3 (1) 400 25 2 / 12
VUB 5 48000 5,5 (2,5) 120 25 9 / 0
UA 4 44400 4 (3) 51 19 1 / 2
LUC 4 18700 1 (0,4) 2,5 0 3 / 2
KUB 0 816 0 0 0 0 / 0
Data for 2002
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4.2. The spin-off process at IMEC: a centrally led technology push model 
 
This section specifically sheds light on the spin-off process in IMEC and how it 
evolved over time. What is the decision making process and which structures does a 
potential project go through before it is actually spun off? Different activities of a 
proactive spin-off management process have been identified by Degroof (2002) and 
elaborated by Clarysse et al. (forthcoming). Following these authors’ 
conceptualisation, we discuss subsequently: (a) How IMEC has set up structures to 
enable the identification of technological opportunities. (b) How IMEC bridges the 
time between the identification of the opportunity and the start of the incubation 
phase. (c) The specifics of the incubation phase: which activities is IMEC actually 
engaged in? (d) The internal strategies towards IP assessment and transfer to the spin-
off. (e) How IMEC finances the commercialisation process. Interviewing each senior 
manager at IMEC, we used these activities to structure the data and ask the 
respondents to also provide an historical account of how the implementation of these 
activities evolved over time. Figure 4 serves as a roadmap throughout this section. 
Figure 4: The commercialisation process at IMEC by setting up science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. 
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a. Opportunity recognition 
The recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities has been identified as one of the 
central features in the study of entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 1999). 
How are these identified at IMEC? Since the mid nineties there is an increasing 
awareness at IMEC that knowing the pool of technological opportunities is a first step 
in the commercialisation process. Most recently, IMEC has been discussing 
opportunities to establish an Idea Board that has a technological orientation: what are 
the hot topics that are at most 3 years away from the application phase? Which 
industry standards are likely to be implemented? This Board wants to enable the 
proactive identification of new, potential intellectual property and ideas from a 
technological point of view. IMEC plans the establishment of this vehicle because 
they conclude that currently too small an amount of entrepreneurial ideas are brought 
to the fore. However, the commercial orientation of opportunity recognition for 
technology transfer in general and spinning off ventures in particular, seems to have a 
much longer history. Since business development Flanders started to exist as a formal 
structure and separate entity (1991), this division has undergone major changes and 
shifts in responsibilities. In the early years (1992-1993), business development was 
organised in its most generic form. Two persons, the heads of IMEC’s business 
development division, managed the commercialisation of research through setting up 
ventures. The most important shift happened in 1996-1997, when a separate 
“Incubation” cell was established. This cell moved a couple of times in the 
organisation structure of IMEC, showing that IMEC went through an important 
learning phase in the second half of the nineties as to where to position these 
“venturing activities”. 
Senior management of the different departments is still very much involved today in 
the “Sales Board”. This structure takes the form of a communication platform that 
brings together the heads of department from the Scientific Divisions, the Incubation 
and Industrialisation Division and the Business Development Department. These 
Sales Boards are specific for each scientific division (DESICS, MCP and SPDT) and 
meet every eight weeks to discuss overall business development opportunities: 
technological developments that can be structured in contract research through 
IMEC’s Industrial Affiliation Programme with industrial partners, licensing 
agreements or opportunities for establishing SBEF. Compared to the Idea Board, this 
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platform has a commercial orientation. An idea is considered appropriate for a spin-
off if the application phase is less than two-three years away and if IMEC can freely 
use the IP associated to the idea. Most of the time, this is an iterative process. If the 
Sales Board deems an idea or project feasible for spin-off creation, the project is 
administratively transferred to the division Incubation & Industrialisation (I&I). 
 
b. From first market analysis to incubation 
This phase during the spin out process as well as the actual incubation phase has 
gained momentum ever since a division ”Incubation” was set up (1996-1997). Since 
then, the department has professionalised its activities from an organisational and 
methodological perspective. Currently, the I&I Division is a team of 8 persons of 
which 3 persons are directly engaged in evaluating and supporting specific spin-off 
projects. A project manager, who performs a preliminary market analysis and IP 
evaluation, is assigned to an idea to assess the market potential of the idea. Each of 
these 8 business developers have a PhD in engineering / sciences and are assigned to a 
project based on their acquaintance with the project’s technology. The project leader 
performs a preliminary market analysis and a first evaluation of the intellectual 
property position. This evaluation phase takes 4-6 months and happens in 
collaboration with the inventors/researchers that are interested in commercialising the 
technology through a spin-off. The result of this evaluation is a “Go / No Go” 
decision: If it is decided that an idea cannot be structured in a spin-off (yet), the idea 
is sent back to the Sales Board with specific feedback. If the results of the market 
analyses are positive, the project manager writes an Incubation Plan, again in close 
collaboration with the researchers(s)/inventor(s). Different aspects are taken into 
account: the financial requirements, milestones in technology development, 
(temporary) strategy of the project to reach market maturity. Interesting during this 
stage is that the role of the researcher – entrepreneur remains limited. The market 
analysis seems to be primarily a technical and methodological process. Input from the 
market is very limited. Ideally, some experienced business developers could be 
involved or a series of interviews performed with specialists from potential 
(industrial) customers or partners. Also, at this point the Vice President (VP) of I&I 
will have a meeting with the patent office (structured in the department Business 
Development Division) to evaluate the use of Intellectual Property components by 
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other companies, including the extent of exclusivity. The Vice President of I&I co-
ordinates this. 
 
c. Incubation and business plan development 
Once a project enters the incubation phase, the researchers involved get separate 
offices on the IMEC Campus in order to start their first (commercial) activities. 
Depending on the particular case, an ‘Incubation Company’ is set up. Sometimes it 
may be important that the “incubated” project is set up as an independent company to 
attract subsidies for technology development and to gain legitimacy towards potential 
partners and / or clients. For the spin-offs established since 1999, this is always the 
case and also reflects an increasing structuring and visibility of the incubation process 
within IMEC.   
The spin-off project is managed as follows: First, there is operational support to 
develop the business plan. At the onset of the incubation phase the project leader of 
I&I passes the incubation plan on to his colleagues from the Enterprise Cell within the 
Financial Department (3 Full Time Equivalents). This Cell supports the project from a 
“corporate” perspective: juridical / IP matters, accounting and fiscal issues. Second, 
the project gets some strategic support. Although during this stage there is not a Board 
of Directors, the researchers – entrepreneurs are coached in the development of the 
company’s business model by a Steering Committee. This Committee meets monthly 
and consists of the Vice President and the Project Leader of I&I, the Vice President of 
the Financial Department, the Vice President Business Development and (one of) the 
inventors / researchers - entrepreneurs. During these meetings the progress of the 
company is discussed. Most of the time, the first concern is technology development 
to arrive at a workable alpha prototype. Related to specific technology milestones, 
these discussions also serve as a sounding board for the researchers – entrepreneurs to 
define the business model and commercial strategy. 
The technology driven character of the public research institute is also clearly 
reflected in the profile of the employees from the division Incubation and 
Industrialisation. Each of them has a strong scientific background, without or with 
very little commercial, industrial experience. The project leaders prepare the spin-offs 
and the activities during this process are developed via procedures and software 
packages. Consequently, the market analysis and the development of the business plan 
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have a strong methodological orientation. However, various studies argue that ‘trial 
and error’ is at the heart of defining the market in these early stages: a team of 
entrepreneurs / business developers introducing prototypes / products on the market 
incrementally and learning from the feedback of (potential) clients (Herstatt and Von 
Hippel, 1992). Enabling this requires that from very early in the commercialisation 
route individuals with complementary, commercial skills are recruited and that 
already during the opportunity recognition phase entrepreneurs – researchers in close 
contact with industrial partners are involved. Currently, the “external CEO’s” are 
recruited at best during the incubation phase, which is rather late from the perspective 
of developing the business model. Despite IMEC’s policy to attract experienced, 
external management for its SBEF, this has only happened in two companies within 
the year after founding.  
The incubation phase usually takes 12-18 months20 and should result into a venture 
capital investment in the “Incubation Company”. It is also at this time that the 
intellectual property is formally transferred to the spin-off and that the incubation 
costs are discounted. The Enterprise Cell follows up the company after external 
capitalisation and provides feedback to the Vice President of the Financial 
Department.  
 
d. Transfer of intellectual property:  
One of the most important shifts IMEC went through since the mid-nineties is an 
increasing focus on positioning IMEC as an international player through programme 
driven partnerships (Imec’s Industrial Affiliation Programme). The specific IPR 
policy of IMEC was a central facilitating factor in the internationalisation process. 
Moreover, it has led to an increase in intellectual property (“background 
information”) with new commercialisation routes in Flanders. Hence, IMEC is a 
research institute that wants to maximise the commercialisation of her intellectual 
property.  
 
In the context of spin-off companies, the valuation of the IP traditionally happened at 
the start of the incubation phase through a licensing agreement. Since 1999-2000, 
                                                                 
20 There is one particular company that, at the time of writing, entered the 24th month of incubation. Venture 
capitalists could not (yet) be convinced and IMEC decided the invest 1 million € in the company themselves. 
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IMEC stopped her non-exclusive and exclusive “licensing for royalties” strategy 
towards spin-offs and decided to move to a model based on the exchange of IPR for 
equity. The context for this change is that since the mid nineties IMEC increasingly 
wanted to manage the spin out process in a integrated way, instead of only focusing of 
the management of IP. With the change in approach to valorising IPR, the institutional 
incentive for exploiting the research has changed. In the first model, the incentive was 
‘income generation’ through royalties from licensing. The second model implies that 
IMEC spins off an existing research activity (and the corresponding revenues) and 
that the financial return is much more dependent on the success or failure of the new 
firm. Concurrently though, in a model based on IP for equity, venture capitalists 
require a maximum input of IP in return for their investment. This imposes a risk on 
IMEC of loosing a complete research stream: a “cash” and “brain” drain IMEC 
exactly wants to prevent. Fillfactory, for example, a spin-off established in 1999, was 
set up with the whole team of IMEC researchers working on CMOS imaging. An 
advantage here is that the company is profitable and growing.  
Moreover, given the economic downturn started in 2000-2001, VC’s are not willing to 
assign high values to IP from the start, since most of the IP’s potential remains to be 
proven. This introduces a conflict since it also essential that the full IP is brought into 
the company from the beginning in order to have freedom to operate. Therefore, 
IMEC has adopted a strategy in which the valuation of the IP happens in different 
phases21.  
 
It is a huge challenge for IMEC to address two broad goals: establishing SBEF AND 
maintaining momentum in its leading research streams, without jeopardising both 
parties. In its vein to keep a critical mass of know how and technology within IMEC, 
the research institute has developed a unique “Intellectual Property Fingerprint 
Model”. The model implies that the partner gets a unique “fingerprint” of IP from 
IMEC, including exclusive and non-exclusive components. The necessity and mix of 
each of the components is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Since the mid-nineties 
                                                                 
21 For example, in a first stage, a lower boundary is defined based on the historical costs incurred to 
develop and maintain the IP (e.g. 750 000 €). In the subsequent stages, the increase in IP valuation is 
connected to specific milestones until the ‘full value’ that has been negotiated between the parties has 
been reached (e.g. 1 500 000 €). The valuation of IP is performed within IMEC and the scientific 
division is compensated for the value of the IP at time of establishment of the spin out. 
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this model has worked well with IMEC’s corporate industrial partners, since it enables 
them to develop their own product line independently from each other, even in a 
environment where competition is fierce. IMEC wants to apply this model in the 
context of technology transfer to their spin-off companies. However, venture 
capitalists require exclusivity, which often means stopping the research activities in 
this particular domain.  
Applied to spin out companies, the “unique fingerprint” would be developed during 
the incubation phase. At the beginning the spin-off would receive non-exclusive 
licenses for all technologies they potentially need throughout incubation. After the 
incubation phase, ideally when a first injection of external capital takes place (VC, 
BA, corporate, …), exclusive licensing agreements would be negotiated for these 
technologies specific for the spin-off and for the developments, improvements made 
during this stage. To date, this model has not been applied yet for spin-offs.  
 
e. Funding process 
The financial environment has changed significantly since the early nineties and 
IMEC has attempted to follow the trends proactively. Since in Europe the venture 
capital industry and financial markets financing technologies in the (pre)seed stage 
were rather immature in the early nineties, the “funding gap” (see Cressy, 2002) was a 
major challenge facing science-based entrepreneurial firms. Thus, in order to deal 
with financial constraints, some European PROs increasingly set up seed capital funds 
to address the funding needs of projects they evaluated as promising technologies in 
their portfolio of contract research. In addition, this attention to the issue of finance 
was shared by governmental institutions through the provision of alternative sources 
of risk capital – i.e. governments creating their own (pre)seed funds.  
In the early years, the main financial partners for the science-based entrepreneurial 
firms were large, corporate firms. Also IMEC – and the universities from the 
associated labs – brought in a part of the capital. During the mid nineties venture 
capital in Europe had become a more legitimate source of funding for start-ups and 
late professor Van Overstraeten, championed the establishment of a venture capital 
fund called IT Partners in 1997, which would target the semiconductor industry. By 
setting up this IMEC “friendly” venture capital Fund, IMEC wanted to consider only 
those projects requiring capital in the range of € 750 000 - € 1 000 000. The 
management of ITP consists of former VC’s. The idea behind the establishment of IT 
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Partners was to meet the need for funding for the potential IMEC spin-off projects and 
to manage more professionally IMEC’s portfolio of participations. ITP only invests 
25-30% of the required capital and requires the ventures to attract complementary 
(VC) money.  
 
In 2000, IMEC decided to launch an Incubation Fund because of the increasing 
difficulty in securing venture capital for early-stage, high potential projects that have 
not yet made a working prototype or drafted a long-term business plan. IMEC’s 
Incubation Fund was established in October 2001 with € 5 million22 to stimulate new 
possible spin-off initiatives by providing the necessary (pre)seed capital to prepare 
prototype products and early market introductions during the incubation period. The 
Fund only considers project proposals based on IMEC technology. These proposals 
must include a first feasibility analysis of the idea, work plan and required budget. 
Once a project is approved by the Fund, budget is released for setting up a company 
dedicated to realise the project, work out an extensive business plan and attract the 
needed skills. Then, the venture should attract external capital to realise its business 
plan. Under the terms of the Fund, they may provide up to 60% of the required 
capital. Up to 1999 the cost of the incubation phase was completely incurred by 
IMEC. They fully carried the risk. Since then, the costs associated with the incubation 
phase (i.e. the physical infrastructure and administrative support) is discounted to the 
firm at the time a first round external investment takes place.  
The problem of the IMEC Incubation Fund seems to be a contradiction in terms: the 
Fund wants to meet the need for capital in early stage technology but also seems to be 
a bottleneck for the young companies. A first explanation for this is that the fund was 
confronted with much larger proposals than initially targeted: invest maximum 20% 
of the Fund in a project and up to 60% of the required capital23. Moreover, due to the 
small size of IMEC’s Incubation Fund, they could not secure (part of) the follow up 
financing for the incubated projects. Finding a lead investor for follow up financing is 
                                                                 
22 De financial partners are KBC Investco, Fortis Private Equity N.V., Software Holding & Finance N.V. and 
V.E.M. Chaudfontaine CVBA. 
23 This is because IT Partners formally has the right to invest up to 40% of the capital (postmoney, after 
which IP is brought in and VC’s stepped in) 
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practically impossible in the current financial – economic climate in Belgium, 
especially when the existing shareholder does not co-invest. Finally, IMEC’s IP 
policy is such that IP is only brought in at the time of external capitalisation, which 
makes negotiations with potential venture capitalists even harder. Currently, the 
Fund’s shareholders decided to shift the investment focus of the Fund to early stage 
investment, i.e. at the moment that IMEC brings in its IP and other Venture Capitalists 
step in24. IMEC is actively planning to set up a seed Fund (40-60 million €), in which 
the Incubation Fund could be absorbed25. 
  
4.3. Resource Endowments to IMEC ventures 
IMEC spun off its first venture in 1986 and up to 2002, 23 ventures were established. 
The majority of these firms are spin-offs (14). 
 
Table 7 provides an overview of the population of companies that originated from 
IMEC up to 200226. The majority of these firms are spin-offs (14). 
 
Table 7: Science-based entrepreneurial firms from IMEC 
Start-ups  Spin-offs 
1. Matrix (1987) (A: Cobrain) 
2. LCI SmartPen (1992) (B) 
3. Soltech (1989)  
4. JSR Electronics (1989) 
5. Easics (1991) (A: TransWitch) 
6. Destin (1992) (B) 
7. Alphabit (1992) (A: HP) 
8. Ansem (1998, with KUL) 
9. 3E (1999) 
1. C-Cam Technologies (1996) (B) 
2. Target Compiler Technologies (1996) 
3. Sirius communications (1996) (A: Agilent 
Technologies) 
4. Coware (1996) 
5. Frontier Design (1997) (MBO and A: 
Adelante Technologies) 
6. Oligosense (1998) 
7. Q-star test (1999) 
8. Fillfactory (1999) 
9. Septentrio (2000) 
10. Xenics (2000) 
11. Photovoltech (2001) 
12. Vivactis (2002) 
13. Loranet (2002) (B, as incubation company) 
14. Acunia / SmartMove (1996) (B) 
B = Bankrupt; A = Acquired; MBO = Management Buy Out 
 
 
                                                                 
24 In total, the Fund invested about 1.2 million € in 2 projects.  
25 The first closing of fund raising is planned during the third quarter of 2004. 
26 In 2003, 4 other spin outs were in the incubation phase at IMEC: Magwel, Andel Systems NV, 
PowerEscape Inc. and Gemidis. These firms had not started business yet at the time of questioning the 
IMEC representatives and the spin-offs’ founders / CEOs (January – August 2003). 
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Table 8 gives an overview of some characteristics of these companies in terms of 
financial resources (capital after 12-18 months), the human resources (number of 
founders and employees) and the technology resources (the maturity of the technology 
at time of founding). Resource based scholars have traditionally pointed to these three 
types of resources as significant assets (Barney, 1996; Heirman and Clarysse, 2003). 
We compare the SBEF that emerged from IMEC to other Flemish SBEF (Moray, 
2004) and other high tech start-ups (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) set up from 1991 up 
to 2002. 
 
Table 8: Resource endowments to IMEC ventures at time of founding compared to other science-
based entrepreneurial firms and high tech start-ups in Flanders27 
 
  SBEF FROM 
IMEC 
 OTHER 
SBEF 1 
 OTHER 
HIGH TECH 
START-UPS 2 
 
CHARACTERISTICS MEASURES DATA 
 
N DATA N DATA N 
Capital after 12-18 
months (K €) (*) 
Mean 
Median 
St.dev. 
Min-max 
1957,2 
671,8 
2585,8 
75 – 9940 
20 688,5 
198,3 
1362,4 
3 – 6000 
57 234,1 
61,5 
713 
0,1 – 5000  
120 
Number of founders 28 
(*) 
 
Mean 
Median 
Min-Max 
3 
3 
0-11 
19 2,6 
3 
1 – 7 
56 1,8 
1,5 
0 – 6 
120 
Number of employees 
at time of founding 
Mean 
Median 
St.dev. 
Min-Max 
5 
3,5 
6 
0 – 25 
19 3,3 
3 
3 
0 – 16 
55 4 
2 
10 
0 – 101 
121 
Maturity of technology 
(0-3)29 
Median 
Min-Max 
1 
0 – 3 
20 1 
0 – 3 
55 0 
0 – 3 
121 
(*) Differences between groups significant at p < 0,01(Kruskall Wallis test) 
 
1. Moray (2004), IN: Clarysse, 2004 
2. HITO Database, Steunpunt Ondernemingen, Ondernemerschap en Innovatie 
 
 
The average SBEF from IMEC established since 1991 raises almost 2 million € of 
capital within 12-18 months after founding. If we take the three firms into account 
established before 1991, the average capital is 1,6 million €. This is significantly 
higher than the other science-based entrepreneurial ventures and high tech start-ups 
                                                                 
27 For the other high tech start ups, we use the definition of ‘research based start ups’ as conceptualised 
and sampled by Heirman and Clarysse (2004).  
28 Founders are the persons who have a hands-on function in the company AND/OR who have equity at time of 
formal incorporation.  
29 Measured on 0 - 3 scale: idea phase (0), alpha prototype: proof of concept; the technological idea works in a lab 
environment (1),  beta prototype:  prototype that works in a real life environment (2) and market ready product (3).  
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established in the same region and time period. About 7 IMEC ventures attracted 
venture capital at founding or within the 12-18 months after founding; 4 of those were 
incorporated in 1999 or later. Moreover, Coware, established in 1996, is the only 
IMEC spin-off that received US venture capital (from a Boston based VC firm). Thus, 
16 IMEC starters were not VC backed at the onset of their activities. A group of 
IMEC starters received the majority of their founding capital from large corporate 
firms (N=9). The other companies were financed either by IMEC (or IMEC’s 
Incubation Fund since 2001) and individual, private investors (N=7). If we look at the 
human resources with which the venture starts, i.e. the number of founders and the 
number of employees the IMEC ventures seem to start-up with larger founder teams. 
Looking at the maturity of technology, IMEC ventures are generally set up as legal 
entities at the time an alpha prototype is nearly ready (score 1 = alpha prototype). At 
time of founding, they still needed 1-3 years of product development before reaching 
the product stage. However, 8 firms were set up with a technology still in the idea 
phase.  
 
The previous section sets out that the SBEFs from IMEC display rather unique 
resource characteristics compared to other science-based entrepreneurial ventures and 
high tech start-ups established in the same region and period. Since IMEC has 
developed its technology transfer and incubation activities significantly over the 
years, we investigated if changes in these activities co-evolve with the nature of the 
resources endowed to the science-based entrepreneurial firms. 
 
4.4. The interconnectedness of institutional context and resource endowments: 
Three generations of science-based entrepreneurial firms at IMEC 
 
 
Following the evolution within IMEC regarding the transfer of IP and the investment 
policy, we distinguish “three generations” of science-based entrepreneurial firms at 
IMEC. The first generation of starters runs up to 1995. The second generation of 
companies are those firms established in the period 1996-1998. From 1999 onwards, a 
third generation emerges. These “generations” are conceptualised based on their level 
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of financial, technological and human resources at time of founding. For the financial 
resources, we both look at the founding capital and the capital the ventures were able 
to attract within the first 12 – 18 months. This is important, since legal founding is in 
some cases only a vehicle to raise credibility and only requires a legal minimum 
capital to be injected. For the technological resources we discern whether or not 
technology was transferred formally (start-up vs spin out) and the maturity of the 
technology, adopting Roberts’ scale (1991) from basic research (1) becoming 
increasingly developmental (8) until alpha prototype (9)30. Although on average 
IMEC ventures are set up with an alpha prototype ready, we wanted to be able to 
measure the maturity in more detail before technology development reached that 
stage. We also add some detail in evaluating the human resources. There is a general 
consensus that investors often emphasise the quality of the human resources more 
than other factors as they make investment decisions (e.g. Cyr et al., 2000). At least 
two issues are of crucial importance in terms of establishing a critical mass of human 
resources in a high tech firm: the researchers developing the technology and 
professional management. Clearly, researchers acquainted with the technology are 
important intangible assets since the legitimacy of the technology often resides in its 
intellectual carrier(s), but they often need to be complemented with professional 
business developers. Therefore, we also looked at the extent IMEC researchers were 
involved in the science-based entrepreneurial firm and the number of external 
managers attracted in the venture within 12 months after founding.  
                                                                 
30 We decided to use another measurement scale as compared to table 8, to gain more insight in the 
diversity in technological maturity among the SBEFs from IMEC. Since half of the firms start activities 
without an alpha prototype, we believe it was interesting to understand the relative positioning of the 
these companies in technological maturity (1-8; 9 represents an alpha prototype). 
Table 9 provides an overview of the resources at time of founding of the three 
generations of science-based entrepreneurial firms. 
Table 9: Resource endowments of three generations of IMEC ventures at time of founding 
1987-1995
(N=7)
1996-1998
(N=8)
1999-2002
(N=8)
Financials
(mean, K€)
Founding
capital
457 293 1621
Capital after 12-
18 months * 594 1163 3026
Technology
(median) Maturity 9 7 5
Involvement
inventor 3 5 5
People
(median)
N founders 3 4 4
Mean
experience
founders
(years)
17,5 35,8 41
FTE employees 2 3 4,5
N External
management 0 0 0
N IMEC
researchers in
company
1,5 1,5 4
* Difference between groups significant at p< 0,05 (Kruskall Wallis test) 
 
a. First Generation: 1986 – 1995 
For all the companies established up to 1995, IMEC only brought in (a limited 
amount of) cash. The main source of external capital, were incumbent firms. 
Especially interesting is that these firms’ capital levels did not raise significantly after 
18 months. Moreover, IMEC did not have much experience in setting up companies 
and it was difficult to evaluate the concrete capital needs. As a result, some of these 
firms – all academic start-ups -- were largely undercapitalised. Destin for example 
was set up in 1992 with 75 000 €. The company specialised in developing high 
resolution test equipment for electronic components. The first years, Destin generated 
revenues by selling services and projects to large microelectronics companies. From 
the start the company was operationally break even and managed to realise small 
profits. Revenues increased from 100 000 € in 1993 to more than 800 000 € in 1999. 
At that moment, Destin was ready to introduce a set of products to the market. It was 
crucial to attract capital in order to realise the growth potential of the firm. Since 
different attempts for capital increase failed, the board of directors decided to 
liquidate the firm. Destin was officially liquidated at the end of 2000. 
 101 
Most of the companies set up during this era were based on a clear need from a 
corporate firm. As a result, most of these firms had a working alpha prototype ready at 
the time they started their business activities (9 represents an alpha prototype). Only 
few IMEC researchers joined the start-up (on average 1,5 full time equivalents). 
From the 7 start-ups established up to 1992 (from 1993 up to 1995 no science-based 
entrepreneurial firms were set up), only 1 is still in operation as an independent entity 
today (Soltech). 4 companies have been acquired (UCB Electronics, Matrix/Cobrain, 
Alphabit en Easics) and 2 went bankrupt (LCI SmartPen en Destin). Easics for 
example was set up in 1992, acquired by TransWitch in 2001 and now operates as an 
R&D subsidiary.  
 
b. Second Generation: 1996-1998 
During the early nineties, IMEC went through some major changes in the organisation 
of her business development activities. The introduction of IMEC’s Industrial 
Affiliation Programme was a prominent change. This professionalisation trend in 
industrial liaisons affected the way IMEC set up new ventures: during this era IMEC 
increasingly grows attentive for bringing in IP in the firms. We observe a careful shift 
to the transfer of IP through licensing agreements, but IMEC does not engage in this 
effort (yet) in a systematic way. Of the 8 firms established from 1996 to 1998, 3 are 
spin-offs (i.e.: IP based) and also received some start capital from IMEC (Oligosense, 
C-Cam Technologies en Coware NV). IMEC brought in only cash in the 5 other firms 
at the start of their activities. In most cases though, license agreements were 
negotiated during the lifetime of the start-up. 
We observe a significant increase of the capital that the second-generation IMEC 
starters can attract during the first 12 – 18 months. The average company established 
during this time started operations with 293 000 €, whereas after 12-18 months the 
capital level increases up to more than 1 million €. The fact that this generation of 
firms can attract additional capital can be explained by the overall shift from industrial 
capital providers to seed capital funds, business angels and venture capitalists as main 
sources of capital for the first round of external financing. Apparently, these firms 
needed to ‘survive’ the first 18 months with low levels of capital and prove the 
workability of an alpha prototype, in order to convince investors to bring in the 
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required capital. Although IT Partners was set up during this period, the Venture 
Capital Fund did not invest in any “second generation spin-off” at time of start-up31.  
The founders setting up these ventures seem to have more cumulative sector and 
business experience than their colleagues from the first generation starters have (36 
years compared to 17 years). In addition, the inventor or principal investigator that 
triggered the initial research is in most cases part of the core management team (CEO 
or CTO) (score = 5). 
 
c. Third Generation: 1999-2002 
The third generation starters are characterised by the fact that all but one are spin-offs 
whereas during the first era only start-ups could be noted and the second generation 
showed a balanced mix of start-ups and spin-offs. Additionally, these firms seem to 
start business activities with a less mature technology (score 5, compared to 7 and 9 in 
the two previous generations. This evolution clearly reflects the increasing technology 
push model adopted by IMEC. We can expect that the IMEC spin-offs will be 
formally incorporated in an earlier phase through internal capitalisation (via 
FIDIMEC – IMEC Holding managing the bulk of participations since 2000 – or via 
the new seed fund). This should enable the spin-offs to get easier access to EU/ESA 
and project financing from the Flemish government. From 1999, the IP policy of 
IMEC gets up to speed: IP is brought into the spin-off for equity. Also, the incubation 
costs / investments from are discounted at the time an external capitalisation takes 
place. 
IMEC researchers that were involved in the research project are more prone to join 
the company, instead of remaining an employee at IMEC. The mean start capital 
increases significantly during this period. Fillfactory started the trend, followed by 
Septentrio and Xenics, which have closed different successful capital rounds to date. 
IMEC stopped bringing in cash into the companies. Between 1999 and 2003 IMEC 
did not invest cash in its spin-offs at time of founding32. However, with the crash of 
the technology stock markets during the first half of the year 2000, potential IMEC 
spin-off projects increasingly experienced difficulty to attract capital. As 
aforementioned, it was in this context that the IMEC Incubation Fund was established 
                                                                 
31 ITP did invest in 2 third generation IMEC ventures at time of start up: Fillfactory and Septentrio 
32 During this period, IMEC did perform a number of follow up investments to defend its investment 
and get the young companies through the economic downturn. 
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and two companies received capital from this fund. Since the mid nineties, IMEC 
wanted to focus on technology platform companies that are riskier than other 
technology companies and that have higher capital needs. 
 
In conclusion, the founding resource endowments of the SBEFs that emerged from 
IMEC seem to co-evolve with the way IMEC transfers knowledge or technology. 
Since IMEC devotes substantial attention and resources to developing incubation 
initiatives, we should also consider how do these firms perform in terms of 
multiplying investment value and ensuring employment. The next section sheds some 
light on this. 
 
4.5.  Financial-economic added value of IMEC’s science-based entrepreneurial 
firms 
 
 
Over the years IMEC strongly developed and professionalised its business 
development activities in general and spin out activities in particular. The majority of 
the entrepreneurs underscored the importance and the value of IMEC during the start-
up process as a way of building legitimacy. Nevertheless, what role do these 
companies have today? How ‘successful’ are they? We discuss a number of financial- 
economic performance indicators of these science-based entrepreneurial firms.  
 
Table 10: Performance indicators of three generations IMEC ventures 
Data last updated January, 1, 2004 
1987-1995 
(N=7)
1996-1998 
(N=8)
1999-2002 
(N=8)
Realised multiple 
(Actual exits)
2,54 0,69 0
Estimated 
multiple, incl. TS
2.88 1,47 1.9
Estimated IRR 11.10% 8.75% 42.97%
Employment Q3 
2003 (N FTE)
48 271 126
Total invested 
capital,  Q3 2003, K 
€
9,915.40 81,897.90 29,293.65
 104 
a. Multiples and internal rate of return 
An important indicator to calculate performance is the “fair market value”: the 
estimated valuation of a company based on the guidelines of the European Venture 
Capital Association (EVCA)33. To have an idea about the creation of financial value 
added over the years, we calculated the average multiple for each generation of IMEC 
starters. We divided the total fair market value today for all companies in the group by 
the total cumulative capital invested in the companies34. Next to the estimated 
multiple, we also calculated the realised multiple, taking into the account the value of 
the trade sales realised during each generation.  
 
Since multiples do not take into account the different time perspective over which 
investments are made, we also calculated the internal rate of return per year for each 
company and averaged it per generation of SBEF. In this calculation, we decided not 
to use the capital invested at time of formal incorporation of the company because for 
a lot of firms first round of external capitalisation was already in preparation at time 
of formal establishment of the company. Since some firms would not have been set up 
without successful negotiations about external capitalisation prior to founding the 
company, it is more correct to use these capital levels for all firms. 
In general, the SBEFs from IMEC set up between 1986 and 1995 generate almost 
three times their investment value. A multiple of 2.88 for the first generation SBEFs 
reflects an estimated gross return of 11,1 % per year on seed and follow up 
investments35. This return seems to be higher than the average return realised with 
other seed investments (about 5%) (Murray and Mariott, 1998). However, for an early 
stage venture capitalist this is rather low. With an average gross return of 11% the 
venture capitalist will be able to provide about 7% return to his investors, which is a 
risk neutral investment. Taking into account the actual realised investments an 
average multiple of 2.5 can be noted for the 5 ‘first generation’ companies exited up 
till today. For the second and third generation IMEC starters we mainly rely on the 
estimated valuation, since only 2 trade sales took place during this time. The 
estimated multiple based on the fair market value for the second generation (1996-
                                                                 
33 See EVCA Yearbook, 2003. 
34 This is not necessarily the multiple realised by IMEC: this depends on the capital investment of IMEC and their 
equity position. 
35 Before dedcution of the costs incurred to set up the companies, to incubate them and to participate in different 
boards of directors. 
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1998) shows a multiple of 1.536. The estimated internal rate of return is about 8.75%. 
Especially interesting here is that after 5 to 8 years hardly a trade sale has been 
realised whereas venture capitalists have time horizons of 5 to 10 years. Obviously, 
the estimated multiple and IRR for the third generation of starters is indicative, since 
the IRR assumes that all investments are valorised in 2003, which is not the case. That 
is why the latter is misleadingly high. More informative here is the estimated multiple, 
which is 1.9. Somewhat higher than its equivalent for the second generation, but much 
lower than the expectation of a professional VC.  
 
b. Exits and employment  
From the 23 science-based entrepreneurial firms that were set up, 14 were still active 
in 2003. IMEC realised 5 trade sales, of which 2 were successful. In total 5 
bankruptcies took place up to 2003. Only five companies are operationally break 
even. This seems to scare investors, especially given the current financial – economic 
conditions. Two companies established after 1999 were successful in closing new 
capital rounds in 2003, after they showed a plan to the investors to control the burn 
rate. 
Today, the 14 active IMEC start-ups and spin-offs employ about 450 full time 
equivalents (12/2003). In general, every investment of about 250 000 € results in the 
creation of a full time job. If we assume that about 10% of this investment is done 
with public money (through the subsidy of the Flemish government to IMEC), then a 
job is created for every 25 000 € public money invested.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, we offer an integrative perspective on how the venturing process is 
organised in a public research organisation, which is recognised as being a worldwide 
centre of excellence in the field of microelectronics. We show how the technology 
transfer policy adopted over time seems to affect the resource endowments going to 
science-based entrepreneurial firms (SBEF).  
Spinning out ventures has clearly become an alternative way of commercialising 
technology in many public research organisations, including IMEC. However, setting 
                                                                 
36 Acunia closed the books in December 2003. The bankruptcy of Acunia was not taken into account (still valued 
at fair market value), since the curator is still negotiating for a potential acquisition of the firm.  
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up an organisation to implement a coaching model for SBEF is a complex issue, 
which needs strategic support by the top management and commitment of the board to 
invest resources in the long term. In the paper, we have described in detail how IMEC 
has developed a structure to enable the establishment of new ventures.  
The strategic choice to stimulate SBEF in general and spin-offs in particular had 
major implications. First, IMEC has been confronted with the need to finance these 
firms. The financing issue is often the first barrier, which is tackled by universities 
and public research organisations because it is a visible problem not related to the 
organisation’s core business. IMEC participated in the capital of a venture capitalist 
(VC). Despite IMEC’s presence in the board, the VC only invested in 2 IMEC spin-
offs within 12 – 18 months after incorporation. IMEC learned that the seed phase is 
not interesting for venture capital firms and tried to tackle this by setting up an 
Incubation Fund dedicated to invest in pre-seed and seed capital. Again, the fund 
expectations were not in line with those of IMEC, mainly because the fund’s 
shareholders had similar expectations as the VCs about the exit potential of business 
plans.  
 
The financing problem was only the first issue that IMEC tried to solve. We have 
shown in the paper how IMEC changed its IPR management. The organisation 
developed and recently implemented a specific IP management model to guarantee 
enough freedom to operate and valuable proprietary technology for the spin-off in 
order to attract financial investors but without being forced to divest a full research 
stream within IMEC. As described in the paper, the “IP fingerprint model” seems to 
be a promising solution but has not been applied yet to spin-offs and will have to 
prove its merit in the years to come.  
 
The third set of resources, next to the financial and technology resources, are the 
human resources. Gradually, IMEC has set up a coaching organisation to assist SBEF 
during their incubation period. As in the two previous cases, the development of this 
resource has proven to be a learning process. First, some formal aspects of business 
plan support were developed. Next, IMEC initiated the recruitment of experienced 
external managers from its network. However, also this proved to be very difficult and 
only in two cases such a manager could be attracted. In the meanwhile, business 
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development remained mainly lacking. Recently, IMEC attracted internal business 
developers to coach their projects in the incubation phase. 
 
The main question that emerges is whether IMEC’s initiatives affect the resource 
endowments of the SBEFs that are created. This question is not only interesting from 
a practical point of view it is also inspired by theoretical considerations. In 
entrepreneurship research, the institutional context from which SBEF emerge is often 
implicitly neglected by lumping together firms from diverse institutional parents, 
without controlling for these differences. Overall, SBEF from IMEC start at a 
significantly larger scale than SBEF from other public research organisations and 
other high tech start-ups. The differences are the largest for the financial resources 
(nearly € 2 million vs € 650K vs € 250K). Because the population of IMEC’s SBEFs 
is biased towards the IT based and microelectronics technology might be a main 
explanatory variable. However, the lacking group are biotech ventures, which are 
generally considered to start at a larger scale. Since IMEC has undertaken most efforts 
to set up a sound investment system and to attract venture capital, it is not surprising 
that the SBEFs from IMEC start up with a significantly larger capital base. It indicates 
the impact of the institutional choices made but it does no t necessarily imply that the 
companies really need this amount of money. 
Next to the financial resources, we also find that the SBEF from IMEC have 
significantly more founder-entrepreneurs than the other high tech start-ups, but not 
more than the SBEF from other public research organisations and universities. 
Founding teams of 3 people on average seem to be characteristic for SBEF. Although 
we have no clear direct explanation for this, one suggestion might be that the centrally 
managed and controlled techno logy transfer might cause this. Usually a small team of 
researchers is at the basis of the technology. The project leaders from I&I guide the 
researchers for starting a company. The cost benefit question only comes in later. As 
aforementioned, we observe a lack of heterogeneity in the founding teams, which is 
generally argued to be important for attracting external capital.  
Also in terms of technology, a difference is found although not significant. There is 
some indication that SBEF are started with a less mature technology than the other 
high tech start-ups. Although the cross sectional comparison of the population of 
SBEF from IMEC with other SBEF and high tech start-ups gives a first intuition 
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about the potential impact of IMEC on the resource endowments, it remains a crude 
analysis. Since this descriptive analysis does not take into account the changes in 
policies that have taken place over time, we analysed whether changes in IMEC 
policy resulted in changes within the IMEC population of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms over time. 
 
We have described that IMEC has three generations of SBEF, each reflecting a 
particular shift in IMEC’s technology transfer policy. Although IMEC’s venture 
capital fund was not a straightforward success in itself, it raised the interest of other 
local venture capitalists for the (potential) SBEFs from IMEC. This is clearly reflected 
in higher capital levels these ventures were able to attract during the first 12 months of 
operations (less than € 600 K for the first generation up to over € 3 million for the 
third generation).  
 
Its change in technology transfer policy and management is also clearly reflected in 
the maturity of the technology at which the different generations start, the 
involvement of the inventors in the SBEF and the number of researchers recruited in 
the new venture. Whereas the first generation SBEF were started by researcher-
entrepreneurs, who envisaged a nearby market opportunity, the third generation, 
consisting mainly of spin-offs, are clearly the result of a strategic choice to 
commercialise a part of the technology through spin-offs instead of contract research 
or licensing. Spin-offs are based on a technology that is far from market ready and 
seems to be too marginal as a basis for contract research. Different researchers-
entrepreneurs seem to step into the new company. The transfer of part of the research 
team is reflected in a larger number of founders and employees coming from IMEC.  
 
Overall, we can conclude that the decisions taken at IMEC to change its venturing 
policies have an effect on the type of companies created. The resource endowments to 
SBEFs have changed as a result of these changes. Companies have become larger, 
start up with more employees and a technology further away from an alpha prototype. 
As a result, they need more coaching and incubation support before they can start up 
and the screening mechanism has become more selective. Although we could 
potentially infer from this that a smaller amount of projects will be started, it seems 
that IMEC wants to upscale its technology push strategy: IMEC wants to realise 3-4 
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spin-offs per year. The underlying rationale of IMEC is that in fact the opportunities 
are there but that an increasing pro-active role needs to be played in recognising these 
technological and market opportunities in the labs. 
 
Finally, we asked the question about the role of IMEC’s SBEF from a socio-economic 
perspective. We calculated the multiple (and related IRR) realised by the SBEF from 
IMEC (first generation) and compared it to the multiples found in the venture capital 
literature. The IRR of 11,8% for the first generation of SBEF is double the IRR of 
5,2% (Murray and Mariott, 1998) which was found to be an average for seed 
investments in high technology sectors. Still, this financial performance is below the 
expectations venture capitalists had during the mid- and late nineties when they 
wanted to invest in high technology. In Belgium, these expectations were between 30 
and 35% for seed investments, meaning that only few projects seemed attractive 
enough for investment (Manigart et al., 2002). Moreover, in other European countries, 
expectations were even higher. The conclusion seems to be that the IMEC approach 
works and renders more gross profit than an average approach, but the organisational 
cost to realise this is very high and the average IRR is still much lower than the one 
that is expected by venture capitalists. As a result, IMEC has major difficulties to 
convince institutional investors to invest in its own fund.  
 
Further, we observe that the science-based entrepreneurial ventures from IMEC create 
a total employment of about 450 full time equivalents. From a socio-economic 
perspective, this is significant. On the other hand, however, the total employment of a 
much less time consuming initiative such as the TOP programme at the university of 
Twente (The Netherlands) to stimulate science-based entrepreneurial firms was about 
1200  people in 2001 (Van der Sijde et al. 2002). Total employment created by small 
start-ups might be higher than employment created by a few large spin-off companies.  
 110 
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Stimulating academic entrepreneurship has been high on the political agenda since the 
mid-nineties (e.g. OECD, 2003). In its shareholder agreement with the Flemish 
government, IMEC needs to set up one SBEF per year. Introducing such key 
performance indicators to encourage public research institutes and universities to take 
part in the entrepreneurial process has become increasingly popular among policy 
makers all over Europe. 
However, given the complexity of setting up such an entrepreneurial process, it seems 
questionable whether most public research organisations have the necessary resources 
and top management commitment to do so. Moreover, from a public policy 
perspective it remains even uncertain whether targeting one venture per year is a good 
idea. There are other models for stimulating entrepreneurship that seem to create 
much more employment and socio-economic return at a significant lower cost (see 
Clarysse et al, 2004). 
At the micro level, the study clearly shows that being a centre of excellence in a 
certain technological domain is no guarantee to have a network in the financial and 
business community. In fact, we observe that IMEC had little or no impact on the 
decisions made, even by the venture capitalists in which the organisation participated 
as a shareholder, to invest in its SBEFs. The financial market follows its own logic 
and the research organisation can at most present its jewels to the client. This implies 
that the incubation period either has to be financed by the research organisation itself 
or by a form of public seed capital. If a policy maker decides that public research 
organisations have to spin-off a fixed number of companies per year, it has also to 
make sure that the local financial environment can support this.  
Not only the financial resources are difficult to manage, also the human resources 
often form a barrier. IMEC does not succeed to attract people with a clear business 
background in its SBEF. Usually these people are recruited very late in the process, 
once most decisions are already made about the concrete market opportunity. More 
importantly, at the moment of opportunity seeking, no persons with experience in 
different industries are involved. Although the organisation might be a leading 
research institute, it is not necessarily attractive as an employer for young high 
business potentials. In fact, if policy makers enforce public research organisations and 
universities to commercialise their technology by imposing numbers, it is not 
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sufficient to subsidise part of the technology transfer activities or even provide some 
seed money. Conversely, one of the most important assets of a start-up company– its 
human resources – should originate in the organisation’s core business. But most 
public research organisations have no strong middle management of high potentials 
with business skills. Usually, they have a strong top management of professors or top 
managers (in public research institutes), many bright researchers at junior level and a 
few as project leader at senior level. These are embedded in a culture where 
intellectual capacity is appreciated among peers, much more than emotional 
intelligence, which typifies most business high potentials. It is very uncertain whether 
these structures and cultures are fruitful soils for new business opportunity ideas. 
Interestingly, Van Dierdonck et al. (1990) already pointed to the necessity of liaison 
offices for being main contact facilitators with industrial players, instead of focusing 
on the ‘structuring’ the technology transfer process at the institution. Thus, if the 
government wants to stimulate the recognition of business opportunities in a research 
setting, there is a need for a well-balanced view of what entrepreneurship entails and 
it needs to be integrated in the organisation culture. More specifically, employees 
need to be recruited with a strong entrepreneurial orientation and commercial 
interests. It is important that the government also takes into account these facilitating 
indicators for stimulating entrepreneurship, instead of solely focusing on the amount 
of ventures to be generated per year. These observations are in line with Goldfarb and 
Henrekson’s (2003) findings, who argue that a top down approach in stimulating the 
commercialisation of technology potentially impedes the freedom to interact with 
industry and new firms, which are in turn an important source of experienced business 
people. 
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGE AND RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS TO SCIENCE-BASED 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS: A EUROPEAN EXPLORATION 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses theoretical and empirical gaps in the relationships between the 
nature of institutional linkage, firm resources and growth in the context of spinning 
off ventures from public research organisations (PROs). Institutional linkage is 
considered a two dimensional construct consisting of the formality of technology 
transfer and the research specificity of a PRO. In this perspective, both categorical 
variables are hypothesised to predict the resource endowments of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. Additionally, given the widespread attention from academics 
and policy makers to IP based science-based entrepreneurial firms, the formality of 
technology transfer is expected to be associated with growth.  
Empirical tests of hypotheses derived from this view are based on data from about 
100 science-based entrepreneurial firms, representing 24 public research 
organisations. The research sought to identify how the variables interrelate at the 
multivariate level. Multivariate analysis of variance shows that institutional linkage 
predicts firm resources in general, showing significance levels for start capital and the 
degree in which the technology is embodied in a product. An ordinal interaction effect 
shows that companies established with a formal transfer of technology start with 
higher resource levels when started from a PRO with a specific research base. 
Contrary to expectations, two-stage regression analysis indicates that the formality of 
technology transfer has no single direct effect on growth in employees, although it is 
mediated by start capital. A formal transfer of technology however does affect the 
propensity to attract additional capital, independent of the start capital of the firm.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The insights that resource based theories and the new institutionalism in organisation 
studies have contributed to our understanding of firm founding and survival suggest 
that these distinct perspectives are in fact complementary. Resource based theories 
suggest that firms make economically rational choices that are shaped by the 
economic context of the firm. According to institutional theory, firms make 
normatively rational choices that are shaped by the social context of the firm. 
Although Oliver (1997) already suggested that resource based and institutional views 
actually converge, very few have investigated how combined insights from these 
distinct perspectives can explain firm similarities and differences.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which institut ional linkage has 
an impact on the resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms, which 
are founded from the research base developed at public research organisations. We 
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define institutional linkage as the nature of the relationship between the science-based 
entrepreneurial firm and the PRO. More specifically, we consider institutional linkage 
as a two-dimensional construct consisting of the formality of technology transfer 
(formal or informal) and the research specificity of the PRO (generic or specific) from 
which the venture emerges. We also assess the extent to which institutional linkage 
affects the growth of science-based entrepreneurial firms. 
 
Investigation of the influence of the nature of institutional linkage to PROs on the 
resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding is 
potentially important for different reasons. First, public research organisations are 
increasingly argued to play a key role in knowledge creation, knowledge 
dissemination and economic growth (OECD, 1998; 2003) and the US was the first 
country to set the stage. The successes of Route 128 and Silicon Valley led to wider 
endorsement about the US model and the central role of public research organisations  
in such regional successes (Saxenian, 1994). In this perspective it has been recognised 
that the economic sectors with the most rapid growth are those closest associated with 
the ‘science base’: microelectronics, software, biotechnology and new materials (Van 
Looy et al. 2004). As a result, policies have been put in place to stimulate the 
commercialisation of research and, more specifically, the creation of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. New regulations gave PROs ownership of IP arising from their 
research base and the right to commercialise the results obtained. 
 
Second, both the early neo- institutional framework and resource dependency view 
have been criticised: the institutional framework for its focus on homogeneity and 
persistence of organisational forms (Dacin et al, 2002); the resource dependency view 
for not taking into account the context of resource acquisition (Oliver, 1997). Thus, 
combining elements from both an institutional and resource-based perspective in a 
conceptual model of firm heterogeneity and similarity may shed light on how 
institutional linkage of science-based entrepreneurial firms partly explains the 
resource conditions of these companies. Integrating both perspectives in an empirical 
analysis helps addressing the seemingly paradoxical challenges new science-based 
entrepreneurial firms face: although they rely a lot on the entrepreneurs’ initiative to 
attract the necessary resources, we expect them to be also partly determined by their 
institutional linkage at time of founding. To our knowledge, this study is one of the 
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few attempts focusing on the investigation of the specific institutional relations that 
science-based entrepreneurial firms have at time of founding and the predictive 
capacity of this linkage on firm resources and growth.  
 
Finally, this study is also important because it typically focuses on the founding 
conditions of companies. More specifically, the question of initial resource 
endowments has been argued to be of significant interest in organisational ecology, 
evolutionary theory and entrepreneurship research (Shane and Stuart, 2002). At the 
organisational level, Stinchcombe (1965) was the first to stress the “imprinting effect” 
of initial conditions at founding, including the institutional environment. Later 
research has confirmed this view. Population ecologists as well as institutional 
theorists, for example, have confirmed that the main organisational characteristics 
when an organisation is established tend to become institutionalised (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Boeker, 1989). Over the years, a general 
consensus has been growing about the fact that initial (founding) conditions are likely 
to have an effect on firm survival and growth.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, we describe the context in 
which the phenomenon of science-based entrepreneurial firms has increasingly gained 
momentum. Second, we develop the conceptual model combining elements from both 
institutional and resource dependency perspectives, hypothesising that institutional 
linkage explains firm resources and growth. Third, we discuss the data and methods 
employed. Fourth, we present the analyses and the results, developing the main 
findings of this research. We conclude with a discussion section pointing to the main 
implications of this study.  
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2. SCIENCE-BASED ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS, INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGE AND RESOURCE 
DEPENDENCY  
 
2.1. Background: Science-based entrepreneurial firms in Europe 
 
Science-based entrepreneurship looms large in the public arena (Henrekson and 
Rosenberg, 2001). There is a large tendency among public research organisations to 
add ‘entrepreneurial’ objectives to their mission, including a spectrum of evolutions 
such as more involvement in social and economic development, more intense 
commercialisation of research results, patent and licensing activities, the 
institutionalisation of spin-off activities and managerial and attitudinal changes among 
academics regarding collaborative projects with industrial partners (OECD, 1998; 
Van Looy et al. 2004). A marked increase in the number of companies created from 
PROs has been observed in North America as well in Europe since the early nineties. 
The creation of new companies from PROs has become central to research and 
innovation policy and policies have been put in place to promote the development of 
these ventures (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Mustar, 1997). Regulatory constraints 
have been removed or loosened so as there are now more possibilities for an academic 
to create a company. However, different studies in different countries use a variety of 
definitions of what exactly constitutes a spin-off company. Terms used include 
(academic) spin-outs, university based start-ups, (academic) spin-offs, firms created 
by researchers, research-based spin-offs, … A common definition has been developed 
by authors such as Roberts and Malone (1996), Smilor et al. (1990) and Steffenson et 
al. (1999): 
 
A spin-off is a new company that is formed by a faculty member, staff member, or 
doctoral student who left university (research organisation) to found the company or 
started the company while still affiliated with the university, and/or a core technology 
(or idea) that is transferred from the parent organisation.  
 
This definition leaves room for inclusion of a variety of firms and a lot of researchers 
to date have adhered to this definition, albeit using it in diverse ways. The 
heterogeneity in the interpretation of this definition partly reflects the fact that 
researchers have indeed observed that research-based spin-offs are not a 
homogeneous group of companies (Stankiewicz, 1994; Mustar, 1997; Druihle and 
Garsney, 2003), urging them to make empirical choices as to whether or not firms are 
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to be included in sample frames. As a result, in Europe, spin-offs often comprise all 
the ventures that are “listed” or “identified” by researchers and / or technology 
transfer officers as having emerged from PROs (Moray and Clarysse, 2004).  
 
The remainder of this paper will use the term “science-based entrepreneurial firm” 
(SBEF), following authors such as Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) and Murray 
(2004). We choose this term to denote an inclusive concept for the companies that 
have been identified by researchers or technology transfer officers as having emerged 
from the research performed in public research organisations. This paper develops 
hypotheses about the effect of institutional linkage on resource endowments at time of 
founding and venture growth. The basis assumption is that institutional linkage at time 
of founding has potential explanatory capacity for the heterogeneity that is observed 
among science-based entrepreneurial firms, both in terms of resources at time of 
founding and growth.  
 
In the remainder of this section we combine elements of institutional and resource 
dependency perspectives to the study of science-based entrepreneurial firms. The 
basic, rather intuitive value of combining the ‘material’ with the ‘institutional’ lies in 
the observation that science-based entrepreneurial firms emerge from within diverse 
public research organizations, and that new firms typically need to attract the 
necessary resources to start and develop their activities. We develop hypotheses 
taking into account both aspects of this reality. 
 
2.2. Institutional linkage and science-based entrepreneurial firms 
 
Researchers have stressed the importance of institutional characteristics in the 
commercialisation of innovation (e.g. Lynn et al, 1996). In the context of science-
based entrepreneurial firms, this is particularly apparent because these companies 
display different types of links with the institutional parent at the moment the venture 
is set up.  
 
One of the common features of PROs is that they have, in varying degrees, 
commercial ideas in their research portfolio. However, they differ substantially in the 
extent to which they actively search for these business opportunities as well as in the 
extent to which the trajectory of business development is guided and supported, if at 
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all. Previous researchers have studied the differences in technology transfer activities 
in a range of European public research organisations and have developed useful 
classifications. Clarysse et al. (Forthcoming), for example, have developed a typology 
of interface services based on the resources they employ and the activities they 
actually engage in for supporting new businesses. Together with other authors (Siegel 
et al. 2003), they also come to the conclusion that technology transfer activities are 
difficult to measure, especially as it is an intrinsically evolutionary phenomenon: 
public research organisations can be in transition, evolving of one ‘incubation’ model 
to another. In spite of a general convergence, the practical implementation of these 
models and the regional / national regulatory details are very diverse and make it 
difficult to judge whether and under which circumstances such models are effective. 
 
Therefore, we decided to focus on one particular element that can be informative 
about the nature of technology transfer activities in the PRO: institutional linkage with 
the science based entrepreneurial firm at time of founding. Baum et al. (1991) already 
pointed to the importance of institutional linkage when they studied the impact of 
institutional linkage on mortality rates of service organisations. Focusing our analysis 
on institutional linkage at time of founding has at least two advantages. First, it 
empirically overcomes the intrinsic evolutionary nature of technology transfer 
activities as they are practiced in the PROs. This pace of change has been quickened 
since the mid nineties and a lot of European PROs have not reached equilibrium. 
Second, taking into account “institutional linkage” will prove to be helpful to 
categorise science-based entrepreneurial firms, potentially leading to a better 
understanding of the characteristics and the relative role of different types of science-
based entrepreneurial firms.  
 
In this research, institutional linkage is considered a two dimensional construct, 
consisting of formality of technology transfer to the science-based entrepreneurial 
firm and the research specificity of the parent research organisation from which the 
venture emerges. The formality of technology transfer refers to the extent in which a 
company is formed based on a formal transfer of intellectual property. Roberts (1991, 
103-107) already noted the variety of linkages of science-based entrepreneurial firms 
with MIT. He questioned the entrepreneurs about the link of the firm with the research 
organisation and, more specifically, about the importance of technology transferred to 
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the new firm. He asked the respondents to rate the degree of dependence on source 
technologies: direct, partial and vague. In these categories learned technology is 
unquestionably important; the difference is only in degree. Where technology is 
transferred directly, the company would not have been started without the formal 
transfer of Intellectual Property Rights (by means of a license agreements or transfer 
of a patent). “Partial” means that the company was founded based on the formal 
transfer of Intellectual Property rights; however, this know-how needed to be 
expanded with some other source of know-how (i.e. IP coming form another institute 
then the parent institute). We label the companies that received a partial or direct 
transfer of technology as the IP based spin-offs. The category “vague” represents 
those companies that are categorised as a SBEF by the parent institute for other 
reasons than formally transferred technology, for example because academic staff co-
founded the company based on know how they acquired at the parent organisation or 
because the PRO provided some start-up capital.  
The Association of University Technology Managers37 has made an explicit 
distinction between “start-ups” and “spin-offs”. The first group of companies are 
based on know how developed at the PRO without formal transfer of technology. It is 
possible however, that the PRO has an equity stake through the provision of capital. 
The start-ups clearly use source learned (but often non-protected and non-formally 
transferable) knowledge and/or technologies. Conversely, “spin-offs” received a 
formal transfer of technology by means of a license agreement in return for royalties 
or IP in return for equity (i.e. they were directly or partially dependent on source 
technologies at time of founding). 
 
Next to the formality of technology transfer we define institutional linkage by an 
intrinsic characteristic regarding the research base developed at the PRO. Some of 
PROs have a specific technology focus while others perform research in a variety of 
technological domains and the humanities. In Europe, the majority of the research that 
is publicly financed is organised in universities or research institutes. In practice we 
observe that research institutes are more likely to have a specific technology focus, 
whereas the universities can have either a generic research portfolio or be quite 
specific in a few domains. Chalmers institute of Technology for example has five 
                                                                 
37 www.autm.org 
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explicit strategic research streams: biotechnology, information technology, the 
environment and micro- and nanotechnology. Intuitively, one can expect PROs with a 
specific research base to be able to specialise in the commercialisation of these 
research results, which have a rather delineated scope. Since these PROs often have 
contract research with industry as core competence, these PROs are expected to be 
more involved in intellectual property issues and technology transfer activities, since 
they seem to operate much closer to industrial partners. As the propensity of research 
and technology transfer can be captured in a number of indicators, (Siegel et al, 2003), 
we use these indicators for empirically validating this conceptual distinction (see 
section 3.2 for specification of the variables). Since the specific – generic distinction 
regarding the research base of PRO has not been validated and generally 
acknowledged to date, in contrast with the ‘formality of technology transfer’ 
dimension (AUTM), our first hypothesis addresses this issue: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A public research organisation with a specific research focus (one 
or a number of clearly delineated technological domains) is more actively 
engaged in technology transfer related activities than a generic PRO. 
 
 
2.3. Resource dependency and science-based entrepreneurial firms 
 
Resource Dependency Theory is generally characterised as the necessity of extracting 
resources from the environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This perspective holds 
as premise that firms will act in self- interest, trying to gain access to, and ultimately 
control over, needed resources. Science-based entrepreneurial firms are especially 
sensitive to this issue, as they need to build their resource base from the ground up. It 
has also been argued that ventures originating from public research organisations 
display a variety of resource configurations (Druihle and Garsney, 2004). Researchers 
studying the diversity of science-based entrepreneurial firms often focused on internal 
characteristics associated to the business model of the company. Bullock (1983) 
already identified two categories:  “soft companies”, the technical consultants solving 
customised problems, and “hard companies” that sell standardised products to a 
general market. In parallel, Stankiewicz (1994) classifies science-based 
entrepreneurial firms according to the way they operate. He identifies three different 
operation modes: consultant and R&D boutique mode, product-oriented mode, and 
technological-asset mode. Still others have suggested defining science-based 
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entrepreneurial firms according to specific types of resource transfer from their 
environment (Carayannis et al., 1998). Although these studies have significantly 
contributed to our understanding of the diversity of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms, most studies have not extended their approaches to looking for potential 
predictors “external” to the firm as an organisational entity that can help explain the 
diversity in resource configuration. Additionally, most of the categories described 
above are intrinsically developmental and overlapping, so that it is hard to integrate 
them in an empirical research design. This research hypothesises that the nature of 
institutional linkage will affect the resource endowments of a science-based 
entrepreneurial firm at time of founding.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The nature of institutional linkage affects the resource 
endowments of a science-based entrepreneurial firm at time of founding 
 
Following resource based scholars we focus on the financial, human and technology 
resources (Barney, 1996). More specifically, we expect ventures that are established 
with a formal transfer of technology (the ‘spin-offs’) to start with higher capital levels 
and a more productised technology. We hypothesise that starting business activities 
with a formally transferred technology is intrinsically more capital intensive since the 
technology needs to be valued as part of the transfer agreement between the PRO and 
he new venture. Consequently, these types of science-based entrepreneurial firms are 
expected to start with a more productised technology, that is to say, further developed 
along the product development cycle and closer to market. Clearly, the higher the 
capitalisation and valuation of the associated technology, the more productised one 
expects the technology to be. As a result of the higher start capital and the more 
productised technology, we expect ventures starting with a formal transfer of 
technology also to have more researchers working in the firm. The human resources 
in a science-based entrepreneurial firm are intrinsically tied to the research and 
technology they bring into the company. When one employs researchers, it is the 
researcher’s labour and scientific and technical human capital that is actually brought 
into the company: the formal educational endowments, but also the skills, know-how 
and "tacit knowledge," embodied in individual scientists and engineers (Bozeman and 
Mangematin, 2004). The relation between the different resources however, cannot be 
clearly stipulated. For example, an argument can be made that more capital is needed 
in “spin-offs” because they need more researchers / employees to further develop and 
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maintain the technology (platform) on which the firm is built. Although there is an 
increasing awareness that resources are interrelated with one another, the direction 
and order of these interrelations have not been examined extensively. Therefore, when 
formulating our hypotheses, we put the resource variables at one level.  
 
H2a: When know how is transferred formally to a science-based entrepreneurial firm, the 
firm will display higher capital levels, a more productised technology and a higher number of 
employees as compared to ventures that start activities without formal transfer of technology. 
 
Similarly, we expect ventures emerging from specific PROs to start with a greater 
resource base as compared to companies that emerged from a generic PRO. The 
reason for this is twofold. First, building on the results of hypothesis 1, we infer that 
specific PROs seem to have the commercialisation of research and technology more 
central to their activities as compared with generic PROs. As a result, one can expect 
that the ventures set up from these institutes will have more often transferred 
protected technology at time of founding as compared to ventures coming from 
generic PROs. Since we do not have complete data sets of the full population of 
ventures emerging from the PROs in the sample, we could not test this intuition in the 
context of this paper. However, Moray (2004, IN: Clarysse, 2004) has shown this for 
the full population of science-based entrepreneurial firms in Flanders (Belgium): 
generic PROs set up significantly more science-based entrepreneurial firms without 
formal transfer of technology (“start-ups” according to AUTM) as compared with the 
specific PROs which seem to have the establishment of IP based science-based 
entrepreneurial firms as core strategy (“spin-offs” according to AUTM). Second, 
PROs that put the commercialisation of research and technology to the core of their 
mission are expected to have more developed systems and trajectories to guide and 
support these types of ventures. This potentially increases the legitimacy of these 
companies and subsequently the amount and the nature of the financial, technological 
and human resources they attract at time of founding (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Suchman, 1995). These observations lead to the formulation of the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2b: A science-based entrepreneurial firm originating from a PRO with a specific research 
portfolio will display higher capital levels, a more productised technology and a higher 
amount of employees as compared to ventures that start from a PRO with a generic research 
base. 
 
 
2.4. Growth of science-based entrepreneurial firms 
 
While science-based entrepreneurial firms are argued to be a key feature of the 
modern economy, our insights into their growth and productivity remain limited 
(Murray, 2004). Growth of start-up companies in general is a complex and 
multidimensional phenomenon and factors such as firm age and industry affiliation 
have been argued to be important characteristics predicting growth (Delmar, 2003). It 
is likely that the conditions at time of founding are related to growth of these science-
based entrepreneurial firms. Since policy makers have been emphasising the 
commercialisation of intellectual property through setting up science-based 
entrepreneurial firms as an important engine for economic growth (OECD, 2003), we 
hypothesise that the formality of technology transfer will affect the average growth of 
the company. We argue that the research specificity of a PRO is of much less 
importance in predicting the potential economic contribution of a science-based 
entrepreneurial firm, given the time lag between founding the company and assessing 
growth. More specifically, we expect “spin-offs” to display higher average growth as 
compared to “start-ups”, given policy makers’ substantial focus on IP based science-
based entrepreneurial firms. The following hypothesis summarises this: 
Hypothesis 3: A science-based entrepreneurial firm receiving a formal transfer 
of technology will display higher average growth in capital and employees as 
compared to a science-based entrepreneurial firm that is established with 
intangible know-how. 
Figure 5 summarises the hypotheses developed in the previous section. 
Figure 5: Conceptual model: overview of hypotheses 
Growth of science-based
entrepreneurial firms
Resources of science -based
entrepreneurial firms
Start capital
Productisation of technology
Employees
H 3
H 2
Average growth in capital
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3. METHOD 
 
The following section elaborates on the construction of the European sample, the data 
collection procedures and the variables included for both univariate and multivariate 
analyses. 
 
3.1. Sample and data collection  
 
One of the main problems in performing studies on science-based entrepreneurial 
firms from PROs is the difficulty to randomly sample either a number of PROs or 
science-based entrepreneurial firms across Europe. This would require a large up-
front knowledge base about the composition and the nature of the population of PROs 
as well as science-based entrepreneurial firms in the respective countries. This is not 
the case at both levels. For the PROs, because each country has its own specific 
context of organising and financing research and development activities in public 
research organisations. Estimating the population of PROs that rightfully represents 
the majority of publicly financed research in a region or country in a comparable 
international dataset is a research project in itself. For the firms, because researchers 
involved in the domain of science-based entrepreneurial firms have only very recently 
launched initiatives to integrate data sets from respective countries. Moreover, at the 
micro- institutional level, PROs often are not knowledgeable about the full population 
of science-based entrepreneurial firms that are set up from their research base. This is 
especially true for the firms that start without formal transfer of technology38 and in 
countries with a strong decentralised system for different types of technology transfer 
related activities such as Germany and Sweden.  
 
                                                                 
38 In this perspective, some researchers are strong advocates to only include science-based 
entrepreneurial firms in empirical analyses that start with a formal transfer of technology (focusing on 
‘spin-offs’ only). Although empirically, this is probably the ‘purest’, it intrinsically denies the issue that 
in a lot of countries samples are constructed as a mix of different types of firms having a link with the 
parent institute. This does not only make research results hard to compare internationally, it also takes 
not into account that whether or not technology transfer happens, is an evolutionary phenomenon: some 
firms that were started in the early nineties as ‘start-ups’, would today be established as ‘spin-offs’, 
given the upsurge of the phenomenon. We explicitly argue that sample frames should be all-inclusive, 
representing particular regional contexts, BUT that the science-based entrepreneurial firms should be 
coded as to the nature of institutional linkage at time of founding to better understand the heterogeneity 
among these firms and their relative importance, both at the firm, the micro-institutional and the 
regional/national level. 
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To date it has been very difficult to construct comparative European sample frames 
and this has urged researchers to construct theoretically sampled data sets to address 
particular questions of interest (see for example Clarysse et al. forthcoming). It has 
been argued that theoretical sampling is a valid alternative to random sampling as 
long as the research design is determinate and if the conditions of unit homogeneity 
and conditional independence are met (King et al., 1994), issues contributing to 
making scientifically sound inferences.  
 
This research is performed in the context of a European collaborative effort between 
researchers from 7 European countries: Belgium (Flanders), France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Italy and Hungary. Theoretically sampling a number of 
PROs we arrive at a research design ensuring maximum variety regarding the 
organisation of R&D in PROs. A three-step approach was utilised for sampling and 
data collection at the PROs and the science-based entrepreneurial firms in the 
respective countries.  
First, for each country an analysis was performed looking at the broader context of the 
national innovation systems and start-up activity. How is research organised and 
financed? What is the R&D expenditure and patent activity? Table 11 shows that the 
countries included vary significantly in their share in R&D activities and patent 
activities. Most of the countries studied are in the top 10 in their share of triadic patent 
families (except Belgium and Hungary). Since we analyse institutional linkage and its 
potential impact on resource endowments, this variety of contextual constellations 
improves external validity of the findings, i.e. improves the probability that the 
hypotheses at the level of the public research organisation and the firms hold true 
across national contexts.  
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Table 11: Investment in R&D and output from the research sector 
Selected 
regions in 
Europe 
R&D 
expenditure 
as % of GDP, 
2001 (1) 
Number of 
Researchers 
/ 1000 
labour force 
(2) 
Articles per 
researcher (2) 
Number of triadic 
patent families per 
million population 
(3)                Rank 
Share of triadic 
patent families in 
total applications 
(3)              Rank 
EU-15 1,93 5 0,3 36,61 32,39%       
Sweden 3,78 8,6 0,37 102,39        2  4,16%       7 
Belgium 1,96   37,66          11  0,9%         12  
Germany 2,52 5,9 0,25 73,02          5 14,07%     4 
Hungary 0,95    0,07%       26 
France 2,13 6 0,29 35,23          13 4,99%       5 
Italy 1,04 3,2 0,36 12,4            19 1,68%       9 
UK 1,84 5,1 0,44 30,26          15 4,16%       6 
(1) GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
(2) OECD, MSTI Database, 2000 
(3) OECD, Patent Database, July 2003, 1999 estimates; Patents all applied for at the EPO, USPTO 
and JPO.  
 
Given these contexts, we discussed with the national experts / researchers what is the 
best way to sample public research organisations and the science-based 
entrepreneurial firms that emerged from their knowledge base ensuring ‘real life’ but 
‘controlled’ diversity so as to maximise comparison and external validity. There was a 
general consensus that the common denominator for public research activities across 
Europe, is that the majority is organised in universities or research institutes. In 
relatively small samples – as compared to the total population – this controlled 
diversity is key in making scientifically sound inferences. Thus, the second step 
involved the selection of a small number of PROs in each country that is 
representative for the way research is organised. Moreover, the technology transfer 
office needed to be at least three years old and the PRO needed to have a significant 
track record in setting up science-based entrepreneurial ventures since the mid 
nineties. Data on each PRO was collected through personal interviews with 
technology transfer managers. Each public research organisation in the sample (N = 
24) was interviewed using the UNICO-NUBS questionnaire specifically designed for 
collecting quantitative indicators from Technology Transfer Offices of Public 
Research Organisations (UNICO-NUBS, 2003). Sampling the PROs first was crucial 
since we are typically interested in micro institutional linkage with the research base 
at time of founding the science-based entrepreneurial firm. The data on the PROs is 
used to test hypothesis 1. 
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Third, for each PRO about 4-5 science-based entrepreneurial firms were sampled. 
Companies established since 1991 were included. In some cases the national experts / 
researchers were able to identify the full population of science-based entrepreneurial 
ventures and sampled the firms as such that they can be seen as representative 
examples of companies set up from the research base of the particular parent. In most 
cases, populations were unknown and firms were included based on the ‘known’ 
science-based entrepreneurial firms and the willingness to participate in the study. 
Given our research questions, which want to explore the impact of institutional 
linkage on resource endowments and growth, this is appropriate, as we do not expect 
the willingness of founders/CEOs to cooperate or the (lack of) knowledge of the 
population of firms to influence both independent variables representing institutional 
linkage. We developed a standardised survey instrument that was used as a road map 
during face-to-face interviews with the founders and/or CEOs of the companies. 
During these 1 - 1,5 hour interviews, we questioned the respondents about the start-up 
history of the firm in terms of technology transfer from the PRO, the inventors 
involved, how (much) resources were attracted at time of founding and how the 
company evolved since then. Special attention was given to the resource endowments: 
the human, financial and technology resources. Our final sample consists of 24 PROs 
and 96 science-based entrepreneurial firms that emerged from these institutions.  
 
3.2. Measures  
 
To address the hypotheses outlined above we selected or developed measures 
regarding institutional linkage, firm resources and growth. 
 
Institutional linkage 
As aforementioned, we measure institutional linkage by two categorical independent 
variables, which are both coded at the company level: research specificity of the 
parent organisation and the formality of technology transfer at time of founding. Since 
the validity of the distinction between formal technology transfer and the informal 
transfer of research / know how has been launched and generally acknowledged by 
the Association of University Technology Managers, hypothesis 1 specifically 
addresses the empirical validation of the conceptual distinction between generic and 
specific PROs, using univariate Mann Whitney U tests. Siegel et al. (2003) identified 
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a number of input indicators related to university – industry technology transfer, 
internal to the research organisation: invention disclosures (a proxy for the set of 
available technologies), labour employed by the Technology Transfer Office (TTO), 
and the legal fees incurred to protect the intellectual property of the PRO. We 
augmented these measures with research expenditure, license income, patents filed 
and the number of science-based entrepreneurial firms set up in 2002 to get an idea of 
the nature of commercialisation activities at each of the groups of PROs. We compare 
the generic and specific PROs in the sample on this set of indicators. 
 
Resource measures 
Several researchers have traditionally pointed to the financial (Manigart et al., 2002), 
technological (Utterback et al., 1988) and human resources (Shane and Stuart, 2002) 
as significant assets in young firms and science-based entrepreneurial firms in 
particular. The entrepreneurship literature Roberts (1991) argued that the human, 
technological and financial resources are instrumental in the development of an initial 
resource base. 
 
For each group of resources we selected one variable argued to be crucial for 
founding science-based based entrepreneurial firms (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) and 
that rightfully represent the resource categories of interest. Choosing one variable for 
each resource category is appropriate given the relatively small sample and since there 
is a high inter item reliability39. For the financial resources we included the start 
capital of the company, i.e. the total capital represented in the company during the 
first year of activities, including capital from entrepreneurs equity investors and 
debtors. Including the total capital is important, because for some firms the (high) 
valuation of the technology on behalf of the PRO need to be taken into account. We 
measured the technological resources at time of founding by the degree of 
productisation of the research / technology, i.e. the extent to which the research / 
technology is deployed in a service oriented business models or if it is developed to 
                                                                 
39 For the financial resources we evaluated inter item reliabil ity between total capital at founding and 
the amount of external capital (Cronbach Alpha = 0,99). The inter item reliability for the technology 
resources is lower (Cronbach Alpha = 0,69), but still acceptable, given the fact that the degree of 
productisation of the technology (1-5) and the maturity of the technology until reaching an alpha 
prototype (1-9), are in fact complementary measures of which the latter precedes the first in (time) 
order. For the human resources, we are focusing on the amount of people actively involved in the firm, 
which is captured in one measure. 
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eventually reach the stage of a market ready product. More specifically, we measured 
the degree of productisation using a scale of 1 to 5: the closer to 5, the more the 
technology is embodied in a product40. Since a lot of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms develop and market technologically new or improved products, services or 
processes, gaining understanding in where they are situated along a continuum of 
productisation is particularly relevant in providing a sense of the nature and extent of 
pre-founding efforts and  the maturity of the research base. Finally, we measured the 
human resources by looking at the size of the team that starts working in the newly 
founded business, providing a crude indicator of firm size. We count the number of 
active persons working in the firm, including the employees, active founders and 
managers.  
 
Growth measures 
When measuring growth of high tech companies in general, authors have used a 
variety of indicators (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004b) such as sales growth (e.g. Lee et 
al., 2001), employment growth (e.g. Westhead and Birley, 1994), first product 
shipment (e.g. Schoonhoven et al., 1990) or some composite performance indicator. 
Delmar et al. (2003) argue that there is no “one best way” of measuring firm growth 
because it is intrinsically multidimensional. Although different measures of growth 
have been proposed in the entrepreneurship literature, the following growth indicators 
seem to be listed most often: (return-on) assets, employment, market share, physical 
output, profits, and sales. However, several scholars argue that traditional accounting-
based indicators of profitability and assets are inappropriate for relatively young 
companies in high technology sectors (e.g. Shane and Stuart, 2002). However, for 
science-based entrepreneurial firms, it is possible that capital levels and employment 
will grow before any substantial sales and revenues are generated or profitability is 
obtained, displaying the investment intensity that often entails these types of 
companies. Therefore, we measure growth in terms of average growth in employees 
and capital. Both growth measures seem to be suitable indicators if the specific 
interest is assessing policy implications. Growth in capital is informative about the 
                                                                 
40 The items on the scale represent the following stages: 1: Service oriented business model; 2: 
Research / technology is in the idea phase specifically to develop it along a new product development 
process; 3. The technology reached a proof of concept (working in a lab environment), i.e. a a-
prototype; 4. The technology reached a prototype that works in realistic environment, i.e. b-prototype; 
5. There is at least one concrete market-ready product based on the research / technology. 
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propensity of the venture to attract investors for science-based entrepreneurial firms, 
which are established from largely publicly funded research. Growth in employees 
helps us understand the relative role of spin-offs and start-ups in their contribution to 
job creation. Moreover, resource-based scholars value employment based measures as 
a highly suitable indicator of firm growth (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 1992). Thus, both 
growth measures provide insight in the relative contribution of spin-offs and start-ups 
in regional development objectives: employment creation and attracting (foreign) 
capital. We do not use relative growth measures (%) since the smallest venture 
naturally ends up with highest relative growth even if in absolute terms its growth is 
negligible compared to the absolute growth of its larger counterparts. Instead we 
choose to include absolute average growth in our analyses (value today minus value 
during first year of operations, divided by the age of the firm). 
 
The next section discusses the analyses performed for assessing the hypotheses 
developed above.                                                             
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RES ULTS 
 
Different analysis techniques were used to test the three principal hypotheses. To test 
hypothesis 1, univariate Mann Whitney U tests were used to study the differences 
between the two conceptualised types of public research organisations. Hypothesis 2 
is evaluated using a 2X2 factorial design for MANOVA in order to assess the 
predictive power of institutional linkage on resource endowments. Finally, we test 
hypothesis 3 performing a two stage least squares regression analysis, allowing to 
separate the individual effects of the formality of technology transfer and start capital 
on the growth of science-based entrepreneurial firms. This section presents the 
analyses and the results for each hypothesis. 
 
4.1. Hypothesis 1: Specific PROs are more actively engaged in technology transfer 
activities than generic PROs 
 
Our primary goal for testing the first hypothesis is to provide an empirical validation 
of the conceptualisation of ‘generic’ versus ‘specific’ PROs, as we developed earlier.  
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Table 12 displays the descriptive data of the PROs in the sample (N=24), as well as 
the respective p-values representing the significance levels for the differences in 
technology transfer related activities between the PROs with a ‘generic’ and a 
‘specific’ research base. The non-parametric tests show that the two groups of PROs 
differ substantially in a variety of research and technology transfer indicators 
(supporting hypothesis 1). The results mostly point to the hypothesised direction: 
specific PROs score significantly higher on IP protection expenditure, invention 
disclosure, patent applications, active license agreements and license income. 
Additionally, the technology transfer offices seem to be somewhat older and they 
employ significantly more personnel managing the start-up process of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. 
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Table 12: Descriptive data and non parametric tests for generic and specific PROs (hypothesis 1) 
Data for 2002 M-U GENERIC PRO’S SPECIFIC PRO’S 
Variables P 
level 
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD 
Research 
expenditure,  
mio € 
 
0,4 
11 84,4 60,6 70,4 7 292,1 107 531,3 
IP protection 
expenditure, mio 
€ 
 
* 
10 7,7 0,3 16,8 7 254,9 6,5 594,5 
Invention 
disclosures  
** 10 34,8 25 31,8 7 98,4 75 89 
Patent 
applications US 
 
*** 
9 1,3 0 2,1 6 55 24,5 71 
Patent 
applications EU 
 
** 
5 2,2 1 2,6 5 22 27 15 
Total active 
license 
agreements, 
options, 
assignments 
 
** 
11 26,6 19 31,3 7 151,6 40 199 
License income 
2002, mio € 
 
 
** 
10 10,8 0,09 32,3 8 416,1 5,1 1154,1 
Number of spin-
offs 
0,3 13 2,15 2 2 9 4,1 3 4 
Number of start-
ups 
0,7 13 1,7 1 3,3 8 1,6 0,5 3 
Age of 
Technology 
Transfer Office 
 
0,2 
12 9 5 8,9 9 14,9 14 10 
FTE in 
Technology 
Transfer 
 
* 
14 7,16 4 6,6 10 22 15,5 29 
FTE in licensing ** 14 2,2 1,3 3,1 10 7,6 3,3 10,6 
FTE for SBEF * 
 
14 1,7 1 1,5 10 4 3,5 2,8 
* p < or = 0,1  ** p < or = 0,05  *** p < or = 0,01  ****p < or =0,001 
 
FTE = Full Time Equivalents 
SBEF = Science-based entrepreneurial firm 
M-U = Mann Whitney U  
 
There are a number of interesting observations to make from this table. First, the age 
of the technology transfer office -- as a proxy for experience of the PRO in the 
organisation of technology transfer activities -- is not significantly different for both 
types of institutes. Although the technology transfer offices of the generic public 
research organisations are somewhat younger, the difference is not significant. In a 
recent survey of TTOs from the OECD (2003, p. 38), it was found that most TTOs 
from public research organisations are less than 10 years old. Second, the specific 
PROs have significantly more invention disclosures as well as patents filed, 
suggesting there are intrinsic differences in the nature of the research activities, 
technological domains and the commercialisation trajectories adopted in the two 
groups of PROs. Third, generic and specific research organisation do not seem to 
differ in the amount of R&D expenditure they have. This suggests that in terms of 
research size and TTO experience, the generic and specific PROs are quite similar, 
providing a seemingly logical explanation for the fact that they do not differ from 
each other in terms of spin-offs and start-ups they generate.  
However, when we relate some input and output indicators from the previous table, 
some clear differences emerge. Table 13 summarises some comparative output 
indicators for generic and specific PROs. For one out of every three inventions that is 
disclosed, specific PROs seem to file a EU and/or US patent. The same ratio for 
generic PROs is 25:1. Moreover, generic PROs tend to patent almost only in the EU, 
while the specific institutes seem to have a much more global strategy, covering also 
the US. This indicates that specific PROs have a much more elaborated and 
professional staff involved in intellectual property issues: the IP staff tends to be three 
times a large in the specific group of PROs as compared to the generic ones, which is 
in turn reflected in the license income. Specific PROs generate more than 20 times the 
license income per full time equivalent employed in licensing activities as compared 
to the generic PROs. 
 
Table 13: Comparative output indicators for generic and specific PROs 
Median Generic PRO Specific PRO 
Invention disclosures / patent EU (US) 25 (NA1) 2,7 (3) 
License income / FTE in licensing 70 000 € 1 550 000 € 
License income / patent EU (US) 90 000 € (NA1) 189 000 €  
(208 000 €) 
License income / IP protection expenditure 0,3 € 0,78 € 
SBEF / patents EU (US) 3 (NA1) 0,13 (0,14) 
FTE SBEF / SBEF 0,3 FTE 1 FTE 
FTE TT, licensing en SBEF / SBEF 2 FTE 6 FTE 
(1) The median for filed US patents in the generic PROs is 0 
 
Although there is a clear input-output relation between IP expenditure and staff 
employed in licensing on one hand and license output such as number of licenses, 
patents and license income, the input-output relation between staff and science-based 
entrepreneurial firms is less clear. Generic PROs employ 2 full time equivalent 
employees for every venture that is created as compared to 6 in specific PROs. This 
potentially suggests that the technology transfer offices of specific PROs are more 
intensely involved in the establishment and incubation of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. Since there are three times as much people involved in the 
creation of these companies, we might expect that the coaching and support will be 
more elaborated.  
 
Overall, we find that specific PROs show clear indicators of a more professionalised 
technology transfer office: they significantly patent more and if they patent it is at a 
global rather than at a EU level; they generate significantly more license income; they 
have a larger staff, … Interestingly, they seem to generate about the same amount of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms in general and spin-offs in particular as the 
generic research organisations. However, if a specific PRO engages in establishing a 
SBEF, the data suggest that specific PROs put more effort in incubating and / or 
coaching the project.  
 
 
4.2. Hypothesis 2 and 3: Institutional linkage predicts founding resources and 
growth of SBEF 
  
Whereas the first hypothesis is tested at the level of the PRO in order to empirically 
validate the conceptual distinction between generic and specific PROs, the second and 
third hypothesis are tested at the level of the science-based entrepreneurial firm. Each 
company in the sample is coded for the two dimensions of institutional linkage at time 
of founding the company: the formality of technology transfer (two levels: formal 
transfer of technology – informal transfer of know how) and the research specificity 
of the PRO from which the venture emerged (two levels: generic PRO – specific 
PRO).  
 
Table 14 shows the descriptive data and the correlations of the variables used to test 
both hypothesis 2 and 3. The data display a huge variety in the companies in the 
sample, mirroring observations from academics and practitioners that science-based 
entrepreneurial firms differ substantially in their resource conditions and growth 
patterns. We included age and technology domain41 as contextual variables, as it is 
                                                                 
41 Technology domain was coded according t the following categories: 1= Life sciences and 
biotechnology, 2=Hardware and Microelectronics, 3= IT, 4=other 
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possible that these characteristics produce variation among the variables used to test 
the hypotheses. For example, life sciences ventures are generally argued to start with 
higher capital levels (Mangematin et al. 2003). Nevertheless, the coefficients do not 
display significant correlations between the variables of interest and the firms’ age, 
nor technological domain. 
The next section elaborates on the multivariate analyses and results for both 
hypothesis 2 and 3. 
 
Table 14: Means, standard deviations, ranges and correlations (of variables used to test 
hypothesis 2 and 3) 
* p < 0,05 
 
Total 
capital 
Empl. Prod. 
Tech. 
Growth 
capital 
Growth 
empl. 
Age Tech 
domain 
 
Resources at time of 
founding 
       
1. Total Capital, K €         
2. Employees, N 0,41*       
 
3. Productisation of the 
technology, 1-5 
0,18 0,1      
        
Growth measures        
4. Average annual 
growth in capital, K€ 
0,29* 0,28* -0,1     
5. Average annual 
growth in employees, 
N 
0,39* 0,04 0,07 0,41*    
        
Mean 786 
 
4 3 859 3 5,4 3 
Median 100 5 1 0 7 3 1 
Min 0,149 0 1 -1003 -2 1 1 
Max 6 137 42 5 1838 57 13 4 
SD 1522 5,3 1,2 2771 7 3 1 
Valid N 87 89 96 84 81 97 91 
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4.2.1. Hypothesis 2: Science-based entrepreneurial firms with a formal transfer 
of technology and emerging from specific PROs will display higher resource 
levels  
 
 
In order to assess the nature and the magnitude of the potential effect of institutional 
linkage on the resources endowed to science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of 
founding, a 2X2 factorial design for Multivariate Analysis of Variance is used. 
MANOVA is appropriate since we want to assess the effects of independent, 
categorical predictor variables on multiple dependent variables. More specifically, we 
test the effect of the formality of technology transfer (formal – informal) and the 
research specificity of the PRO (generic – specific) on the start capital, the 
productisation of the technology and the number of employees of the science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. 
We preferred a MANOVA to a series of separate ANOVA’s primarily because it has 
been argued that resources are intrinsically multidimensional and interacting (Brush et 
al., 2001; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004a). Morevover, MANOVA has a number of 
empirical advantages over performing separate ANOVAs on each dependent variable 
(Bray and Maxwell, 1990, 9; Hair et al. 1995). For example, MANOVA protects 
against inflated type I error due to multiple tests of likely correlated dependent 
variables. However, MANOVA has some strict assumptions that need to be met 
before this type of analysis can be performed. The assumptions of normality of the 
dependent variables, homogeneity of variances, sufficient correlation between the 
dependent variables and a balanced design (Hair et al., 1995), are all tested for and the 
results allow us to proceed with the planned analysis (see appendix for an overview of 
the tests).  
 
Table 15 gives an overview of the components of the multivariate analysis of variance 
used to test hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 15: Overview of Multivariate Analysis to test hypothesis 2 
Main effect Interaction effect 
Formality of technology transfer (a in Table 
16) 
-> Start capital * productisation of technology * 
employees 
 
Research specificity (b in Table 16) 
-> Start capital * productisation of technology * 
Formality * research specificity (c in Table 16) 
-> Start capital * productisation of technology * 
employees 
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employees 
 
In the course of the discussion, we assess the interactive or joint effects between the 
two categorical variables on the dependent resource variables collectively. First, we 
evaluate the interaction effect between formality of technology transfer and the 
research specificity of the parent PRO. More specifically, this analysis addresses the 
question whether or not spin-offs and start-ups differ in their resource endowments at 
time of founding, depending on the research specificity of the parent PRO. Second, 
we evaluate the main effects of each independent variable separately on the resource 
variables as a group.  
 
The MANOVA design, constructed as 2X2 combinations of institutional linkage, 
produces 4 groups of firms: (1) spin-offs (receiving formal transfer of technology) 
from specific PROs, (2) spin-offs from generic research organisations, (3) start-ups 
(receiving an informal transfer of know-how) from specific research organisations and 
(4) start-ups from generic PROs. The null hypothesis that the four groups of firms do 
not differ across the mean scores of the dependent variables can be rejected at the 0,05 
level (F=2,5), suggesting that institutional linkage is significantly associated with 
variations in founding resources.  
 
Table 16 contains the MANOVA results for testing the interaction and main effects. 
Evaluation of the interaction effect is important because it is a condition to correctly 
interpret the main effects. The multivariate tests -- Wilks Lambda and Pillai’s 
criterion42 -- indicate that there is a significant interaction effect: the differences 
between the groups of the first categorical variable (formality of technology transfer) 
vary depending on the level of the second independent variable (research specificity). 
This indicates that the main effects to not operate independently: the differences 
between spin-offs (formal technology transfer) and start-ups (informal transfer of 
know-how) are not equal across their origin from generic or specific parent 
organisations.  
                                                                 
42 Wilks Lambda and Pillai’s criterion represent multivariate F values. Wilks’ Lambda is the most 
commonly available and reported test statistic in a MANOVA setting. However Pillai’s criterion is 
more robust and more appropriate when there are small or unequal sample sizes. 
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Table 16: MANOVA for founding resources: Start capital, Productisation of technology and 
number of employees 
MANOVA  Wilks Lambda Pillai’s criterion df F P 
Formality of technology transfer (a) 
 0,743 0,257 3 7,601 0,000 
Research focus (b) 
0,977 0,023 3 0,518 0,671 
Formality * research focus (c) 0,889 0,111 3 2,5 0,049 
Adjusted R2 = 0.25 
Power 64% at alpha=0,05 
 
Figure 6 specifically documents the ordinal interaction effect that this entails43. Spin-
offs (with a formal transfer of technology) seem to be established with higher resource 
levels than start-ups (with an informal transfer of know-how), and this difference is 
reinforced by the research specificity of the PRO from which the science-based 
entrepreneurial firm emerges. Since the ordinal interaction effect is conceptually 
acceptable, we further evaluate the main effects separately and investigate the specific 
group mean differences using a post hoc procedure. 
Figure 6: Plot of interaction effect in 2X2 factorial design MANOVA 
 
First, we find a significant main effect of the formality of technology transfer and the 
resource endowments of the firms: the spin-offs -- the science-based entrepreneurial 
firms that received a formal transfer of technology at time of founding -- are founded 
                                                                 
43 The lines are not parallel and do not cross between levels, indicating that the effects of both 
independent variables are not equal across the groups but the magnitude is in the same direction. 
Weighted Means
Wilks lambda=.88890, F=2.7497, p=.04964
Vertical bars denote 0.95 confidence intervals
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with higher resource levels as compared to the start-ups, which are launched based on 
an informal transfer of know-how. Conversely, we find no direct effect of the research 
specificity on the resource endowments -- i.e. start capital, productisation of 
technology and the number of employees -- of the science-based entrepreneurial firms 
at time of founding. 
 
Second, we are also interested in the nature of the differences among the 
combinations of groups, for each dependent variable separately. This allows us to 
discern whether it is start capital, productisation of technology and / or the number of 
employees that accounts most for the observed differences between the groups. To 
analyse this, we use a post hoc procedure. To avoid inflated type I errors commonly 
prevalent in small samples such as ours, (Hair et al. 1995), we decided to use the 
Scheffe test, which is argued to be one of the most conservative post hoc tests (Winer 
et al., 1991). Doing so, we downsize the chance of obtaining false significance 
levels44.  
 
Scheffe tests show that the differences between spin-offs and start-ups across the 
research specificity of their parent PROs, holds true for start capital and the 
productisation of technology. Spin-offs originating from public research organisations 
with a specific research or technology focus start activities with significantly higher 
capital levels than the other three groups (p=0,02, p=0,000, p=0,004). However, for 
the productisation of technology the difference is only significant between the spin-
offs from both specific and generic PROs on one hand and the start-ups from specific 
PROs on the other. The univariate results also indicate that the differences in 
employees are non significant across all groups.  
 
                                                                 
44 Moreover, Kruskall Wallis tests display results in the same direction (KW=19,5; p<0,001) for start 
capital en degree of productisation of the technology (KW=8,2; p<0,05). For both dependent variables 
box whisker plots show 1>2,3,4; 2>3,4 and 3<4. 
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Table 17: Post hoc tests for 2X2 factorial MANOVA (hypothesis 2) 
 Spin-offs 
from 
specific 
PROs (1) 
Mean (Sd) 
N = 26 
Spin-offs 
from 
generic 
PROs (2) 
Mean (Sd) 
N = 31 
Start-ups 
from 
specific 
PROs (3) 
Mean (Sd) 
N = 11 
Start-ups 
from 
generic 
PROs (4) 
Mean (Sd) 
N = 18 
Total 
Sample  
 
Mean 
Valid 
N=86 
Scheffe test  
 
Start capital, 
K € 
1766 
(2168) 
606 (1141) 23 (27) 148 (221) 786 1>2*, 1>3 **, 
1>4 *** 
2>3* 
Productisation 
of technology 
2,9 (1) 2,9 (1) 2 (1) 2,5 (1) 4 
 
1,2>3 * 
 
Employees 4 (3) 4 (5) 2 (2) 5 (8) 3 
 
 * p < or = 0,1  ** p < or = 0,05  *** p < or = 0,01  ****p < or =0,001 
 
Descriptive data are reported in real values; for significance testing the log of variables start capital and 
employees is used. 
 
These results potentially indicate that spin-offs are the result of a clear strategic choice 
for commercialising intellectual property through setting up a new firm. Since these 
spin-offs start with the highest capital levels, this mirrors the professionalisation of 
technology transfer activities in the originating parent from an organisational point of 
view and the observation that these companies probably have higher IP valuations at 
time of founding. In other words, the professionalisation trend of technology transfer 
activities in specific PROs seems to have the largest impact on the start capital of the 
spin-offs 
 
One of the impediments of using a MANOVA, is that it is hard to control for potential 
confounding categorical variables, of which technological domain is particularly 
relevant for this research. More specifically, life sciences companies have been argued 
to generally start larger as compared to companies in other technological domains 
(Mangematin, 2003). In order to test the robustness of the MANOVA results across 
technological domain we separate the effect of ‘life sciences’ by providing the split 
sample ANOVA results for the life sciences sub-sample and the MANOVA results for 
the non- life sciences sub-sample. Given the small sample size of the first category 
(N=22) it is not possible to perform a 2X2 factorial MANOVA. As a result, we only 
test the main effect of formality of technology transfer on the dependent variables 
identified earlier.  
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The life sciences companies sub-sample shows that the formality of technology 
transfer is not significant (Wilks Lambda=0,79; F=1,6 p=0,22)45. Although the life 
science spin-offs start with somewhat higher capital levels (N=16, of which 3 come 
from a specific PRO) as compared to the life sciences start-ups (N=6, of which all 
come from generic PROs), the difference is not significant. This actually strengthens 
our finding from the MANOVA: spin-offs are significantly different from start-ups, 
even including the non-significant differences of the life sciences group. Further, we 
can make an argument that the life sciences spin-offs originating from generic PROs 
actually downsize the real differences between spin-offs from specific and generic 
PROs. Therefore, we can conclude that the significance levels found in the main 
MANOVA are valid across technological domain.  
For the non- life sciences sub-sample (N=68), the ordinal interaction effect between 
formality of technology transfer and research specificity of the PRO is significant 
(Wilks Lambda=0,8; F=3,5; p=0,02), showing a significant main effect of the 
formality of technology transfer (Wilks Lambda=0,76; F=4,6; p=0,007). This is in 
line with what we found in the MANOVA for the complete sample: spin-offs have 
higher capitalisation and a higher degree of productisation than the start-ups. This is 
especially true for the spin-offs originating from specific research organisations.  
 
To summarise, hypothesis 2a is supported in that the formality of technology transfer 
predicts start capital and, to a lesser extent, the degree to which the technology is 
embodied in a product. The effect does not hold true for the number of employees, 
which is remarkable. It means that spin-offs start with more capital but with an equal 
amount of human resources, as compared to the start-ups. However, it is usually the 
human resources that make up the capital intensity and value of the venture. This 
suggests that the higher capital level can mainly be explained by the valuation strategy 
of the intellectual property going into the venture. Hypothesis 2b is not supported. 
However, there is a significant interaction effect between the research specificity and 
the formality of technology transfer, for the three resource variables collectively. The 
spin-offs which have a formal transfer of technology, emerging from specific PROs 
start with significantly higher capital levels than the spin-offs from generic PROs. 
                                                                 
45 Finding the additional discriminatory power of the effect of formality of technology transfer in the 
life sciences sub-sample could be solved by increasing the significance level. However, the p-value is 
too high (p=0,21) in order to do so. 
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Conversely, the start-ups -- that are established with an informal transfer of know-how 
-- from specific PROs have significantly less start capital that the start-ups from 
generic PROs. This indicates that technology transfer offices at specific PROs tend to 
focus on the support and/or incubation of science-based entreprneeurial firms that 
receive formal intellectual property of the research organisation at time of founding, 
whereas the generic universities seem to support both spin-offs and start-ups. 
 
4.2.2. Hypothesis 3: Science-based entrepreneurial firms with a formal transfer 
of technology will display higher growth 
 
 
Since institutional linkage seems to matter in understanding resource endowments of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms, we also need to address the issue whether 
institutional linkage at time of founding has an enduring effect on the growth of these 
firms. In other words, do the spin-offs grow more than the start-ups? Given the policy 
attention for IP based science-based entrepreneurial firms (the spin-offs), hypothesis 3 
stipulated that companies founded with a formal transfer of technology are more 
likely to grow in employees and capital, as compared to firms that are started without 
formal transfer of technology (the start-ups)46. The main reason for hypothesising this 
is the fact that governments are increasingly giving attention to the creation, 
ownership and exploitation of IP emerging from publicly funded research 
organisations, given the evidence and awareness that IP that can be protected through 
patents and copyright, contribute to technological innovation and growth (OECD, 
2003, p. 21). 
 
We analyse the association between the formality of technology transfer, start capital 
and growth using regression analysis 47. We control for ‘demographic’ variables in the 
                                                                 
46 We deliberately choose not to focus on growth in revenues because it has been argued that traditional 
accounting based measures are not appropriate for young firms in high technology sectors (Lee et al., 
2001; Shane and Stuart, 2002). 
47 We choose not to include the growth variables as additional dependent variables in the 2X2 
MANOVA for different reasons. First, it is conceptually confusing to combine resource variables at 
time of founding with growth variables that are inherently evaluated at a later stage. Second, the 
research specificity of the PRO will probably only impact the early stages of the companies’ existence, 
whereas the formality of technology transfer can be argued to have more enduring effects on the firm, 
since the firm need to maintain its acquired technology base. Thus, for assessing growth we specifically 
focus on one aspect of institutional linkage. Third, it is important to separate out the individual effects 
of formality of technology transfer and start capital on growth.  
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analysis that are generally acknowledged to potentially influence growth measures 
(Delmar, 2003): technology domain, age and firm size. First, we take into account 
whether or not the science-based entrepreneurial firm is a life sciences firm. Life 
sciences firms are argued to have a higher minimum critical scale (Mangematin, 
2003) and therefore can be expected to display higher average growth. Second, since 
population ecologists have traditionally argued that firm growth is age related we also 
take into account the age of the SBEF. Empirical studies indicate that firm growth 
decreases with firm age (Barron et al., 1994). Thus, the growth potential of new firms 
seems to be most apparent during their initial phase of evolution. Third, we use the 
number of active researchers, entrepreneurs / founders and managers in the company 
as a proxy of firm size. For convenience, we label all the active people in the firm as 
“employees”, although not all of them are on the pay roll of the company. We take 
firm size into account because several noted studies have recently reached the 
conclusion that the basic tenet underlying Gibrat's Law - that growth rates are 
independent of firm size – actually does not hold (Audretsch et al. 2002). Estimating 
how the different factors affect growth would require the following regression 
equation: 
 
Growth employees (capital) = f(Formality of technology transfer, Start Capital, 
Employees, Life sciences firm, Age) 
 
 
However, estimating the full model in one equation is not appropriate because there is 
strong mutual dependence between start capital and growth of the science-based 
entrepreneurial firm, both in terms of employees and capital. More specifically, 
ventures might look for a high level of start capital to be able to recruit a high number 
of employees in the years to come, which implies that a priori growth expectations 
determine the start capital. Conversely, start capital might be a reflection of the 
soundness of the business plan, which allows the company to grow in terms of 
employees and raising additional capital. Moreover, the results from hypothesis 2 
indicate that the formality of technology transfer is highly predictive for the start 
capital of the firm, which makes separating its individual effects necessary to tackle 
the issue of interest. In these cases, it is generally advised to perform a two stage least 
squares regression (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, 298), in order to separate out the 
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effects of the problematic variables. Therefore, we estimate the following system of 
equations: 
 
Stage 1: Start capital = f (Formality of technology transfer, Employees, Age of firm, 
Life Sciences firm) 
  
Stage 2: Growth employees (capital) = f (Formality of technology transfer, 
Employees, Age of firm, Life Sciences firm, Residual of stage 1 regression) 
 
The first regression estimates the extent in which the formality of technology transfer 
explains for start capital, taking into account some demographic characteristics. For 
assessing the significance levels of the variables included in the model on the growth 
of the SBEF, we include the residual of the first stage regression in the main 
regression. As a result, we include an instrumental variable in the main regression 
(stage 2), which is a proxy for start capital.  More specifically, by taking the residual 
we include the variance of start capital that is not explained by the other independent 
variables in the model. This allows us to evaluate the exogenous effects of both 
formality of technology transfer and start capital on the growth of the SBEFs, both in 
terms of employees and capital.  
Table 18 provides an overview of the regression results.  
 
Table 18: Two-stage least-squares regression to test hypothesis 3 
 STAGE 1 STAGE 2 
Variables Start capital 
 
Beta (St. err.) 
Sign Growth in 
employees 
 
Beta (St. err.) 
Sign Growth in 
capital 
 
Beta (St. err.) 
Sign 
Formality of 
technology transfer 
0,44 (0,47) 0,000 
**** 
0,03 (0,67) 0,79 0,19 (1,6) 0,09 * 
Employees 0,29 (0,26) 0,006 
*** 
0,07 (0,37) 0,55 0,29 (0,89) 0,01 
*** 
Life sciences firm 0,17 (0,47) 0,11 -0,12 (0,64) 0,31 0,07 (1,69) 0,54 
Age -0,11 (0,08) 0,28 0,18 (0,1) 0,13 0,28 (0,27) 0,02 ** 
Residual   0,37 (0,17) 0,003 
*** 
0,19 (0,42) 0,09 * 
       
R Sq 31%  19%  26%  
R Sq adjusted 27%  12%  19%  
F 7,38  2,76  3,95  
P model  0,000 
**** 
 0,027 
** 
 0,004 
*** 
* p < or =  0,1  ** p < or = 0,05  *** p < or = 0,01  **** p < or = 0,001 
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The first stage regression clearly shows that both the formality of technology transfer 
and the number of employees explain significantly for the start capital of science-
based entrepreneurial firms. In line with the findings presented earlier, spin-offs start 
with higher capital levels as compared to start-ups. The second stage regression 
results indicate that start capital has an effect on the growth in employees, 
independent from the formality of technology transfer (p<0,01). However, the 
significance of the formality of technology transfer disappears, suggesting that start 
capital has a mediating effect between the formality of technology transfer and growth 
in employees. Baron et al. (1986) argue that at least two requirements need to be met 
for evaluating mediation. First, the initial variable needs to be correlated with the 
mediator (formality of technology transfer affects start capital, stage 1 regression). 
Second, the mediator affects the outcome variable (start capital affects growth in 
employees, stage 2 regression). Since a direct estimation of the effect of formality of 
technology transfer on growth is not appropriate given the mutual dependence 
between start capital and growth, a path from formality to growth in employees can be 
implied based on the two conditions that are met. The implied effect of formality of 
technology transfer on growth in employees however, disappears when the mediator 
start capital is controlled. Hence, being a ‘spin-off’ – with a formal transfer of 
technology at time of founding – does not necessarily mean that higher employee 
growth will be displayed as compared to the start-ups. The implied effect is largely 
mediated by the capital levels of these firms.  
 
For the effect of formality of technology transfer on growth in capital a different 
picture emerges: both start capital and the formality of technology transfer have an 
individual effect on capital growth. The formality of technology transfer continues to 
explain the growth in capital. Thus, starting as a spin-off -- as opposed to a start-up -- 
has intrinsically higher potential to attract additional capital, irrespective of the capital 
at time of founding. This shows that investors in general, and the venture capital 
community in particular, seem to be more interested in companies with protected 
technology / intellectual property, favouring spin-offs over start-ups. Moreover, the 
individual effect of the formality of technology transfer on capital growth is intrinsic 
to the activities of the firm: spin-offs often need additional (venture) capital in order 
to further develop and maintain their acquired technology base. On the other hand, 
however, the high valuations of these companies at the onset of activities may blur our 
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perspective on the amount of working capital that is effectively available to develop 
the business. It may be that spin-offs – as compared to start-ups – start up with too 
small an amount of working capital as compared to the total capital of the firm. 
Concurrently, however, we observe that a higher number of employees also increase 
the propensity to attract additional capital (p<0,05), pointing to the capital intensity of 
the nature of the technological and business development. Figure 7 summarises the 
regression coefficients for the relationships we tested in hypothesis 3. The first path 
model documents evidence for a mediating effect of start capital between the 
formality of technology transfer and employee growth. The second path model shows 
that both start capital and formality of technology transfer have independently 
predictive capacity for capital growth. 
Figure 7: Coefficients of regression equations: relationships between formality of technology 
transfer, start capital and growth in employees / capital (hypothesis 3) 
 
 
      
 
         
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < or =  0,1  ** p < or = 0,05  *** p < or = 0,01  **** p < or = 0,001 
 
 
Hence, hypothesis 3 is partially supported in that the formality of technology transfer 
predicts growth in capital, independent from start capital. We have shown that this is 
not the case for employee growth, where the implied relationship is mediated by start 
capital. Drawing conclusions from this requires some caution. The growth measures 
used in this paper illustrate capacity growth, mirroring employment and the 
propensity to attract (foreign) capital. A link to financial performance is a step further 
along the line and cannot be evaluated from this analysis. 
Formality of 
technology transfer 
Start 
Capital 
Growth 
Employees 
Formality of 
technology transfer 
Start 
Capital 
Growth 
Capital 
0,44 **** (stage 1) 0,37 *** (stage 2) 
0,19 * (stage 2) 
0,19 * 
0,03 (stage 2) 
0,44 **** (stage 1) 
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The remainder of the paper summarises the results from this study and discusses the 
arguments and contributions that can be drawn from this.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
This study explicitly recognises the heterogeneity of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms in Europe and provides a mutually exclusive categorisation for these firms 
denoting their institutional linkage at time of founding. More specifically, we 
attempted to understand whether institutional linkage affects the resource endowments 
of science-based entrepreneurial firms and whether this matters in terms of the growth 
of these companies. We operationalise institutional linkage as a two-dimensional 
construct, consisting of the formality of technology transfer (formal or informal) and 
the research specificity of the PRO (generic or specific).  The main argument of the 
paper is that institutional linkage matters in predicting the resources a science-based 
entrepreneurial firm attracts at time of founding. Contrary to our expectations we 
found mixed results as to the effect of formal transfer of technology on the growth of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms. We tackled these issues in three steps.  
 
First, we hypothesised that specific PROs are more active in technology transfer 
related activities as compared to PROs with a generic research base. In recent years, a 
lot of research organisations have attempted to formalise technology transfer and 
capture a larger share of the economic rents associated with technological innovation 
by establishing technology transfer offices (TTOs) (Siegel et al., 2003). Although 
TTOs have in common that they facilitate technological diffusion through the 
licensing to industry of inventions or intellectual property resulting from university 
research, research organisations seem to differ significantly in the magnitude of these 
activities. We have shown that specific PROs engage much more in 
commercialisation activities than generic ones. This is particularly reflected in the IP 
protection expenditure, invention disclosures, patent applications and license income. 
Looking at the relative productivity by comparing some input indicators to output 
measures, it was shown that the PROs with a specific research base file significantly 
more patents relative to the disclosed inventions as compared to the generic PROs. 
Apparently, the nature of the research base is important to contextualise the 
commercial use of research performed in PROs. Although inventions and licensing 
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activity have an impact on the entrepreneurial activity, these indicators could well be 
moderators for the particular research base of the PROs. What is especially intriguing 
is the fact that despite the larger critical mass of specific PROs in terms of persons 
employed in the technology transfer departments, the number of science-based 
entrepreneurial firms they start in a given year is not significantly different from the 
generic PROs which seem to have a less elaborated technology transfer office. This 
seems to suggest that the research portfolio is the critical factor in the establishment of 
SBEFs and that the TTO plays a mediating role.  
 
Second, we tested whether institutional linkage predicts firm resources at time of 
founding. We found that spin-offs clearly display higher capital levels and a more 
productised technology than the start-ups in the sample. The fact that the spin-offs are 
established with higher capital levels reflects the fact that PROs want to value their 
technology by converting it into equity shares. In turn, this leads to a higher valuation 
of the venture at time of founding and, by definition, to higher capital levels 
(otherwise the PRO would own 90 + % of the company). In this respect it is 
interesting to find that the spin-offs from specific PROs start up at an even larger scale 
than the spin-offs from the generic PROs. Conversely, the start-ups from the PROs 
with a specific research base show the lowest resource levels. This might indicate two 
interrelated issues. First, setting up start-ups seems to be of less strategic importance 
for PROs that specialise in one or a number of technological domains. This would be 
in line in what we found in a parallel study (Moray and Clarysse, 2004): IMEC, for 
example changed its strategy the last 5 years to focusing on establishing spin-offs. But 
even when the research institute was only active in spinning off ‘start-ups’ (late 
eighties - early nineties), these companies were significantly ‘smaller’ as compared to 
the spin-offs from other PROs (Moray, 2004). Second, in the same study we found 
that the average starting capital of the science-based entrepreneurial firms from a 
specific PRO has more than quadrupled over the last ten years. This increase in capital 
went together with the professionalisation of the technology transfer office and an 
increasing focus on transfer of intellectual property into new companies. Thus, if 
PROs want to commercialise their technology using spin-offs as a vehicle, this usually 
means that they need to set up an equity relation with the new firm. However, doing 
this boosts the value of the company at time of founding and makes external capital a 
necessity to balance the shareholder structure. In order to attract capital, the business 
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plan needs to be more ambitious, more oriented on quick return and growth and more 
focused on exit related valuation. All this implies, however, that even more capital is 
needed while only a few of all invention disclosures have the intrinsic potential to 
establish such a growth path. This seems to be what professionalised TTOs at specific 
PROs are learning: if one wants to create spin-offs with the potential to become high 
growth ventures, scrutinised selection of ideas needs to be done, much support will be 
needed to incubate them and they will have to be established at sufficiently large 
scale. Ideas that do not match these criteria are much less likely to receive a formal 
transfer of technology and will probably be started as a small SME. This is much less 
true for generic PROs where also start-ups -- receiving informal know how – tend to 
be guided towards the public / private equity funds and start at a larger scale. A lot of 
these generic PROs are universities that want to meet today’s expectations of being an 
“entrepreneurial university”. Following a second academic revolution (after research 
had complemented their teaching mission), they also want to envision themselves as 
hotbeds of entrepreneurial activity. In this perspective, it is likely that they equally 
want to emphasise spin-offs and start-ups, resulting in a supportive structure for both 
types of firms. This interconnectedness of different objectives may partly explain the 
fact that start-ups and spin-offs from generic PROs do not differ as much in their 
starting resources as spin-offs and start-ups in general. 
 
To conclude, the mechanism by which research organisations have traditionally 
developed and commercialised a technology, licensing of an intellectual property to a 
large, established firm who ultimately develops the technology in a saleable good 
(Powers and McDougall, 2004), still happens much more frequently than establishing 
SBEFs. The ratio for specific PROs however is larger (11:1) as compared to generic 
ones (6:1). Licensing or equity participation to a new firm has become a logical 
extension and potential trade off. This alternative commercialisation route represents 
research organisations’ efforts at increasing external prestige and legitimacy (Feldman 
et al., 2002) enhancing revenues streams (Bray and Lee, 2000). The Lambert Review 
of Business-University Collaboration (2003) raises concern that some public research 
organisations may be actually setting too high a price on their IP. It is argued in this 
respect that public funding for research, and for the development of technology 
transfer offices, is intended to benefit the economy as a whole rather than to create 
significant new sources of revenues for the research organisations. 
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Finally, without having the ambition of performing an in depth growth analysis, we 
looked at whether spin-offs display higher growth as compared to start-ups. This 
analysis is informed by the fact that European public research organisations have been 
strongly stimulated by policy makers to focus on the commercialisation of intellectual 
property, because of the greater awareness that results of scientific research, in the 
form of IP that can be protected through patents and copyright, contributes to 
technological innovation and economic growth (OECD, 2003, p21). Hence, for PROs 
having a critical mass of science-based entrepreneurial firms in general and spin-offs 
in particular seems to be an important signal to the broader environment and policy 
makers that PROs research activities provide sufficient return to society.  
Our hypotheses – that spin-offs grow more in terms of employees and capital – 
receive mixed support. The regression results indicate that the formality of technology 
transfer does not have an isolated effect on employee growth; start capital seems to 
operate as a mediator. In practice this means that having a sufficient amount of start 
capital is a powerful predictor of employment growth in the subsequent years, 
irrespective of whether or not the company received a formal transfer of technology. 
Being a spin-off as opposed to a start-up however, has a single direct effect on the 
propensity to attract additional capital. In other words, receiving a formal transfer of 
technology does not only impact the start capital but also the capital that can be 
attracted in the years to come. This reinforces our finding that these ventures are 
under scrutinised selection procedures since most ideas have not the intrinsic potential 
to justify a large capital basis and subsequent capital injections. Further, these 
companies need be incubated or embedded in a supportive entrepreneurial / business 
development network, to raise their chance on success. 
 
These results open the perspective for policy makers to be cautious for focusing their 
measures solely to (IP based) spin-off companies, which are argued to have most 
potential to become high growth ventures, given the breadth of their technology 
platform, the possibility of mass production of a revolutionary product / new material 
and / or the scope of their market. Technology transfer offices have often been 
established or re-structured exactly to serve this type of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. Start-ups however, embody tacit know how and often do not require a full-
fledged organisational structure to support the start-up process. However, in some 
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cases we observe that companies that could potentially start without formal transfer of 
technology from the PRO, are expected to do so given the upsurge of the phenomenon 
since the mid nineties, resulting in high valuations and necessary capitalisations. From 
a purely economic development perspective, stimulating start-ups could be argued to 
be equally important, especially given the lower costs involved in setting up these 
ventures. 
 
Contribution to theory and limitations  
This study contributes indirectly to theory in that it dynamically integrates elements of 
two theoretical perspectives in one empirical analysis that have traditionally been 
argued to emphasise competing aspects of an organisation’s struggle for viability and 
competitive advantage. Resource dependence theorists posit that firms differ in their 
possession of resources and that, if used effectively, this resource asymmetry can be a 
source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1996; 2001). Institutional 
theorists however, suggest that -- while resource based theory assumes that resource 
acquisition is guided by economically rational choices motivated by efficiency and 
profitability -- in fact, normatively rational choices are made for attracting the 
necessary resources, induced by historical precedent and social context (Oliver, 1997).  
Based on these perspectives, we designed an empirical analyses typically focused 
towards better understanding the potential predictive capacity of institutional linkage 
on the founding resources and growth of science-based entrepreneurial firms. The 
research has shown that institutional linkage matters and therefore needs to be taken 
into account by technology transfer managers as well as potential, (academic) 
entrepreneurs when commercialising research results through setting up new ventures.  
 
Our study also contribute to academic entrepreneurship research, in that this study is 
one of the very few attempts trying to better understand the intrinsic effect of 
institutional linkage on the resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. Traditionally, researchers have looked at broader environmental circumstances 
in understanding the resource constraints and opportunities for new ventures. For 
example, the availability of venture capital or public capital in a region and a network 
of entrepreneurs / experienced managers have traditionally been argued to be 
important for the successful establishment of the resource base of a firm (Roberts, 
1991). In most studies to date, resources of new firms are evaluated in view of their 
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external environment and how the company succeeds in managing these 
interrelationships. This study substantially adds to these research endeavours by 
taking another lens: the parent organisation in general and the nature of the knowledge 
base, including varying emphases on respective transfer modalities seem to be equally 
important to take into account when assessing the founding resources and growth of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms. Interestingly, whether or not a company receives 
a formal transfer of technology and originates from a specific or a generic research 
organisation seems to be an issue that cannot be managed by an (academic) 
entrepreneur: it is intrinsic to the PRO from which the company emerges.  
 
Although this study offers new insights in sources of explanation for the diversity of 
science-based entrepreneurial firms, it is not without its limitations. First, the data of 
the technology transfer related activities from the public research organisations is 
limited to one year. Although for the purposes of our study – empirically validating 
the difference between PROs with a generic and a specific research base – this is not 
necessarily a problem it misses out a number of research opportunities to be 
addressed. One issue that could be tackled with multi year data is whether or not 
PROs with a specific research base do set up more spin-offs as opposed to start-ups, 
for example during the last five years, in order to capture the broader institutional / 
environmental changes. Although our data show a spin-off / start-up ratio of 0,5 for 
the generic PROs and 0,17 for the specific PROs, data of one year is indicative at 
most. Testing this intuition with the company data was not possible given the range of 
the period in which the ventures are established. Nevertheless, temporal 
considerations are a potentially important issue regarding the time horizons involved 
in potential strategic changes in setting up different types if science-based 
entrepreneurial firms. The same is true for developing a technology, licensing it, and 
seeing it produce an income stream (Powers and McDougall, 2004). Second, this offer 
does not offer insight in the intrinsic quality of the technology transfer offices. The 
indicators are used to display the numeric variation across PROs and as signals of 
technology transfer related activities. Today, a lot of European PROs run their own 
technology transfer operations. Following Lambert (2003), this study opens up the 
question whether all these PROs have a strong enough research base to be able to 
build the high-quality offices of their own. Further research should shed light on 
whether or not the development of shared services in technology transfer on a regional 
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basis and/or technological specialisation basis should be encouraged. Third, since 
some companies in the sample are still relatively young (ranging from 1 – 13 years), it 
might be too early to rightfully assess the growth that these companies display. On the 
other hand, this is not necessarily a problem for our research purpose, which was 
specifically aimed at discerning the individual impact of the formal transfer of 
technology and start capital on the growth in employees and capital science-based 
entrepreneurial firms display. 
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APPENDIX: TESTS OF ASSUMPTIONS FOR MANOVA 
 
Hypothesis 2 assesses the interaction and main effects of institutional linkage on the 
resources endowed to science-based entrepreneurial firms using a 2X2 factorial 
MANOVA. 
Because two of the three dependent variables - start capital and number of employees 
- were not normally distributed (positively skewed), we transformed the variables by 
taking the natural logarithm. MANOVA is argued to be robust for small deviations 
from normality and the two most important assumptions for legitimately running a 
MANOVA are met (Hair et al., 1995). First, the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices across groups. With most of the univariate tests showing 
non-significance, we can proceed to the multivariate test. Box’s M test has a 
significance level of 0,22, allowing us not to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity 
of variance-covariance matrices stating that the groups show no significant 
differences. As a result, we are able to directly interpret the results without having to 
consider group sizes as potential impacts on the statistical tests of group differences. 
The second assumption is sufficient correlation of the dependent measures, which is 
assessed with the Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The significance level is 0,000, 
satisfying the necessary level of intercorrelation to justify MANOVA. Table 19 
summarises this diagnostic information. 
 
Table 19: Tests of assumptions for 2X2 factorial MANOVA: Homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrix and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
 Start capital 
(log) 
Productisation of 
technology  
Employees (log) Overall 
 Statistic P Statistic P Statistic p Statistic p 
Univariate         
Levene 1,99 0,12 0,85 0,47 0,61 0,61   
Cochran 0,41 0,04 0,37 0,64 0,34 0,62   
Multivariate:  
Box M 
      25,05 0,22 
Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity 
      55,03 0,00
0 
 
Although our research design is not strictly balanced, it is argued that more or less 
balanced designs are appropriate to enable MANOVA (Hair et al., 1995). In practice 
this means that the largest cell size divided by the smallest cell size of the groups that 
are created by the factorial design should be smaller than 3 (2,8 for our study). 
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APPENDIX 1: CINE: SPRING 200448 
 
 
The strategy has evolved that today CINE builds, sells and supports secure 
middleware and distributed content protection solutions for audiovisual markets, 
mainly for the Digital Cinema and Broadband/Broadcast network applications. The 
current CEO of CINE has more than 20 years of experience in several successful 
start-ups in Europe and has significant sales and product marketing expertise. By 2002 
- 2003, three of the founders left the company.  
 
CINE targets the European marketplace to establish strong partnerships with market 
leaders and provide them added value through leading edge R&D. They focus on 
three high-growth markets: Digital Cinema, Professional Broadcast and Broadcast / 
Broadband applications. They plan to become a recognised technology provider in 
content protection for business and consumer applications. CINE approaches its 
markets in a four-steps process. They search for leading equipment providers, build 
relations and recognition through their expertise and positions itself on the market as a 
technology sub-contractor and a licensor of his middleware. Finally, they produce 
prototypes and products. 
 
Since July 2002, the Company exploits its own IPR and middleware to carry out 
several paid developments projects that has confirmed the CINE business model and 
technology. The fiscal year 2003 showed a substantial increase in sales and a first year 
of profitable operation. The Company is seeking for a 2nd round of capital to penetrate 
more quickly its targeted markets by accelerating its R&D and the commercial 
development of its activities.  
                                                                 
48 Absracted from Moray, N and B. Clarysse. 2004. External Professional Management in a University 
Spin-off: Friend or Foe? In: Iniciativa Emprendedora . Con la colaboración académica del IESE, 
Universidad de Navarra, España [In Spanish – English text available]. 
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APPENDIX 2: THREE CASE STUDIES OF IMEC SPIN-OFFS: VIVACTIS, SIRIUS 
COMMUNICATIONS AND C-CAM TECHNOLOGIES 
 
A. VIVACTIS  
 
Started in February 2002. 
Technology situated on cross borders of MicroSystem technology and biology. 
 
Core Technology49,50 
The research activitie s that lead to the creation of Vivactis were started early 1995 at 
IMEC. Vivactis is IMEC’s first spin-off in the emerging fields of microelectronics 
and biotechnology, known within IMEC as the Human++ program. Most of the early 
research was performed during the Ph.D. of one of the founders, resulting in the thesis 
“non- labelled techniques for physiometry”, Leuven (2000). During the Ph. D. work, a 
prototype sensor was fabricated (1998): Biological tests proved that the device could 
sense the activation of living cells by addition of an agonist. The work resulted in the 
creation of Vivactis, first incubating in IMEC (July 2001), and started in February 
2002. Vivactis’ technology is situated on the cross borders of MicroSystem 
technology and biology. Vivactis is a biotechnology platform company primarily 
serving the life science industry. Also the food industry and the chemical seem to be 
promising markets. The researchers built a system (calorimeter) that allows the 
measurement of minimal temperature differences. Vivactis’ activities require a 
dynamic combination of several scientific disciplines: biochemistry, biology, drug 
discovery, electronics, MEMS engineering and computer science. Vivactis has a 
double mission statement: (1) Bring screening and assay-development of any target at 
the fingertips of any expert and non-expert scientist (2) Give the scientist information 
of the complete activity spectrum of any compound. 
 
Vivactis' in-house synergy between microsystem technology and biology enables the 
company to bring its proprietary microcalorimetry technology as a general and 
universally applicable assay technology to the drug discovery market. The 
                                                                 
49 Interviews and 
http://www.leuveninc.com/pooled/profiles/BF_COMP/view.asp?Q=BF_COMP_4174; 
http://www.vivactis.be/; (most recent access: May 2003) 
50 Interviews and Trends, 22-02-02 ‘IMEC baart spin-off’ and 28-02-02 ‘IMEC incubatiefonds 
investeert in eerste projecten’ 
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microcalorimetry technology and a number of strategic applications are protected by 
patents.  
 
History 
1993 The department MicroSystems at IMEC (Belgium) was started 
(mechanisch bewerken van silicium)  
 
1994 PVG (co-founder) starts working for IMEC in the department 
MicroSystems. His PhD focused on binding between molecules (and 
later specifically biomolecules). 
 
1997 – 2000 PVG works for Heraeus. He defended his thesis successfully May 
2000. The experience at Heraeus led PVG to have a quality focus and 
to gain business sense (‘It is important to take commercial issues into 
account during the research process’51). 
 
1995–2000  PhD of KV in the department Microsystem at IMEC: she developed a 
sensor, allowing to measure activity in cells. During this research, she 
worked for a while in Gasthuisberg (University Hospital of Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven) and Janssen Pharmaceutica, since they delivered 
the cells needed to test how they would react on medical compounds.  
  
Building credibility for the technology was key (‘people laughed at 
what I did’). After four years of intensive research, KV had a few 
invited papers and people started to ‘believe’ in the technology. Mid 
2000, a decision had to be made: sell the technology or create value 
through a spin-off. She chose for the latter. Initially, she wanted to start 
small but IMEC did not agree; “you have to go international or you 
just don’t start”. 
 
2000 IMEC proposes KV to ask PVG to come back to IMEC to contribute to 
the spin-off process52. 
                                                                 
51 Interview with PV, June 2001 
52 KV and PVG were already good friends long before the plans for a spin-off emerged 
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PV joins IMEC in order to participate in the start-up effort KV and PV 
met abut a year earlier at one of the invited paper sessions of KV) 
 
02-2001 A Private Limited company (bvba) is created for IP reasons (with 3 
partners: KV, PVG and PV53). Patents: 2 pure technical patents and 3 
applications. Goal is to incorporate this entity once the spin-off is 
formally established. 
 
06-2001 Technology: Vivactis examines several applications in micro-
electronics. There is a Prototype but no proof of concept on biological 
material. 
There is a generic platform allowing the development of about 30 
different services. Choices need to be made (which services will be 
started (first) and subcategories need to be identified). Building on 
industry needs, the firm needs to focus on 3 services (‘Developing a 
service portfolio takes 2 – 2,5 years’) 
  
Plan: attract about 400 000 € to overcome 4-6 months incubation from 
July 2001 onwards and establish legal entity by the end of 2001. The 
capital would come either from the Incubation Fund or together with a 
second partner (VC). However, the latter prefers a direct VC injection 
and KV only wants this if it’s no more than 650 000 € (dilution of 
equity). VC negotiations are ongoing. 
  
People: 3 partners (KV, PVG and PW: no hierarchy) and 1 employee. 
Searching for an external CEO54  
 
Business development manager of IMEC argues that Vivactis is a 
‘testcase’ for the Incubation Fund that will be established.  
   
                                                                 
53 PV left / resigned from Vivactis the second half of 2001. He considered the progress too slow 
54 At this time, this only happened 2 - 3 times in IMEC spin-offs. 
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10-2001 IMEC Incubation Fund is established55. The fund invests in IMEC 
research projects that have commercial potential but are not mature for 
the market. More specifically, projects in the stages between 
technological idea and the realisation of a prototype are eligible for 
funding56. Next to IMEC, four investors participate in the fund: KBC 
Investco, Fortis Private Equity, Software Holding and Finance (SHF) 
and VEM Chaudfontaine. The fund and the establishement of the 
division industrialisation and incubation within IMEC should enable 
closer contacts with corporate businesses. IMEC wants to adopt a 
market driven approach.  
 
02-2002 Establishment of the Limited Liability Company with 600 000 EURO 
(IMEC and incubationfund), as a juridical vehicle. The Private Limited 
company (KV en PVG) is not yet incorporated.  
 
KV and PVG are still on the pay roll of IMEC and PV left. As a result, 
Vivactis has a very low burn rate allowing IMEC to finance their 
activities for a couple more months. 
 
Vivactis prepares first VC injection 
Aim to have 30 employees by 02-03 
 
09-2002 IMEC points to PW as an interesting contact to join KV and PVG. He 
comes from Fortis and has substantial financial expertise. His main 
responsibility is to search for and negotiate VC investment. 
 
10-2002 Technology: ready to enter the chemical market. In this market, the 
feedback is much faster than in the Pharma industry and revenues can 
be generated earlier. For the moment, the chemical market is the 
‘enabling’ market, although the main target remains Pharma. Once 
                                                                 
55 Lissens, J. 2002. Imec diversifieert naar biotechsector. Onderzoekscentrum haalt banden met 
bedrijven aan. De Financieel Economische Tijd , 21-02-2002, p. 1, p. 12 
56 Lissens, J. 2002. Imec richt investeringsfonds van 5 miljoen euro op. Slechte tijden remmen 
technologie-investeerders niet af. De  Financieel Economische Tijd , 17-10-2001, p. 40 
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they are ready for this market, they will license out the activities for the 
chemical market. 
Negotiations with a potential CEO for the new Ltd. Company  
02-2003 Vivactis is in a process of offering ordinary shares to accredited 
investors. 
  7 employees 
  Aim: 20 employees in 18 months 
 
08-2003 Vivactis opens new lab facilities 
Vivactis moves its lab premises to Kapeldreef 60, 3001 Leuven, 
Belgium. 
 
Business strategy and positioning57 
 
Growth ambition 
When the private limited company was established in February 2001, the 
entrepreneurs had a business plan with huge expectations. Due to the Incubation Fund 
however, they had to minimize these ambitions. KV argues that the inertia that 
Vivactis experienced is due to the newness of the Incubation Fund and to the lack of 
bio expertise among the investors in the fund. During the fall 2002, having attracted 
external financial expertise (PW), the growth expectations have increased. 
 
Service model 
Initially, Vivactis wanted to sell services / information to the pharmaceutical industry, 
useful in their drug development process (For example: identify molecules to block 
proteins, testing possible side effects of drugs, … In this perspective, a huge lab 
would be build in Leuven. The ultimate longer term goal was to develop drugs.   
In the meanwhile, Vivactis has adjusted its business plan, since it became clear that 
also the food industry and the chemical market can use their calorimeter. The food 
industry for example can use the system for quality control. When the founders 
presented the machine, it seems that it could perform the work of one year in exactly 
twelve minutes. 
                                                                 
57 Trends, 13-02-2003, ‘CEO tegen wil en dank’, p. 24 
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Selling the system as a product 
The entrepreneurs learned that some pharmaceutical companies do not want to 
outsource their screening. Therefore, they decided to also sell the calorimeter, so that 
they can design their own experimental designs and perform the experiments 
themselves. 
 
Core business 
Vivactis’ business is not geared towards consumer products and it inherently consists 
of the research of the pharmaceutical indus tries. Their ‘product’ is the delivery of 
tools that facilitate the research process in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. 
Therefore, a clear-cut distinction between academia and research and development is 
rather artificial. In the drug development industry the research is both more innovative 
and more applied than in university laboratories. Thus, contacts and contracts in both 
settings are equally important to push the business forward. Obviously, a direct 
collaboration with an industrial partner will generate revenues more directly.   
 
Partnerships / Network 
Vivactis has an ongoing collaboration with IMEC, which allows access to integrated 
sensor fabrication facilities. Vivactis’ partnerships are geared towards the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industry for drug discovery and development, and with 
the food and (bio)chemical industry for enzyme/catalyst discovery and optimization, 
and physicochemical characterization.  
 
In the drug discovery as well as in the food industry segment, Vivactis signed a 
collaboration deal with two multinational companies. These collaborations were set 
up after thorough screening by the founders / entrepreneurs. They wanted to get deals 
with large, well established and well known multinationals. They succeeded 
contacting the right people via telephone conversations and internet searches. It is still 
very much of their strategy to seek for the ‘right’ partners in such a way. 
 
In the area of the chemical catalysts Vivactis acquired a K€ 387 subsidy from the 
Flemish government (IWT), for an Industrial Research Project in collaboration with a 
department from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (a Professor at the Agricultural 
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Sciences Department). This research collaboration is important since the professor 
brings in a wide network of contacts at multinational companies (Bayer, BASF, …).  
 
For the drug discovery and development process, Vivactis' technology allows testing 
all kinds of targets, even the so-called ‘tough targets’. It is their aim to revive orphan 
drugs, to expand the field of lead profiling and eventually to develop a proteome-wide 
screening, all this with only one technology and using only microliters of precious 
sample. For the food and (bio)chemical industry Vivactis’ technology revolutionizes 
high-throughput screening of enzymes and catalysts because it can be done in harsh 
environments, without the constraints associated with conventional labels. It can 
visualize the effect of physical, biological and chemical additives in real-time, and 
this is function of a large set of parameters, like temperature, pH, concentration, 
pressure, etc… 
 
Outsourcing of ‘non core’ technology / activities 
Vivactis explicitly chooses to keep the basic knowledge in house and to outsource as 
much as possible other activities. The idea to build a huge lab was abandoned 
although the firm still aims at developing new drugs. In order to do so, they can 
purchase a chemical library or license in molecules. For the IWT project for example, 
all activities that are related to the Calorimeter, are kept internal.  
Competitors 
Vivactis’s competitors consists of those firms that are also offering tools for steering 
the drug discovery / development process. Competition is not on technology but for 
the market (no companies have similar technology as Vivactis’). Since the drug 
development process easily takes 15 years, a ‘final’ judgment  about which 
technology is most convincing / most appropriate will only be possible in a couple of 
years time. In the meanwhile, the different players are trying to convince the 
pharmaceutical industry of the superiority of their technology and / or tool(s). 
 
Financing 
Rounds 
-  Personal funds (bvba, 02-01, to protect IP) 
-  First capital injection: 600 000 € Incubation Fund (nv, 02-02) 
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- Second capital injection still in preparation. The incorporation of the company (NV 
en bvba into new NV)  was planned for 11-02 VC negotiations have still not come to 
a closure.  
 
Public financing 
IWT project  
GOM West Vlaanderen 
 
Criteria for investing 
Al VC’s want that Vivactis uses commercially interesting cells for its research and 
testing. However, this means different things to different people: some specify the cell 
and the medicine, others (GIMV) are satisfied with any chemical reaction, as long it is 
‘wet’, for the Incubation Fund dry measurement is enough ... This demonstrated that 
VC’s, in order to make informed decisions, should be very knowledgeable about the 
process (search reports).  
 
June 2001: It was key to do as many as possible ‘commercially interesting tests’ 
(which meant different things to different people). However, testing on enzymes or 
cells implies different markets.  
 
People during the start-up process 
KV obtained her Master of Science in microelectronic engineering in 1995 at the 
”Katholieke Universiteit Leuven” (KUL). She also holds a degree in medicine studies 
at the same university. She obtained her Ph.D. on the topic of ‘non- labelled 
techniques for physiometry’ in the microsystem group at IMEC, Leuven in 2000. She 
invented the current design. More specifically, she developed a sensor that enables the 
measurement of living cells on silicium and similar materials. She is co-founder of 
VIVACTIS, where she is responsible for Microsystem Technology and Intellectual 
Property. 
 
PVG obtained a Master of Science in electronic engineering at the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven and a Ph.D. on microsystems technology for biological 
applications at IMEC. In June 2003, he will finish a M.B.A. at the Vlerick Leuven 
Gent Management School. Professionally, he has been managing different R&D 
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projects for more than two years in a sensor technology start-up (Sensor-Nite) where 
he also gained experience in bringing a sensor to the market. 
 
PV has a PhD in biology and has expertise in setting up biolabs. He worked for 2,5 
years in US (post doc, close to Princeton / NY) and then in Lille Pasteur Institute 
(France). After that he decided to go industry because there were more jobs. He 
worked for 3 years for ORGANON (central France), a Dutch pharmaceutical SME. 
Then he worked for Glaxo Welcome Italy for 2 years and another 2 years for Devgen. 
He was director of screening, i.e. responsible for implementation of developments. He 
was part of part of core team that consisted of 15 persons. He left Devgen in 
November 2000 to join VIVACTIS when the incubation phase officially started (Dec 
1st 2000). Over the course of 2002, Phil left the start-up as he found that the whole 
process took too much time 
 
F is a MD and has a Master in Computer Sciences. He has been working in the 
pharmaceutical industry for 10 years. He was KV’s mentor in Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, when she was working on her PhD. They actually both had a 
business plan and went to the same VC: he brought them together to co-operate. In 
June 2001 KV and Felix were talking about whether or not Felix would join the 
company. He decided not to. 
 
PW has obtained a Master of Law at the Rijksuniversiteit of Ghent in 1981 (RUG) 
and a master in Applied Economics at the Universitaire Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius, 
Antwerp 1983 (UFSIA). He has been working for several banks with a specialisation 
in corporate finance and investment banking activities such as IPO’s, private 
placements and the last three years specifically in merger and acquisitions. 
 
Board of directors (next to KV, PVG and PW) 58 
Vivactis has a Board of Directors, which supervises and advises the management. The 
articles of association provide that at least six board members must serve on our 
Board of Directors. Currently, the Board of Directors consists of seven members. 
 
                                                                 
58 www.vivactis.be 
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JVH is director Strategic Development and Vice-President at IMEC. Mr VH has 
obtained a Master in Applied Economics at the Universitaire Faculteiten Sint-Igantius, 
Antwerp (1974). After several appointments in the industry he joined IMEC in 1986. 
At present Mr Van Helleputte is responsible for IMEC’ s strategy.  
 
LD is Director Business Development and Vice-President at IMEC. Mr D. has 
obtained a Master in electronic engineering and mechanics in 1982 and a Ph. D. in 
1989 of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) .Mr Deferm joined IMEC in 1985. 
He gained extensive experience in CMOS-based technologies by heading several 
departments as a director. Since 1999 Mr Deferm is Vice-President Business 
Development worldwide, for the legal and patent group and the IP policy.  
 
HM is director of IMEC’s Invomec department and Vice-President at IMEC. Invomec 
gathers all IMEC’s spin-off activities. Mr. M. obtained a Master of Science in 
electronic engineering at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) in 1971 and a 
Ph.d. Applied Sciences in 1974.  
 
AV is IMEC’s CFO and Vice-President at IMEC. After several appointments in the 
industry at Teves, Raychem (at present Tyco). Mr. V. joined IMEC in 1986 as CFO. 
 
Table 20: Overview of data collection Vivactis 
Contacts / Source Timing of data collection 
KV Interview 06-2001 
 Several e-mail and phone contacts 2001-2002 
 Interview 11-2002 
PVG Interview 06-2001 
 Several e-mail and phone contacts 2001-2002 
 Interview 06-2002 
 Standardized Survey 05-2003 
PV Interview 06-2001 
PR (IMEC) Interview 06-2001 
Mediargusâ Search 05-2003 (time period 01-2000 / 05-2003)  
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B. SIRIUS COMMUNICATIONS 
Started in 1996 
Semi-conductor company (developing and commercializing CDMA chips) 
 
Core Technology59 
Sirius, as a fabless semi-conductor company, is a leading developer of code division 
multiple access (CDMA) and W-CDMA baseband ASIC technology (application 
specific integrated circuits) for the 3G wireless and satellite communications market. 
The company focuses on developing high performance, low-power, and highly 
flexible standards-based CDMA and GPS physical modem layer silicon solutions, 
peripherals and development tools. It designs highly specialized software-
programmable telecom chips for use in cellular, non-cellular and satellite 
communications. 
 
History 
1990 Start of research project in IMEC. The research was performed on request by 
a maritime communication company SAIT and in cooperation with the 
European Space Agency. It involved the development of a modulation-
technique (chip) for satellite communication. More specifically, the 
researchers were expected to integrate three cards of a Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA) receiver into one chip. (‘This chip became the 
mother of all Sirius’s chips’)60 
  
1994 KM starts working for IMEC, in the VLSI Systems and Design 
Methodologies division (group of about 40 people). He was recruited to act 
as a broker a broker between IMEC and industry, including ESA and the 
European Commission. 
 
1995 The research reaches a stage of majority. An a-prototype of the chip, called 
CDMA was available and the idea of founding a company in order to bring 
this chip on the market existed. It was the researcher / inventor that primarily 
                                                                 
59 Interviews and DSP Valley Newsletter, ‘Agilent Technologies to acquire Sirius Communications, 
Developer of CDMA and W-CDMA Baseband ASICS’, 2001, 2(3) 
60 Leijnse. B. 1999. Steraanbieding: Sirius communications. Trends, 92. 
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recognized the market / technological opportunity. The most important 
driving force to valorize this opportunity in a spin-off was the parent institute 
by means of an internal business developer (KM). The inventor (LP) was 
willing to be involved in the start-up of a company. 
 
1996 The company was founded with a capital of 750 000 € (first VC injection).  
 
All founders were researchers at IMEC and had known each other for 7 years 
(expect KM, who only joined IMEC 1,5 years before start up of Sirius). Each 
founder owns 0,75% of the shares. There was a plan to increase this up to 
19,8% after 5 years. 
 
Four Founders: (1) KM (Industrial engineer, business development function 
at IMEC). He developed a business plan for Sirius and looked for capital). 
(2) LP (Civil engineer, researcher at IMEC who invented the chip concept; 
he accepted the function of CEO provided that KM would take care of these 
responsibilities in practice). (3) JVH (Civil engineer, researcher at IMEC, 
took care of the practical implementation of the chip. (4) MW (Civil 
engineer, researcher at IMEC, responsible for the design of the chip). No 
external management was attracted. 
 
In year one, the company generated 250 000 € revenues. Only the first book 
year the company incurred a loss of less than 273 000 €. 
 
1997 Marissa leaves company (shares are bought by other founders). She had 
underestimated the commitment to a start-up and returned to IMEC. 
 
A b-prototype was developed and a product was available. It was sold to 
major companies such as Alcatel and Toshiba. From then on the CDMA chip 
was continuously adapted. 
 
Recognition of the potential of CDMA developments for the 3G wireless 
market. At this time, there were about eight different modulation candidate 
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technologies for succession of the wireless phone. The IWT subsidized a part 
of the (174 000 000 € in 1998 and 275 000 € in 1999) 
 
1998 Revenues amount 768 000 € (increase of 70%). 
 
1999 JVH leaves company (shares are bought by the other founders). As the 
company grew to up to 16 people, the firm became too big for him. He had 
difficulty delegating responsibilities (wanted to stay in control) and was very 
perfectionist. He serves as an independent advisor / consultant for 
Septentrio61 
 
2000 Over the years, no capital increases were realized. The company generates 2 
000 000 € revenues in 2000 and upon acquisition the capitalization of the 
company is 45 000 000 €. 
 
2001 Sirius Communications is a company making profit.  
 
February: Morgan Stanley is appointed as financial advisor to evaluate 
several candidates / possibilities for the acquisition of Sirius. Selling the 
company to one party seemed to be the best option because it provided the 
best perspective on selling the technology world-wide62. 
 
July, 21: Successful trade sale of Sirius Communication at 45 000 000 € to 
Agilent Technologies, a global technology leader in communications 
electronics, life sciences and health care. Sirius becomes part of Agilent’s 
Semiconductor Products Group. The spin-off however, remains on the 
premises in Rotselaar (near Brussels) and functions as an R&D center of 
Agilent (26 people in Sirius as compared to 40 000 of Agilent worldwide). 
 
                                                                 
61 There is an overlap between Sirius and Septentrio’s activities. Septentrio received IP from IMEC, 
based on the same patents as Sirius’s activities (Sirius did not have exclusive license). It was only just 
before the acquisition of Sirius that they were able to enforce an exclusive license and rights on the 
basic patent. Currently, spetentrio has no exclusive license and will have to develop its own patents in 
the future. 
62 De Standaard , 22-05-2001, ‘Chipbelofte Sirius verkocht aan Amerikaanse reus Agilent’. 
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 The engineers from Sirius are part of a broader group of engineers within 
Agilent working on wireless technology. This is a business unit that is 
evaluated according to performance. Of the 1 000 000 000 $ that this group 
generates, Sirius contributes / will contribute about 600 000 000 $, because 
the chip they develop is integrated in products that will be responsible for 
60% of the revenues. 
  
Technology transfer 
Sirius had a non-exclusive license from IMEC. When Sirius Communications was 
acquired by Agilent Technologies, not having an exclusive license formed a huge 
problem. After difficult negotiations the exclusive license was issued. 
 
Financing, including public financing 
At time of start-up, there were 13 shareholders. Besides the founders, friends and 
family, the following investors can be mentioned: IMEC: 25%, represented by capital; 
SAIT: 30%; Software Holding and Finance: 30%; ARM (Cambridge, UK): 3%, the 
CEO of this company functioned as a kind of mentor to KM. 
 
When they wanted to exercise the plan to become the owner of 19,8% of the shares of 
Sirius Communications, IMEC always found a way not to let it happen. KM and LP 
succeeded to have the shares in their possession just before the take-over. 
 
Subsidies 
When Sirius Communications was started no R&D projects were going on. During the 
years it cooperated with IWT, ESA and the European Commission. At the time of 
take-over 4 R&D projects were running. 
 
Exit 
Most successful exit to date of IMEC spin-off 
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Business strategy and market positioning 
 
Revenues 
The first years, Sirius generated revenues from two sources: consulting to customers 
who wanted to develop CDMA chips and the sales of ‘test boards’ for those firms that 
wanted to build CDMA systems. 
Later, Sirius started to license its CDMAxTM wideband transceiver intellectual 
property to foundries and telecommunications companies. 
 
Customers / sales 
At time of start-up, there was no network of direct business contacts. Establishing this 
over the years was a very intensive process and represented a major aspect in KM’s 
job. This was especially true, as the geographical scope of the market was worldwide / 
global right from the start and as a diversity of persons in the customers’ organization 
influences the buying process and it is hard to identify them in the organisation.  
KM took care of sales in Europe and an important part of America. For Washington, 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and India a distributor was contacted. During the 
first year of operations the company targeted temporarily a niche market, focusing on 
a small specific group of customers but with the explicit intention to develop new 
applications and new market segments. 
 
Initially, sales were focused on the US. It was only after two years that also Europe 
became a target. Contacts with the European customers s on a more frequent base 
(several times a week) then with the take place several times a week, whereas 
meetings with the US customers occur on a monthly basis. 
 
In order to sell a completed product, Sirius is not dependent on other companies for 
complementary developments: all knowledge is available in house. 
 
% of the different activities in the total turnover 
33,3% of the turnover comes from the sale of a standardized product (card with 
integrated chip). This product can be adapted to the specific needs (for example a 
smaller card) of the customers, an activity responsible for another 33,3% of the 
turnover. The sale of the ‘rough’ chip accounted for the other 33,3%. The revenues 
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have ever since the start-up of Sirius Communications been divided in the way as 
mentioned above.  
Growth rate of the market 
Compound annual growth rate of 15-20% 
 
The future market is argued to be a very large market. That is when also taking into 
account the market of the third generation GSM’s, a market Sirius Communications 
looks forward to enter. It concerns a market of 4-5 million pieces. It takes a long time 
until this market takes off, but when it will, it will be explosive. KM and LP pushed 
their research, the development of the CDMA chip in that direction for quite some 
time. A lot of players within the sector did not agree with this decision. Now, they 
must see how Sirius Communication is way ahead of them. There is a second market 
in which Sirius Communications has always been active: the telecommunication 
market. This is a market of only 10 000 pieces and knows a very slow but secure 
growth. 
  
Outsourcing 
Sirius focuses on its core business, all tasks that are not directly related were 
outsourced. After the take-over, sales, marketing, legal aspects, etc. are all taken care 
off by Agilent Technologies.  
 
Patents 
At the moment of the take-over, Sirius Communications was the owner of several 
patents (between 6 and 10), which represented an important added value to Agilent 
Technologies. In 2002, Sirius Communications is the owner of 20 patents.  
 
People and organisation of the activities 
Before working at Sirius Communications, KM worked one year and a half at IMEC, 
where he took care of the public relations with customers, political institutions, etc. 
After one year IMEC invited him to coach IMEC spin-offs, which he accepted. The 
first spin-off he guided was Sirius Communications.  
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LP – MW –JVH 
Researchers / developers at IMEC since 1988. LP still is in the subsidiary today. MW 
and JVH left the company during the first two years of operations. 
 
Board 
There were 5 board members at time of start-up (representatives of SHF, SAIT, 
IMEC, ARM and KM). The contribution of the CEO of ARM to the company was, 
according to KM, extremely important (bringing reputation and expertise to the 
company, scanning the environment to connect to new sources of ideas, …). SHF 
(Billion) was useful as negotiator between IMEC/SAIT on one hand and the executive 
management on the other.  
 
Company structure  
At start-up, the tasks in the company were clearly delineated and could not be divided 
in the traditional divisions such as R&D, Production, Marketing, Sales,…. There were 
4 persons each responsible for a different aspect of operations: Concept development, 
Chip development, Practical implementation, Other aspects. 
Just before Agilent acquired the company there were 4 main task streams: System 
specifications, Chip development, Writing of the software, Sales and marketing. 
 
External people 
They had good contacts / specialized in each domain that was necessary for their 
operations: juridical, Financial, Accounting / auditing. 
 
Table 21: Overview of data collection Sirius Communications 
Contact / Source Timing of Data collection 
KM Interview 03-2002 
Interview 10-2002 
PG Interview 03-2000 
Interview 11-2002 
LP Phone conversation Fall 2002 
Mediargusâ Search 05-2003 (Time period 01-1994 / 05-2003; Search terms: 
Sirius Communications) 
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C. C-CAM TECHNOLOGIES 
Started in 1996 
CMOS technology for image sensors 
 
Core Technology 
In the late 80's IMEC started the first experiments with CMOS image sensors. At that 
time they had already a lot of experience in designing CCD image sensors. 
The FUGA technology was born in the early 90's. Some years later C-Cam 
Technologies was started as a first imaging spin-off company of IMEC with the aim 
to commercialise the FUGA sensors63. 
C-Cam Technologies designed, produced and marketed CMOS Active Pixel Sensors 
& Cameras. The underlying FUGA technology of the sensors is initially developed by 
IMEC. Both image sensors & cameras have been sold for use in different markets: 
industrial, consumer, aerospace and others64.  
 
History 
1990  Start of the research project 
 
1995 JA wrote a business plan based on a draft version he received from IMEC and 
some additional information regarding the technology and products. 
According to IMEC, the products were ready and ready for sales and there 
were first customers. So, the original business plans was based on product 
sales (without much technical development) and the main activities were 
approaching potential customers and building distribution channels. 
  
The inventor / developers did not want to leave IMEC to commercialize the 
technology65. Therefore, IMEC and ICOS (who wanted to commercialize and 
further develop the products because they were useful to its business) searched 
                                                                 
63 http://www.vector-international.be/C-Cam/profile.html; accessed May 16th 2003. 
64 http://www.laseroptronix.com/sourc/vector/vectors/C-Cam/ccamindx.html; accessed May 16th 2003. 
65 Three people were very important during the development of the technology, namely (1) LH made 
the first customer contacts; he is now the marketing manager at Fillfactory (a firm that commercializes 
the ‘image sensors’ technology after the bankruptcy of C-cam). (2) BD: currently works for Fillfactory. 
(3) Nico (works at ICOS).  
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for an external entrepreneur. At the same time, JA was actively pursuing a 
business opportunity. 
 
1996 C-Cam was established. The founders were (1) ICOS (250 000 € for 49,5% of 
the shares), (2) IMEC who brought in the technology and received 49,5% of 
the share (the technology was valued at 250 000 €) and (3) JA (no personal 
money, 1% of the shares), who became the CEO. 
 
JA was the only employee. He had an office at the premises of ICOS (he could 
also use their secretary, meeting rooms and other facilities). His first task was 
to approach the already existing customers for this technology and broaden the 
customer base. However, very quickly it became clear that the product was not 
finished. There was an a-prototype and the different components could be sold 
separately, but each customer needed to adapt the technology before it could 
be used (‘The technology was fantastic and very promising. However, the 
existing software of potential customers needed to be adapted in order to read 
the signal of the image sensors and also the hardware needed some 
adaptations. Actually the technology was still in a laboratory phase’). Hence, 
milestones were not reached in the first years. There were some product sales 
in 1996, but much less than expected (‘pilot sales’ of separate components)66. 
  
The business plan was adapted and additional capital was searched for. 
 
1997 Early 1997: Capital increase (250 000 €) by VIV (27% of the shares).  The 
shares of ICOS and IMEC diluted to 34% each. JA invested 5000 €. JA hired a 
salesman and technical person via a recruiting agency. The salesman had 
several years of sales experience, but neither experience nor affinity with the 
technology. The technical person was an engineer ‘pure sang’ and his task was 
to refine the software component of the ‘image sensors’. 
 
Mid 1997: Roger Van Overstraeten (Director IMEC, H 1999?) announced that 
‘IMEC had decided to commercialize the use of the CMOS technology in 
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image sensors’. The idea was to found a new company (Fillfactory) that would 
further develop and sell the CMOS technology. The new company would not 
only sell the ‘product’ or components of the product but actually further 
develop the technology and integrate it in the systems of customers. Actually, 
the new company be set up with the involvement of the researchers from 
IMEC.  
 
Late 1997: By the end of 1997, C-cam needed a second capital increase. 
However, since Fillfactory was a spin-off in the pipeline of IMEC – working 
with the CMOS technology -- the original investors (VIV and ICOS) did not 
want to increase the capital. Although JA started to look for new external 
investors, this seemed impossible without the support and cooperation of VIV 
and ICOS. Moreover, IMEC offered to buy the shares of ICOS (for 250 000 
€). Initially, JV turned down the offer, because he wanted to give C-Cam a 
chance to survive: if one of the investors left, attracting external capital would 
have become extremely problematic 67.  
 
1998  JA did not succeed in persuading investors to inject new money in C-Cam. As 
a result, ICOS divested their participation in C-CAM Technologies. The 
official reason to divest was reported in the  ‘We decided to divest our holding 
in this start-up as a result of the decision made by C-CAM Technologies’ 
Board of Directors to develop consumer applications. Given ICOS’ 
considerable experience with back-end semiconductor manufacturers and 
electronic assemblers, we believe that we should continue to focus our efforts 
on those markets’68. 
VIV bought a part of the shares because otherwise they would have been 
minority shareholder without a ‘voice’. JA did not buy shares because JV 
advised him not to do so. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
66 JA argues that in the sector of image sensors, it takes approximately 3 years to bring a prototype (lab-
scale) to a market-ready product. 
67 JA stated that JV (ICOS) ‘was person with a clear vision. He was a real mentor.’ 
68 http://www.icos.be/events_news/~en/press/980731.htm: results for the second quarter of 1998 ended 
June 30; website accessed May 16th 2003  
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1999  IMEC was looking for someone who was able to raise external capital. IMEC 
screened several candidates but most of these people turned down the 
opportunity (after they were informed about the circumstances?) or IMEC did 
not approve of the candidates. JA contacted LDM (they knew each other from 
the MBA-program) and asked him for help. LDM was interested in the job. L 
dCe (VIV) contacted Van Overstraeten (IMEC) and told him he had found the 
right man for the job (JA could not do this because IMEC would never 
approve a contactperson of him). But also LDM was not able to find capital 
for C-cam.  
 
In a final phase, the idea was to found Fillfactory and to bring in the activities 
of C-cam in this new company. However, the whole process took to long and 
eventually C-cam went bankrupt (23-11-1999).  
 
IMEC hired LDM to write the BP for Fillfactory and to raise the capital. The 
company was formally established in December 1999. Currently, L is still the 
CEO of Fillfactory.   
  
People and organisation of the activities 
JA is an engineer, graduated in 1978. He worked one year in product development. 
Since 1979 he had technical/commercial jobs. He also has an MBA (Antwerp). He 
met Luc De Meyer during this training. In 1995 Jos was looking for a new job 
opportunity and he contacted KVIV, a network of academic engineers to screen 
interesting opportunities. KVIV brought him contact with JVs from ICOS. JV was 
looking for someone that could write a business plan for a new technology developed 
at IMEC and which was useful for the business of ICOS. ICOS could not 
commercialize the technology (not their core business) and JV wanted a new 
independent company to do it.  
 
Composition of Board of directors 
At start-up: 2 persons from ICOS, 2 persons from IMEC and JA 
After capital increase: 1 from ICOS, 1 from VIV, 1 from IMEC (Van Overstraeten 
stepped out) and JA. 
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Table 22: Overview of data collection C-Cam Technologies 
Contact / Source Timing of data collection 
JV Interview 01-2000 
JA Interview 03-2002 
Interview 10-2002 
LH Interview 11-2002 
BD Interview 12-2002 
Mediargusâ Search 05-2003 (time period 01-1994 / 05-2003; search terms: C-Cam 
technologies) 
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APPENDIX 3: THE COMMERICALISATION PROCESS AT A SELECTION OF INTERFACE 
SERVICES FROM FLEMISH UNIVERSITIES IN THE EUROPEAN SAMPLE 
 
A. KULEUVEN 
 
Leuven R&D (LRD) is the oldest and most developed university interface service 
(Debackere & De Bondt, 2002). Debackere en Van Dun (2002: p. 64) point out that 
the organisation chart of the LRD (central management) consists of four core 
departments (see Figure 2): (1) contract research, (2) management of intellectual 
property, (3) innovation and spin-offs, and (4) finance and administration.  
 
Leuven R&D (LRD): Structure and organisation of the commercialisation 
process 
 
Structure 
 
At the KUL, Leuven R&D (LRD) is the organization that is responsible for managing 
contract research carried out for companies, for taking out and following up patents, 
and for establishing science-based entrepreneurial firms and following them up. In 
addition, there is also the Contract Research Department (DOC), which manages the 
contract research for the government. The activities of LRD include: a) contract 
research; b) management of intellectual property; c) innovation and science-based 
entrepreneurial firms and d) finance and administration. 
 
Innovation process 
 
Identification of opportunities 
Leuven R&D has the advantage of a long tradition, a tradition upon which its good 
reputation at the university is based. For this reason we need not spend a lot of time 
on proactively identifying the opportunities. The interface service has been in 
existence for thirty years, during which time it has made a significant cultural impact 
on the university.  
 
IP 
The interface service has built up its own area of competence in the field of patents, 
the writing of claims, etc., and it is because of this expertise that it can follow a 
selective patent policy. The licensing of IP is an important activity in the overall 
responsibilities of LRD. The contractual aspects, the negotiations and the choice 
between the exclusive and the nonexclusive granting of licenses is supported by LRD. 
 
Strategic Choice between science-based entrepreneurial firm, royalty and contract 
research   
The interface service attaches much importance to the presence of an enterprising 
researcher, the potential of the technology, the market and the transition from business 
plan to business model. Emphasis is being put on the search for complementary 
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income as a source of financing. The aim is to realise between two and four science-
based entrepreneurial firms per year. 
 
Financing 
Most science-based entrepreneurial firms are financed by the Gemma Frisius Fund. 
This is a university seed capital fund that can serve as a driving force for the  
formation of consortiums with the financial partners and external VCs; it also enables 
the university to bring in extra financial returns (see Table 2). 
 
Support for start-up 
LRD provides help in drawing up the business plan, concluding contracts (including 
IP), converting from business plan to business model, and attracting capital. 
 
Follow-up after start-up 
LRD plays a role in the board of directors in individual start-ups in which it has taken 
an equity  participation. It also works actively with other agents of innovation. 
 
General innovation support 
Cuyvers & Zimmerman (2002) describe LRD as the ‘network incubator’, which 
means that LRD is an actor in the Leuven 'innovation network'. In addition to LRD, 
there are various other actors who play a role in the innovative landscape of the 
Leuven region. Examples include the incubation center, Leuven INC., which is a 
training and network organization, and Capricorn, a committed private investor. In 
collaboration with the other actors, LRD is devoting a substantial amount of time and 
attention to energizing the innovation climate in the region. 
 
B. VUB 
 
As for its structure and operation, the VUB Interface Service is probably the one that 
most resembles LRD. Just like LRD, the VUB Interface Service manages the contract 
research and it disposes of a portion of the income from this contract research via a 
fixed overhead (pre-deduction). (This fixed overhead, however, is not used solely for 
interface financing or tech transfer, but also takes care of doubtful debtors, disputes 
and pre-financing.) Thus the contracting research financing mechanism is very similar 
to the financing of LRD. 
 
Just as with LRD, this contract research includes all kinds of activities, such as 
stimulating and organizing contacts via company visits, employee participation in the 
business centers/science parks, internal awareness creation actions relating to contract 
research, the dissemination of information about all sorts of calls for proposals, the 
promotion of the services on offer, financ ial and  legal assistance in drawing up 
contracts, the organization of events, etc. In contrast to LRD, the Interface Service at 
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the VUB in its current form is only a couple years old, which means that the service is 
less well known among the academics than LRD. The interface service will therefore 
continue seeking out the more proactive academics and promoting itself among them.  
Logically speaking, therefore, the cultural conversion of researchers within the 
university has progressed less than at the KUL.  
 
Another important difference from LRD is the fact that the financial-administrative 
support for this contract research still comes through the central financial 
administration of the university. This means that the divisions also cannot be set up as 
LRD does, but the contract research takes place rather in the traditional manner within 
the university structure.  
 
The VUB is pursuing a 'selective' patent policy and is supervising the patent 
procedures itself (1.5 FTEs). 
The interface service actively supports the making of business plans. It has a budget 
available for pre-financing any feasibility studies, market studies, patent applications, 
etc. that may be required. By means of intense collaboration with the Board of 
Directors of the BI3 Fund, a potential start-up is being coached for the purpose of 
attracting capital. The interface service is still too young to have already developed a 
number of different tracks, though in collaboration with the VIB it has recently 
produced an exit-oriented science-based entrepreneurial firm with external venture 
capital in biotechnology. Thus it appears that this dynamic interface service is seeking 
to develop a highly diversified portfolio. 
VUB is also devoting a great deal of attention to the availability of incubation 
facilities. Currently, it is establishing a second VUB incubator (in addition to the I&I 
at Zellik, nearby the Jette campus) on the Arsenaal site, near the Oefenplein Campus. 
  
VUB: Structure and organisation of the commercialisation process  
 
Structure 
 
At the VUB there is an 'Interface Service' that is responsible for the administrative 
management of the contract research and for the commercialization of technology 
through the granting of licenses or the establishment of science-based entrepreneurial 
firms. This service is also responsible for obtaining patents. In addition, there is the 
Central Financial Administration, which provides financial-administrative support for 
the contract research (both with companies and government). 
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Commercialisation process 
 
Identification of opportunities 
On a regular basis, the relatively young Interface Service organizes a series of 'starter 
seminars' intended to promote entrepreneurship. In addition, it carries on a great deal 
of internal promotion in support of contract research, as well as undertaking 
awareness creation actions dealing with the commercialization of research and other 
themes at the departmental/research group level. 
 
IP 
IP support is an important activity. The service has developed its own competence in 
this field, which is supplemented by intensive collaboration with external patent 
attorneys. The licensing of IP is an important activity within the overall 
responsibilities of the Interface Service. Other aspects that it also supports include 
contractual matters, negotiations and the choice between the exclusive and the non-
exclusive granting of licenses. 
 
Strategic choice: science-based entrepreneurial firm, royalty or contract research 
The university endeavors to produce an average of one science-based entrepreneurial 
firm per year. 
 
Financing 
The BI3 fund was established in 2002 to provide financing for science-based 
entrepreneurial firm projects. The logical route to take, then, is to present such 
projects to this seed capital fund.  
 
Project support before start -up  
The interface service recently invested in the development of sufficient competence to 
help projects with drawing up a business plan and to direct the development of the 
science-based entrepreneurial firm. This is done in collaboration with the BI3 Fund. 
 
Follow-up after start-up 
Usually – and certainly in the recently established science-based entrepreneurial firms 
– either the VUB or the BI3 Fund has a representative in the Board of Directors.  
 
General innovation support 
The Interface Cell at the VUB devotes much attention to the availability of incubation 
facilities. It is currently busy setting up a second VUB incubator. It also participates in 
the different study groups and regional platforms. 
 
C. GHENT UNIVERSITY 
 
The technology transfer office manages interface activities at Ghent University. 
Contract research is still managed in part by the Research Coordination Office, 
although the aim is to achieve close collaboration and integration. Both sections are 
part of the Research Affairs Directorate, which is under the leadership of the Research 
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Director. The Directorate is a department within the university, in conformity with the 
internal regulations of this institution. Financial and HR support for contract research 
remains within the respective departments of the university. The Technology Transfer 
Office therefore has an indirect overview of contract research, but is not able to 
intervene directly in these affairs, as is the case in LRD.  
 
In contrast to LRD and the VUB Interface Service, the financing of the Technology 
Transfer Office is not related to the volume of contract research. The financing is 
largely dependent on the subsidies that are made available to the interface services by 
the Flemish Community. 
 
Just like at the KUL and the VUB, the Technology Transfer Office devotes much 
attention to managing the IP in the broadest sense of the word. IP affairs occupy a 
central place in departmental operations. In its awareness-creating role, the Office 
endeavors to convince the members of the tenured academic staff to have their 
inventions protected. The primary mechanisms used to achieve these ends are: (1) 
maintaining a very favorable remuneration system (see below) and (2) the 
performance of great amounts of field-work by the people  in the Technology Transfer 
Office. Seminars and workshops are organized on a regular basis dealing with the 
creation of intellectual property and the marketing of that property via licenses or 
science-based entrepreneurial firms. At the same time, the Technology Transfer 
Office is responsible for managing the intellectual property in the contract research 
(contract negotiations, legal support, etc.). 
 
In view of the limited size of the budget, a very strict patent policy is currently being 
pursued. When a potentially interesting technology is signaled, an evaluation of its 
innovativeness is first carried out, and then a study of its economic feasibility. With 
the in-house knowledge available, this can be done in a cost-efficient manner. During 
the priority year, the technology is intensively marketed in collaboration with the 
inventors. If during the priority year it turns out that there is interest on the part of 
industry, or if it turns out that the researchers involved are interested in creating a 
science-based entrepreneurial firm, then the protective measures are continued. 
There is also close collaboration with the Baekeland Fund. This fund – just as the 
other university funds – invests at an early stage in start-ups. 
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Ghent University: Structure and organisation of the commercialisation process 
 
Structure 
 
The Research Coordination Office manages the university's contract research (both 
with the government and with companies). The Technology Transfer Office is 
responsible for (1) creating and managing intellectual property, (2) marketing the 
research results via licenses and science-based entrepreneurial firms, and (3) 
managing the intellectual property associated with contract research. 
 
Commercialization process 
 
Identification of opportunities 
The opportunities are detected mainly via the management of intellectual property 
(via invention disclosures and via the management of contract research). The 
Technology Transfer Office informs the different departments ad hoc about the 
various possibilities for commercialization. 
 
IP 
The Technology Transfer Office is responsible for managing university IP. To this 
end, it pursues a selective patent policy. It has developed competence in a number of 
different fields to enable it to pursue this policy. 
 
Strategic choice: science-based entrepreneurial firm, royalty or contract research 
The most important elements in this choice are the wishes of the researchers involved 
(and their availability for collaborating in the commercialization process), the strength 
of the technology, the structure of the market and the availability (or unavailability) of 
surrogate entrepreneurs. 
 
Financing of science-based entrepreneurial firms 
Just like the VUB and the KUL, Ghent University is participating in a university seed 
capital fund. The Baekeland Fund has the first right of refusal with science-based 
entrepreneurial firms that are starting up. Typically, science-based entrepreneurial 
firms that are ready to start up are presented to this fund.  
 
Assistance with projects before start-up 
The Technology Transfer Office assists with the writing of their business plan, with 
IP management, with the contractual aspects and with finding financing. It also may 
actively assist in finding financing and possibly obtaining capital from the Baekeland 
Fund.  
 
Follow-up after start-up 
Through participation in the Board of Directors. 
 
General innovation-support 
The Technology Transfer Department is devoting much attention to developing the 
regional innovation network (incubation centers, science parks, network activities 
with innovation agents in the region, etc.)  
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D. LUC 
 
Within the Limburg University Center the Interface Service is part of the Research 
Coordination Office. Since Limburg is a university of limited size and with a limited 
number of fields of study (see below), its Research Coordination Office is staffed with 
1.4 FTE, 0.5 FTE of which is dedicated to IP management and science-based 
entrepreneurial firm support. An average of one patent is taken out per year. A 
number of science-based entrepreneurial firms have been created in the past, though 
the university owns shares in only one of them. The university seed capital fund 
(Wendelenfonds) was disbanded in 2002. Just like the other university funds, private 
Venture Capitalists formed this fund. There was a failure, however, to generate 
enough projects meeting the requirements set by the fund. 
 
LUC: Structure and organisation of the commercialisation process 
 
Structure 
The Research Coordination Office manages the university contract research (both 
with government and companies). The Interface Service is part of the Research 
Coordination Office. 
 
Commercialization process 
 
Identification of opportunities 
One person (0.4 FTE) is responsible for the search for opportunities (e.g. via business 
plan competition). 
 
IP 
0.1 FTE takes care of the IP (approximately one patent per year). 
 
Strategic choice: science-based entrepreneurial firm, royalty or contract research 
Potential science-based entrepreneurial firms can count on the support of the Interface 
Service. 
 
Financing of science-based entrepreneurial firms 
Is done by the research departments, possibly supplemented by public support in the 
region (EFRD or European Fund for Regional Development).  
 
Assistance with projects before start-up 
Assistance is given in developing the business plan. 
 
Follow-up after start-up 
Via participation in the Board of Directors 
 
General innovation support 
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Similar activities as in the other universities. 
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APPENDIX 4: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR SCIENCE-BASED ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
1.1. Formal legislation  
 
a. Legal founding date (e.g. creation of a legal entity/partnership) 
Year   ………….….  
Month   …………….. 
Who   …………….. 
Juridical form type  …………….. 
 
b. First injection of money 
Year  ………….….  
Month  …………….. 
Who  ……………. 
 
c. Start of activities 
Year  ………….….  
Month  …………….. 
 
1.2. What type of institutional link did the the company have at TIME OF FOUNDING? 
 
1. None, this is an independent start-up. The company emerged from the ideas and 
knowledge of one or more independent entrepreneurs. 
2. Corporate spin out: the start-up emerged from from the business activities of another 
private corporation. The transfer of knowledge can be formal (through equity 
participation) or informal (e.g. when employee leaves firm to start company based on 
skills acquired at the parent) 
3. Academic spin out: the company spun out from a university or public research institute 
(irrespective of whether there was a formal transfer of knowledge). The key technological 
knowlegde or idea was at least in part developed while working at the university / the 
research institute. 
  
1.3. a. Which research project(s) (or invention(s)), event(s) or ‘business experience 
(s)’ triggered the idea to found the company? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………… 
 
       b. Start of research project in parent institute (s)? 
(= time at which the project, forming the base of the eventual applied technology within the 
company, started within the parent organization; when the project is the result of several 
projects one should consider the time and/or project that added most value to the eventual 
commercialization of the technology) 
 
Company:  …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Parent institute(s:) ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Respondent: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Function of respondent: ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Date:   ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Sector: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Year  ………….….  
Month  …………….. 
 
c. Involvement of the ‘intellectual carrier’ of the idea / the inventor in the 
company? 
 
Circle the number that corresponds to your answer 
 
1. Researcher / inventor was not aware of the technology being transferred into a spin-
off 
2. Researcher stayed in research position at research institute  
How was inventor involvement maintained? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
… 
Did the inventor get shares? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
… 
3.  Shareholder with formal participation limited to employee (no C** function) 
4. Shareholder with participation limited to Board of Directors or SAB 
5. Shareholder with formal participation in a C** function 
 
2. CAPITALIZATION / OWNERSHIP 
 
Please indicate the evolution in the type(s) of financing the firm received, by 
filling out each change in the capital structure of the company.  
 
The tables allow you to fill out the different types of financing the company received at 
different time intervals; the purpose of these questions is to get an overview of the evolution 
of the financial structure of the company. We ask for financial information at time of 
founding and three subsequent financing rounds, because we believe these changes are 
relevant for the overall / technological development of the company. 
 
Type of financing 
(indicate names of 
the investors) 
Moment in time: legal founding date: 
 
INCLUDE ALL CAPITAL THAT WAS INJECTED WITHIN 12 
MONTHS AFTER LEGAL FOUNDING 
 
 Amount (€) % Shares in return for 
CAPITAL2 
% Founder / Management 
or technology shares3 
Total Capital:    
Personal capital1  
 
   
External capital4 
- Fund from 
parent institute 
NAME: 
……………………. 
- Venture 
capitalist(s) 
NAMES: 
……………………
……………………
…………….. 
- Corporate 
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investor(s) 
NAMES: 
……………………
……………………- 
- Business Angel(s) 
/3F    
……………………. 
- Other 
…………………….. 
  
Loans   X X 
Subsidies  X X 
1~ the founders (=inventors) 
2~percentage of shares that the financing party got in return for the injection of money  
3~sometimes no money is injected in a company, but certain parties do receive shares for 
example in return for the transfer of knowledge or technology 
4~external money being any amount and type (i.e. injected by fund from parent institute, VC 
funds, corporate investors, Bas, 3Fs or other parties) of investment that increases the capital 
of the company. 
 
Are there any option plans present at time of founding?    
 Yes/No 
If Yes, describe their nature: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Type of financing 
(indicate names of 
the investors) 
Moment in time: first capital increase 
 Amount (€) % Shares in return for 
CAPITAL2 
% Founder / Management 
or technology shares3 
Total Capital:    
Personal capital1  
 
   
External capital4 
- Fund from 
parent institute 
NAME: 
……………………. 
- Venture 
capitalist(s) 
NAMES: 
……………………
……………………
…………….. 
- Corporate 
investor(s) 
NAMES: 
……………………
……………………- 
- Business Angel(s) 
/3F    
……………………. 
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- Other 
…………………….. 
  
Loans   X X 
Subsidies  X X 
Reserved profits   X X 
1~ the founders (=inventors) 
2~percentage of shares that the financing party go in return for the injection of money 
3~sometimes no money is injected in a company, but certain parties do receive shares for 
example in return for the transfer of knowledge or technology 
4~external money being any amount and type (i.e. injected by fund from parent institute, VC 
funds, corporate investors, Bas, 3Fs or other parties) of investment that increases the capital 
of the company. 
 
Were there option plans  created at this moment in time?    
 Yes/No 
If Yes, describe their nature: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
 
Type of financing 
(indicate names of 
the investors ) 
 
CAPITAL TODAY 
 
YEAR: …………. 
 
         Amount (€)                                                            % Shares in return for 
capital 
Total Capital: 
 
 
Personal capital1  
 
 
External capital4 
 
 
Loans                                                                                          
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
3.  TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
3.1.a.  In what stage was the ‘New Product Development Cycle’ at founding? 
q Idea phase 
q  Proof of Concept, i.e. a-prototype 
q Prototype that works in a real-life environment, i.e. ß-prototype 
q Concrete market-ready product 
q Not applicable, the company works accordingly a service business model 
 
3.1.b.  If the company did NOT have an a-prototype at time of founding, please indicate  
the maturity of the technology. 
 
Scale from basic research, becoming increasingly developmental to prototype development 
Please circle the number that corresponds with the degree of development that is most 
applicable to the company’s initial technology base at time of technology transfer: 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Basic research  --> Increasingly developmental   --> ?  Prototype  
 
1. Investigations in pure and applied theoretical studies 
2. Experimental validation of theory and accumulation of data  
3. Combined theoretical and experimental studies of new or unexplored fields of 
technologies. 
4. Conception and/or demonstration of the capability of performing a specific and 
elementary function, using new or untried concepts, principles, techniques, and / or 
materials. 
5. Theoretical analysis and/or experimental measurement of the characteristics of 
behavior of materials and/or equipment, as required for design. 
6. Development of a new material necessary for the performance of a function. 
7. First demonstration of the capability of performing a specific and elementary 
function, using established concepts, principles and /or materials. 
8. Development of a new manufacturing, fabrication and materials processing 
technique. 
 
3.2. At this time, which phase of technology development has been reached? Since when?  
 
  Since when? M/Yr 
a prototype1 YES/NO  
b prototype2 YES/NO  
Product / standardised service3 YES/NO  
Not applicable, the company still applies/changed to a 
service model 
YES/NO  
1 a-prototype: a first attempt;  
2 b-prototype:final version of the product; 
3 Product: market-ready 
 
3.3. Indicate the degree of importance of technology transferre d from the source 
organization on the formation of the spin-off. 
 
In the first three categories, learned technology is unquestionably important in order for the 
company to be established; the difference is only in degree. Please circle the number that 
corresponds to your answer. 
 
Direct: The company would not have been started without the formal transfer of Intellectual 
Property rights. 
 
Partial: The company was founded based upon the formal transfer of Intellectual Property 
rights; however, this know-how needed to be expanded with some other source of know-
how (i.e. IP coming form another institute then the parent institute). 
 
Vague: No formal transfer of Intellectual Property rights took place. The company was 
founded based upon know-how and skills acquired by the initial founders (coming from 
the parent institute). 
 
None: the link with the parent institute is not quite clear; for some reason the company was 
indicated as a spin-off company (a lot of parent institutes like to have as many as spin-
offs as they can on their track record) 
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3.4. a. How would you describe the link with your ‘parent institute (s)’ at THIS TIME? 
q Independent start-up 
q No link: there is no informal ongoing relationship nor formal transfer of 
technology or equity participation  
q Informal link: There is an ongoing relationship between spin-off and parent, e.g. 
through people (employees / managers of the parent serving on the board or 
advising the spin-off), through scientific collaboration, the parent is a customer or 
supplier or partner to the spin-off. There is no equity participation, nor formal IP 
transfer from the parent to the spin-off.  
q Formal link: the ‘parent institute’ does have an equity participation as a 
consequence of the injection of money and/or the transfer of technology (through 
patenting/licensing) 
 
3.4.b. Did this ‘link’ change over time?     
 Yes/No 
           If yes: What was the cause of this change? 
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................... 
 
3.5. a. Did the firm use office space and laboratory equipment from the parent during 
tech transfer and early start-up?  
 
 Year one  Today If change over time: 
indicate date  
Office space  Yes / No Yes / No ………….. 
Laboratory and equipment Yes / No Yes / No ………….. 
 
3.5.b. Was the company in one way or another subsidized?  
 
 Year one  Today If change over time: 
indicate date  
Loans below market prices Yes / No Yes / No ………….. 
Others? …………. ………….. ………….. 
Indicate the nature? 
 
 
 
4. FOUNDERS , KEY PEOPLE AND EMPLOYEES  
 
1.1. Founding Team 
 
Founding team members: need to have (1) a function (hands-on management function or 
regular employee) within the company AND (2 )ownership of an equity stake 
 
a. Number of founders   …….. 
 
b. Evolution in the composition of the founding team? 
Check the applicable boxes for each of the founders (F1, F2, F3,…) 
 
Original Founding team F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 
Technical degree (bio-science, physics, electronics, 
mechanics, robotics, telecom, …) (0=no; 1=yes) 
     
Non-technical degree (economics, law school,      
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psychology, …) (0=no; 1=yes) 
Number of years of experience2 in R&D       
Number of years of experience2 in production      
Number of years of experience2 in a commercial 
function (marketing or sales; business development) 
     
Number of years of experience2 in financing      
Number of years of experience2 in legal function      
Number of years of experience2 in consulting and 
engineering 
     
Experience in starting a company; did the founder 
already founded/co-founded a company (0=no; 1=yes) 
     
Sector3 experience5      
Management4 experience5      
Function at founding1      
Function today1      
% shares at founding      
% shares today      
 
To what extent was the entrepreneurial team expanded, since founding of the company. 
Please indicate carefully when management joined or founders left the team and what 
their function is / was. 
 
Additions to the team A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 A 5 
Date of joining the firm (mm/yy)      
Function at moment of joining the firm1      
Function today1      
Technical degree (bio-science, physics, electronics, 
mechanics, robotics, telecom, …): (0=no; 1=yes) 
     
Non-technical degree (economics, law school, 
psychology, …) (0=no; 1=yes) 
     
Number of years of experience in the sector3       
Number of years of experience2 in the same function      
% shares at moment of joining the firm      
% shares today      
 
Exits from  team E1 E 2 E 3 E 4 E 5 
Date of leaving the firm (mm/yy)      
Initial function within the company1      
Function at moment of leaving the company1      
% shares when initially joining up the company      
% shares at moment of leaving the company      
1For example:  
CEO (Chief Executive Officer) = Business development, General management  
CFO (Chief Financial Officer) = Financing 
COO (Chief Operation Officer) = Operations management 
CMO (Chief Marketing Officer) = Marketing, Business development 
CTO (Chief Technical Officer) = R&D, Technical Management 
CF = Commercial function, sales man 
R = Researcher 
SH = Shareholder, not actively involved in daily operations 
None = Has left the company 
SAB=Scientific advisory board 
Other: ………... 
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2~working experience 
3~a person has sector experience if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated 
company is active in before joining the company 
4~a person has management experience if that person performed already a 
CEO/CTO/CSO/CMO/CFO/COO function during his carreer 
5 (1): low,  when less then 3 years/ (2): average, between 3 & 6 years of experience/ (3):high, 
higher then 6 years 
 
c. Number of founders that worked with each other before founding   N = 
……………… 
 
d. Number of years of joint working experience of the founders   N = 
..…………….. 
 
e. Entrepreneurial motivation: to what extent were following criteria important when 
taking the decision to (co)-found the  company? (5 = very importantl, 4 = important, 3 = 
moderately important, 2 = slightly important, 1 = very unimportant) 
 
Push Factors 
(Smilor et al., 1990) 
Importance 
Need for additional money  
Ideas are rejected within the university  
Dislike of research responsibilities and requirements  
Dismissed  
Difficulties in dealing with university bureaucracy  
Lack of excitement with university career  
No tenure  
Forced retirement  
General frustration in dealing with the university  
Dislike teaching  
Concern for future  
Pull factors  
(Smilor et al., 1990) 
 
Recognition of a market opportunity  
Desire to put theory into practice  
Desire to try something new  
Desire to work independently (self-employment)  
Desire to have fun with an entrepreneurial venture  
The prospect of business contracts  
Desire for wealth  
Govern contracts  
Research support  
Now or never  
Make world better  
Outside financing  
 
4.2. Employees 
 
a. What was the number of employees at time of founding and today? 
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 At founding Today 
Total number of FTE employees1   
Employees (FTE) in R&D1   
Employees (FTE) in marketing and sales1   
Employees (FTE) in consulting and engineering1   
1 Active founders are included 
 
b. Next to the members of the founding team, what is the number of people that left the parent 
institution to join the start-up (e.g. technicians, software developers, … that were 
knowledgable about the technology)?   
N = ……. 
 
5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Following questions only apply to firms that are public limited companies. 
 
Board of Directors  
a. Number of Board members at start-up:   
In total        
 ……………….. 
Number that are members of the founding team  
 ……………….. 
Number of external members that represent their interests  
within the company (i.e. venture capitalists)   
 ……………….. 
Number of external but independent members   
 ……………….. 
 
b. Number of external board members that were known by members  
of the founding team before the founding of the company:   
 ……………….. 
  
c. How important are different roles of the Board for the company at time of start-up? 
 
Rate 1 (very unimportant) – 5 (very important) 
i. Bring their 
reputation to the 
company 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Ii. Bring their 
expertise to the 
company, assessing 
internal progress 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Iii. Scanning the 
environment to 
connect to new 
sources of ideas  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Iv. Manage 
regulatory process 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
d. Number of board meetings in the first year after start-up   ………………….. 
 1. Very 
unimportant 
2. 
Unimportant 
3. Neutral 4. Important 5. Very 
important 
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     Number of Board meetings last year    …………………... 
 
Investors  
Please answer the following questions regarding your LEAD Venture Capital Investor: 
 
i) Which of the following roles has the LEAD VC investor provided to your company?  
ii) How important was it to you that the lead VC investor carried out this role?  
iii) How effective did you find your lead VC investor in carrying out this role?  
 
  
ROLES i) 
Has the Lead VC 
investor carried 
out this role? 
 
Yes - No 
ii) 
Importance 
 
1=not important – 
5=very important 
iii) 
Effectiveness 
 
1=very low 
effectiveness  – 
5=very high 
effectiveness 
1. Find additional financing    
2. Impose milestones to the 
entrepreneurs 
   
3. Open doors (network)    
4. Meet the entrepreneurs regularly    
5. Negotiate important contracts    
6. Restricitions on changes in ownership    
7. Hire the head of marketing & sales    
8. Daily management (operational tasks)    
9. Negotiate intellectual property rights    
10. Determine the composition of the 
Board of Directors 
   
11. Form an Advisory Board    
12. Hire a CFO    
13. Hire a CEO    
14. Restrictions on the CEO’s 
remuneration 
   
15. Hire the R&D head    
16. Hire new employees    
17. Restrictions on additional 
borrowings 
   
18. Contact potential customers    
19. Assist with strategic planning    
20. Have a seat on the Board of 
Directors 
   
21. Regulary check sales figures    
22. Have a look at the financial overview 
regulary 
   
23. Serve as a sounding board for new 
ideas 
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Parent Institute  
f. Which of the following descriptions describes your ‘parent institute’? 
1. Low selective model 
Socially attractive spin -outs:  
the TTO’s objective is to create employment and enhance development in a 
depressed region. The TTO’s mission is to create many (>7) spin-outs each 
year. Most of those spin-out companies are consulting or service oriented, 
and most target a local market.  
2. Supportive model 
Economically attractive spin-out : 
the TTO’s objective is to create economically profitable businesses. The 
TTO’s mission is to create 3 to 7 spin-outs a year. Most spin-outs are based 
upon a proprietary technology developed at the research institutes. Half of the 
spin-outs are product-oriented spin-outs. Most spin-outs receive money from 
a public/private capital fund, set up by the TTO.  
3. Incubator model 
Financially attractive spin-outs:  
the TTO’s objective is to create businesses that will generate financial returns 
to investors. The TTO’s mission is to create only 1 to 3 spin-outs a year. 
Those spin-outs target a global market, they all receive private VC money 
and all are based upon a proprietary technology developed at the research 
institutes.  
 
6. BUSINESS COMPLEXITY: COMPLEXITY OF THE VALUE CHAIN AND THE SALES PROCESS 
 
a. To what extent is the company depende nt on other companies for 
complementary developments in order to sell their complete first product? 
 
1   2   3   4 
 
 
1. The spin-off needs to lobby with several (high level) parties in different organizations 
in order to further develop and commercialize its technology. 
2. The company does not have all knowledge and technology to bring a complete 
product to market and needs to rely on co-development with one other company.  
3. All knowledge is available in house 
4. Other market players seem tp pull the spin-off into the market. Thus, they have a 
positive effect on (the growth) of the business activities of the spin-off 
 
b. Overall, how would you characterize the complexity of the ‘buying decision’ of 
your main customers? 
 
Be aware that the customer as indicated in the following description, not necessarly needs to 
be the end consumer as such; it applies to the main targeted customer of YOUR company 
 
  1         2           3 
 
 
1. The economic buyer1, the technical buyer2 and user buyer3 are represented by the 
same person in the customer’s organization 
2. Different buyer roles are scattered along different people in the customers’ 
organization. However, identifying the key decision makers is rather easy. 
3. A diversity of persons influences the buying process and it is hard to identify them in 
the organization (e.g. the spin-off may not have access to user buyers) or the key 
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decision makers are located very high in the organization (e.g. corporate 
headquarters).  
 
1Economic buyer = this buyer as the authority to sign the contract; present at the top end 
of the company hierarchy; 
2Technical buyer = this buyer judges the quantifiable aspects of the offered product; he 
will communicate his opinion about the usefulness of the product to the user and 
economic buyer; 
3User buyer = this buyer particularly assesses the impact of the product on his own job; 
will it make his job easier?; present at the lower end of the company  hierarchy. 
 
7. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKET 
 
a. Were / Are there competitors that develop similar technologies / products?  
 
At time of start-up N1 Size2 Present N1 Size2 
0          No     0  No    
1          Yes, at local level   1              Yes, at local level   
2          Yes, at national level   2              Yes, at national level   
3          Yes, at global level   3              Yes, at global level   
1N= number of competitors that develop rival products 
2Size= size in terms of employees of these organizations: 1=small; 2=medium; 3=large 
     
b. What is the geographical scope of the market of the firm?  
Circle the number that corresponds to your answer 
 
At founding %1 Present %1 
1. National / local  1. National / local  
2. European  2. European  
3. Worldwide / global  3. Worldwide / global  
1% = if relevant, the percentage of the overall revenue coming from customers at 
national/local, European and worldwide/global level respectively 
 
c. During the first year of operations, to what extent did your company target a niche or 
mainstream market? 
 
1. The company targeted a niche market: a small market, mostly based on one 
application for a small, specific group of customers; often this implies that services 
rather then final product are offered to a small, specific group of customers 
2. The company targeted temporarily a niche market: the first applications targeted a 
small specific group of customers but there was an explicit intention to develop new 
applications and penetrate new market segments. 
3. The company targeted a mainstream market: a large (mio $) market served by 
other, probably larger and older companies, often characterized by heavy competition 
ot it implies that the company has evolved towards a ‘product-company’ 
 
8.  SUCCESS / GROWTH 
 
a. Revenues 
 Year one  Last year 
Were there any revenues? Yes / No Yes / No 
If so: How much?  ………… (Euro) ……… (Euro) 
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b. Is the company break-even in its operations? 
Break-even = returns – expenses= 0; as from the moment the company has positive 
operational cash flow, we say that company is break-even. 
 
q Yes q No 
If Yes: Since when (month/ year): ………………. 
 
c. What is the total ‘burn rate’ or ‘expenditure’ of the company? 
             
 Year one  Last year 
Total expenditure or ‘burn rate’/ month   
 
d. [GrowthExp_Rev]: How would you evaluate the growth of the company in terms of 
revenues in comparison with your expectations at start-up?  
Below 
expectations 
Equal 
expectations 
Little above 
expectations 
Above 
expectations 
Much above 
expectations 
     
 
e. [GrowthExp_Emp]: How would you evaluate the growth of the company in terms of 
employees in comparison with your expectations at start-up?  
 
Below 
expectations 
Equal 
expectations 
Little above 
expectations 
Above 
expectations 
Much above 
expectations 
     
 
f. [SuccesExp]: How would you evaluate the overall success of the company in 
comparison with your expectations at start-up? 
 
Below 
expectations 
Equal 
expectations 
Little above 
expectations 
Above 
expectations 
Much above 
expectations 
     
 
The early growth phase of high tech start-ups is often full of obstacles. The technology did 
not reach maturity yet; concrete, tangible products are often lacking or the products show 
bugs. Additionally, there is a lot of market uncertainty. After a difficult start-up period, spin-
offs can experience ‘take off’, i.e.: sales cycles become shorter, the customer base expands 
rapidly and the sales grow exponentially.  
  
g. Has your company reached ‘take off’ yet? 
 
q Yes, since….. 
q  No 
q Don’t know 
 
If not:  
Do you expect ‘take off’ (i.e. increase in the growth rate)? 
q   Yes, in the short run (in a few weeks or a few months)  
q Yes, in the middle-long term (about one year) 
q Yes, in the long run (one year to a few years) 
q No, the firm will grow slowly 
q No, the firm will stay small 
 
Please explain 
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APPENDIX 5: GUIDELINES FOR DATA INPUT OF COMPANY SURVEY 
 
 
COMPANY PASSPORT 
 
Variable  Description 
ID  
Name Company Name 
Address: Street and Nr  
Address: ZIP and Town  
Address: Country  
Phone Nr  
e-mail  
Respondent Who did you talk to? 
Function of the 
respondent 
CEO, CTO, COO,…employee? 
 
Date Date of the interview  
 
VAT Nr Only for Belgian companies 
Population 1 = Steunpunt; 2=Indicom; 3=Both 
 
 
GENERAL INFO 
 
TechDomain Mainly Biotech (1) – Mainly hardware/micro-electronics (2) – 
Mainly IT (3) – Other (4) 
IPC code A,B, C, F, G, H, G06F, … 
NACE code 3 numbers and up to 3 different Nace codes per firm 
LegalFound_MMYYYY Date (mm/yyyy) at which a legal entity/juridical form was 
created. 
LegalFound_YYYY  
Form Type of legal entity that was created 
End Date Last data point available: mm/yyyy 
- For firms that still exist as an independent entity this is the 
date of the interview 
- For firms that failed / merged / were acquired, this is the 
date of bankruptcy or acquisition (time they stopped 
operating as independent entity) 
 
Age Number of months since founding until month of the interview 
or until failure or acquisition (N) 
MMYYYY_FirstMoney Date (mm/yyyy) at which a first injection of money took 
place. 
In some countries one can found a company without depositing 
an amount of start capital; the deposit of the start capital is in 
those cases only necessary in a later stage i.e. when the 
company actually starts its activities. 
MMYYYY_StartAct Date (mm/yyyy) at which the company really started its 
activities; date at which the company 
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INST_LINK Type of institutional link 
1. None, this is an independent start-up. The company 
emerged from the ideas and knowledge of one or more 
independent entrepreneurs.  
2. Corporate spin out: the start-up emerged from from the 
business activities of another private corporation. The transfer 
of knowledge can be formal (through equity participation) or 
informal (e.g. when employee leaves firm to start company 
based on skills acquired at the parent) 
3. Academic spin out: the company spun out from a university 
or public research institute (irrespective of whether there was a 
formal transfer of knowledge). The key technological 
knowlegde or idea was at least in part developed while 
working at the university / the research institute. 
DetOrigin Name of the parent institute 
Origin 1: University; 2: Research Institute. 3: Other company; 4: 
Current company that changed its mission; 5: Independent 
entrepreneur; 6: Other 
RP_StartYear Start year of research project within the parent institute (s) on 
which the company’s activities are based (yyyy) 
Start of research project  =  time at which the project, forming 
the base of the eventual applied technology within the 
company, started within the parent organization; whenever the 
project is the result of several projects then one should 
consider the time and/or project that added most value to the 
eventual commercialization of the technology. 
INV_INV Inventor involvement in the company 
 
1. Researcher / inventor was not aware of the technology being 
transferred into a spin-off 
1. Researcher stayed in research position at research institute  
3. Shareholder with formal participation limited to employee 
(no C** function) 
4. Shareholder with participation limited to Board of Directors 
or SAB 
5. Shareholder with formal participation in a C** function 
 
 
CAPITALIZATION/OWNERSHIP 
 
 
Variable  Description 
Table1: moment in time = legal founding date  
All questions relate to the FIRST YEAR OF OPERATIONS! 
TotalCap0 Total capital at founding (Amount in Euro): ALL MONEY 
THAT IS INJECTED WITHIN 12 MONTHS AFTER 
FOUNDING! (since often financing rounds can take a while 
before they are actually closed) 
Personal0 Personal (= injected by the founders/inventors) capital at 
founding: Amount in Euro  
%CapShares_Pers % capital shares: percentage of shares that the financing party 
got in return for the injection of money or for the transfer of 
knowledge/ intellectual property. 
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%FoundShares_Pers % founder shares: percentage of shares that the party got in 
return for the transfer of knowledge/ intellectual property. 
 
External0 External (= by fund from parent institute, VC, corporate 
investor, BA, 3F or other parties) capital at founding 
1. Amount in Euro  
2. % shares: percentage of shares that the financing party got 
in return for the injection of money or for the transfer of 
knowledge/ intellectual property. 
3. % founder shares: percentage of shares that the party got in 
return for the transfer of knowledge/ intellectual property. 
 
%CapShares_Ext % capital shares: percentage of shares that the financing party 
got in return for the injection of money or for the transfer of 
knowledge/ intellectual property. 
%FoundShares_Ext % founder shares: percentage of shares that the party got in 
return for the transfer of knowledge/ intellectual property. 
VC0 Did the company receive financing from an institutional venture 
capital investor during the first year? 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
(3F are excluded, as well as parent institutes) 
Workloans0 (Based on BELFIRST data) = Financial debts_+1y (other debts) 
+ Financial debts_max1y 
(‘handelsschulden’+’belanstingen/bezoldigingen/sociale 
lasten’+’overige schulden’): using data from the founding year  
BankLoans0 (Based on BELFIRST data) = Financial debts_+1y (Fin debts) + 
Financial debts_max1y (debts+1y,verv-1y + fin debt): using data 
from the founding year 
Subsidies0 Did the company receive any kind of subsidies? (Amount of 
Euro) 
Subsidies = grants obtained from government; public money in 
order to support the development of the technology into a 
product. It does not include public loans or public equity. 
 
OptPlans0 Are particular arrangements made at time of legal founding with 
one of parties that specify the ownership of shares as 
time/performance of the company evolves? 1=yes; 0= no. 
If yes, describe these specifications. 
Table2: moment in time = first capital increase 
TotalCap1 Amount of capital increase (Amount in Euro) 
Personal1 Personal (= injected by the founders/inventors) capital: Amount 
in Euro  
External1 External (= by fund from parent institute, VC, corporate 
investor, BA, 3F or other parties) capital: Amount in Euro 
VC1 For the first capital increase, did the company receive financing 
from an institutional venture capital investor? 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
(3F are excluded, as well as parent institutes) 
Subsidies1 Did the company receive any kind of subsidies? (Amount 
inEuro) 
Subsidies = grants obtained from government; public money in 
order to support the development of the technology into a 
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product. It does not include public loans or public equity. 
ResPro1 Reserved Profits 
OptPlans1 Are particular arrangements made at this moment in time with 
one of parties that specify the ownership of shares as 
time/performance of the company evolves? 1=yes; 0= no. 
If yes, describe these specifications. 
Table3: moment in time = second capital increase 
TotalCap2 Amount of capital  increase (Amount in Euro) 
Personal2 Personal (= injected by the founders/inventors) capital: Amount 
in Euro  
External2 External (= by fund from parent institute, VC, corporate 
investor, BA, 3F or other parties) capital: Amount in Euro 
VC2 For the second capital increase, did the company receive 
financing from an institutional venture capital investor? 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
(3F are excluded, as well as parent institutes) 
Subsidies2 Did the company receive any kind of subsidies? (Amount  in 
Euro) 
Subsidies = grants obtained from government; public money in 
order to support the development of the technology into a 
product. It does not include public loans or public equity. 
ResPro2 Reserved Profits 
OptPlans2 Are particular arrangements made at this moment in time with 
one of parties that specify the ownership of shares as 
time/performance of the company evolves? 1=yes; 0= no. 
If yes, describe these specifications. 
Table 4: moment in time = third capital increase 
TotalCap3 Amount of capital increase (Amount in Euro) 
Personal3 Personal (= injected by the founders/inventors) capital: Amount 
in Euro 
External3 External (= by fund from parent institute, VC, corporate 
investor, BA, 3F or other parties) capital: Amount in Euro 
VC3 For the third capital increase, did the company receive financing 
from an institutional venture capital investor? 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
(3F are excluded, as well as parent institutes) 
Subsidies3 Did the company receive any kind of subsidies? (Amount of 
Euro) 
Subsidies = grants obtained from government; public money in 
order to support the development of the technology into a 
product. It does not include public loans or public equity. 
ResPro3 Reserved Profits; the amount (EURO) of profit or loss that the 
companies transfers to the next book year. 
OptPlans3 Are particular arrangements made at this moment in time with 
one of parties that specify the ownership of shares as 
time/performance of the company evolves? 1=yes; 0= no. 
If yes, describe these specifications. 
Table 5: Moment in time = TIME OF INTERVIEW 
CapToday Total capital today (Amount in €) 
ExtCapToday External capital today (in €) 
PersCapToday Personal capital today (in €) 
VC_Today At time of the interview, do one or more institutional venture 
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capital investor(s) have equity in the company? 
0=no 
1=yes 
WorkLoansToday (Based on BELFIRST data) = Financial debts_+1y (other debts) 
+ Financial debts_max1y 
(‘handelsschulden’+’belanstingen/bezoldigingen/sociale 
lasten’+’overige schulden’): using data from the year in which 
the interview took place 
BankLoansToday (Based on BELFIRST data) = Financial debts_+1y (Fin debts) + 
Financial debts_max1y (debts+1y,verv-1y + fin debt): using data 
from the year in which the interview took place 
 
TECHNOLOGY: TECH TRANSFER AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Tech transfer 
a. StageNPD0 
 
Stage in New Product Development Cycle at founding. 
1: The company has a service business model  
2. Idea Phase for product development process 
3. Proof of concept, i.e. a-prototype;  
4. Prototype that works in realistic environment, i.e. b-prototype; 
5. Concrete market-ready product; 
b. Maturity0 Maturity of technology if no alpha prototype at founding 
 Scale from basic research (1), becoming increasingly 
developmental(8) 
 
1. Investigations in pure and applied theoretical studies 
2. Experimental validation of theory and accumulation of data  
3. Combined theoretical and experimental studies of new or 
unexplored fields of technologies. 
4. Conception and/or demonstration of the capability of 
performing a specific and elementary function, using new or 
untried concepts, principles, techniques, and / or materials.  
5. Theoretical analysis and/or experimental measurement of the 
characteristics of behavior of materials and/or equipment, as 
required for design.  
6. Development of a new material necessary for the performance 
of a function.  
7. First demonstration of the capability of performing a specific 
and elementary function, using established concepts, principles 
and /or materials. 
8. Development of a new manufacturing, fabrication and 
materials processing technique. 
Phase of technology development 
Aproto Is there a a-prototype (0: No; 1: Yes) 
DateAproto Date of first a-prototype (Mm/yy) 
Bproto Is there a b-prototype (0: No; 1: Yes)  
DateBproto Date of first b-prototype (Mm/yy) 
Product Is there a concrete product (i.e. a product that was sold more 
than once) (0: No; 1: Yes)  
DateProduct Date of first concrete product (Mm/yy) 
Not applicable  Because the company still applies a service business model or no 
longer has the ambition to develop a product and therefore 
changed its business model to one focusing on services (0: No; 
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1: Yes); 
If the business model of the company changed over the years 
indicate when this change took place (Mm/yy) 
IMPORT_TT Importance of tech transfer for the spin-off company, representing the 
degree of dependence on source technologies.  
1 =  Direct; 2 = Partial; 3 = Vague; 4 = None 
Months_pro  Number of months from founding until the moment the company 
has a product ready (calculate) 
  
a. LINK_PI 
 
The formality of the link between the spin-off and the parent. 
0: Independent Start-up 
1: No link:  the firm spun-off from another organization but 
there is no formal transfer of technology or equity link nor an 
ongoing (informal) relationship with the parent;  
2: Informal link: the parent institute does not have an equity 
participation in the company, but another link does exist. For 
example: the entrepreneur has started up his company based 
upon the knowledge he acquired while working for the ‘parent 
institute’; or the technology was deve loped within the ‘parent 
institute’ but was never officially transferred (through 
patenting/licensing. Another possibility could be that there is an 
(informal) ongoing relationship between spin-off and parent, e.g. 
through people (employees/ managers of the parent sit in the 
board or advice the spin-off informally), through scientific 
collaboration, the parent is a customer or supplier or partner to 
the spin-off;  
3: Formal link: formal link between spin-off and parent through 
equity participation (parent owns shares in the spin-off because 
the parent invested in the company and/ or  transfer of 
technology). 
b. ChangeLINK_PI Did the ‘link (as described in 3.4.a. change over time)? (0: No; 
1: Yes); 
Physical incubation 
Office Space 
 
OS_0 
OS_TODAY 
 
Use of office space  
 
1. Year one : at founding (0 =  No; 1 = Yes) 
2. Today: moment of interview (0 =  No; 1 = Yes) 
 
Labs and equipment 
 
LE_0 
LE_Today 
 
Use of labs and equipment at founding  
 
1. Year one : at founding (0 =  No; 1 = Yes) 
2. Today: moment of interview (0 =  No; 1 = Yes) 
 
 
 
FOUNDERS, KEY MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES  
 
 
Founders  
Founding team members: need to have (1) a function (hands-on management function or 
regular employee) within the company AND (2) ownership of an equity stake 
a. N_Founders  Number of founders (N) 
 
b. Evolution of the composition of the founders’ team? 
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Table 1: Original founding team 
 
EDO1;…;EDO5 Education of first,…, fifth founder (1 = technical; 2 = non-
technical) 
 
Experience Should be interpreted in terms of working experience 
ExpR&DO1;…; 
ExpR&DO5 
Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in 
R&D (N) 
 
ExpPO1;…; ExpPO5 Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in 
production (N) 
 
ExpCO1;…;ExpCO5 Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in a 
commercial function (N) 
 
ExpFO1;…;ExpFO5 Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in a 
financial function (N) 
 
ExpLO1;…;ExpLO5 Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in a 
legal function (N) 
 
ExpCE1;…;ExpCE5 Number of years of experience of the first,…, fifth founder in a 
consulting and engineering (N) 
 
ExpFo1; …; ExpFo5 Does one of the founders has previous experience with the 
founding of a company (0: no; 1:yes) 
 
SectorExpTeam Cumulative sector experience of the initial founding team (=a person has 
sector experience if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated 
company is active in before joining the company)  
(1): low,  when less then 3 years/ (2): average, between 3 & 6 years of 
experience/ (3): high, higher then 6 years 
 
MgtExpTeam Cumulative management experience of the initial founding team (=a 
person has management experience if that person performed already a 
CEO/CTO/CSO/CMO/CFO/COO function during his carreer)  
(1): low,  when less then 3 years/ (2): average, between 3 & 6 years of 
experience/ (3):high, higher then 6 years 
 
F1O1; …; F1O5 Function at founding of the first,…, fifth founder (CEO; CFO; 
COO; CMO; CTO; CF; R (researcher); B (board member); 0 
(none)) 
 
F2O1;…; F2O5 Function today of the first, …, fifth founder (CEO; CFO; COO; 
CMO; CTO; CF; R (researcher); B (board member); 0 (none)) 
 
Shares1O1; …; 
Shares1O5 
Number of shares at founding of the first,…, fifth founder (N) 
 
Shares2O1; …; 
Shares2O5 
Number of shares today of the first,…, fifth founder (N) 
 
Table2: Additions to the team 
1Date Month/year at which a first additional person joined the 
founding/management team 
1Funct_Join Function of that person at moment of joining the team (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
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1Funct_Today Function of that person today (moment of interview) (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
1Educ Education of additional founder/manager (1 = technical; 2 = 
non-technical) 
1SectorExp Number of years of sector experience (=a person has sector experience 
if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated company is active 
in before joining the company)  
1FunctExp Number of years of experience the additional person has in a 
similar function 
1Shares_Join % shares at time of joining the firm of the additional 
founder/manager (0,00) 
1Shares_Today % shares today of the additional founder/manager (0,00) 
2Date Month/year at which a second person joined the 
founding/management team 
2Funct_Join Function of that person at moment of joining the team (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
2Funct_Today Function of that person today (moment of interview) (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
2Educ Education of additional founder/manager (1 = technical; 2 = 
non-technical) 
2SectorExp Number of years of sector experience (=a person has sector experience 
if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated company is active 
in before joining the company)  
2FunctExp Number of years of experience the additional person has in a 
similar function 
2Shares_Join % shares at time of joining the firm of the second additional 
founder/manager (0,00) 
2Shares_Today % shares today of the second additional founder/manager (0,00) 
3Date Month/year at which a third person joined the 
founding/management team 
3Funct_Join Function of that person at moment of joining the team (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
3Funct_Today Function of that person today (moment of interview) (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
3Educ Education of additional founder/manager (1 = technical; 2 = 
non-technical) 
3SectorExp Number of years of sector experience (=a person has sector experience 
if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated company is active 
in before joining the company)  
3FunctExp Number of years of experience the additional person has in a 
similar function 
3Shares_Join Number of shares at time of joining the firm of the third 
additional founder/manager (N) 
3Shares_Today % shares today of the third additional founder/manager (0,00) 
4Date Month/year at which a fourth person joined the 
founding/management team 
4Funct_Join Function of that person at moment of joining the team (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
4Funct_Today Function of that person today (moment of interview) (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
4Educ Education of additional founder/manager (1 = technical; 2 = 
non-technical) 
4SectorExp Number of years of sector experience (=a person has sector experience 
if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated company is active 
in before joining the company)  
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4FunctExp Number of years of experience the additional person has in a 
similar function 
4Shares_Join % shares at time of joining the firm of the additional 
founder/manager (0,00) 
4Shares_Today % shares today of the fourth additional founder/manager (0,00) 
5Date Month/year at which a fifth person joined the 
founding/management team 
5Funct_Join Function of that person at moment of joining the team (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
5Funct_Today Function of that person today (moment of interview) (CEO, 
CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
5Educ Education of additional founder/manager (1 = technical; 2 = 
non-technical) 
5SectorExp Number of years of sector experience (=a person has sector experience 
if he did already work in the same sector as the interrogated company is active 
in before joining the company)  
5FunctExp Number of years of experience the additional person has in a 
similar function 
5Shares_Join % shares at time of joining the firm of the second additional 
founder/manager (0,00) 
5Shares_Today % shares today of the fifth additional founder/manager (0,00) 
Table3: Exits from team 
1Date_Exit Month/year at which a person left the team 
1Funct_Join Initial function within the company ) (CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, 
…) 
1Funct_Exit Function of that person at moment of leaving the company 
(CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
1Shares_Join % shares at founding of the founder/manager leaving the firm 
(0,00) 
1Shares_Exit % shares today of the founder that left the firm (0,00) 
2Date_Exit Month/year at which a person left the team 
2Funct_Join Initial function within the company ) (CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, 
…) 
2Funct_Exit Function of that person at moment of leaving the company 
(CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
2Shares_Join % shares at founding of the founder/manager leaving the firm 
(0,00) 
2Shares_Exit % shares today of the founder that left the firm (0,00) 
3Date_Exit Month/year at which a person left the team 
3Funct_Join Initial function within the company ) (CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, 
…) 
3Funct_Exit Function of that person at moment of leaving the company 
(CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
3Shares_Join % shares at founding of the founder/manager leaving the firm 
(0,00) 
3Shares_Exit % shares today of the founder that left the firm (0,00) 
4Date_Exit Month/year at which a person left the team 
4Funct_Join Initial function within the company ) (CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, 
…) 
4Funct_Exit Function of that person at moment of leaving the company 
(CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
4Shares_Join % shares at founding of the founder/manager leaving the firm 
(0,00) 
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4Shares_Exit % shares today of the founder that left the firm (0,00) 
5Date_Exit Month/year at which a person left the team 
5Funct_Join Initial function within the company ) (CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, 
…) 
5Funct_Exit Function of that person at moment of leaving the company 
(CEO, CTO, COO, CSO, …) 
5Shares_Join % shares at founding of the founder/manager leaving the firm 
(0,00) 
5Shares_Exit % shares today of the founder that left the firm (0,00) 
c.  
PriorKnowlF 
 
Fraction of founders that worked with each other before 
founding (e.g. 3 out of 4 = 0,75) 
d. Ycoop Number of years the founders worked together before joining the 
firm 
e. Nature relationship 
Nature_Rel Context of joint-working experience of the founders (all that 
apply) 
1. Person to person academic interaction 
e.g.: PhD student and advisor, researchers in same department / 
institute, personal contatcs through conferences … 
2. Academic interaction by means of institutional research 
collaboration, i.e. Research project performed jointly by 2 
universities 
3. Person to person industry – academic relation 
e.g.: Someone from academia knows a corporate employee as 
part of his personal network 
4. Industry – academic research collaboration, i.e.: Research 
project performed jointly by a commercial firm and academic 
department 
5. Person to person industry – industry relation, e.g.: Colleagues 
in corporate R&D department, personal contacts in other firms 
(e.g.through trade associations) 
6. Formal industry – industry (research) collaborarion, e.g.: 2 
firms contractually collaborating on research project and / or 
different phases in business development 
Employees 
a. N employees 
FTE1 Total Number of employees at founding in full-time-equivalents 
(N) 
FTE2 Total Number of employees today in full-time-equivalents (N) 
FTERD1 Number of employees in R&D at founding in full-time-
equivalents (N) 
FTERD2 Number of employees in R&D today in full-time-equivalents 
(N) 
FTECF1 Number of employees in a commercial 
function/marketing&sales at founding in full-time-equivalents 
(N) 
FTECF2 Number of employees in a commercial 
function/marketing&sales today in full-time-equivalents (N) 
FTECE1 Number of employees in a consulting & engineering function at 
founding in full-time-equivalents (N) 
FTECE2 Number of employees in a consulting & engineering function 
today in full-time-equivalents (N) 
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b. JoinedSU Number of people (other than the members of the founding team) that 
left the parent company to join the start-up (N) 
 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL MOTIVATION: PUSH/PULL 
 
 
 
 
Push1 – Push11 
 
Pull1-Pull12 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Motivation: to what extent were following 
criteria important when taking the decision to (co)-found the 
company?  
 
(5 = very importantl, 4 = important, 3 = moderately important, 2 
= slightly important, 1 = very unimportant) 
(Smilor et al., 1990) 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Corporate Governance_Board 
a. N_Board Number of board members at time of start-up of the company 
 
b. PriorKnowl_Board Number of external board members that were known by 
members of the founding team before founding of the company 
 
c. Roles_Board 
Reput 1 = Very unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Neutral; 4 = 
Important; 5 = Very important 
Expertise 1 = Very unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Neutral; 4 = 
Important; 5 = Very important 
ScanEnv 1 = Very unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Neutral; 4 = 
Important; 5 = Very important 
RegProcess 1 = Very unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Neutral; 4 = 
Important; 5 = Very important 
d. Board meetings   
RvB1 Number of board meetings in the first year(X/ year) 
RvB2 Number of board meetings last year (X/ year) 
Corporate Governance_Investors  
The following questions are related to the service provided by the LEAD venture 
capital investor to the portolio company. 
e.i. VC services – 
Carried out role? (23 
collums) 
Which of the following services has the LEAD VC investor provided 
in your company? 1= yes; 0= no 
e.ii. VC services – 
Importance carrying 
out role? (23 collums) 
How important was it to you that the lead VC carried out this role? 5 = 
very important, 4 = important, 3 = moderately important, 2 = slightly 
important, 1 = irrelevant 
e.iii. VC services – 
Effictiveness? (23 
collums) 
How effective did you find your lead VC in carrying out this role? 1= 
very low effectiveness, 5 = very high effectiveness 
Corporate Governance_Parent Institute 
f. RoleParent Which of the following description describes best ‘your parent 
institute’? 
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1. Low selective model 
Socially attractive spin -outs:  
the TTO’s objective is to create employment and enhance 
development in a depressed region. The TTO’s mission is to 
create many (>7) spin-outs each year. Most of those spin-out 
companies are consulting or service oriented, and most target a 
local market.  
2. Supportive model 
Economically attractive spin-out : 
the TTO’s objective is to create economically profitable 
businesses. The TTO’s mission is to create 3 to 7 spin-outs a 
year. Most spin-outs are based upon a proprietary technology 
developed at the research institutes. Half of the spin-outs are 
product-oriented spin-outs. Most spin-outs receive money from a 
public/private capital fund, set up by the TTO.  
3. Incubator model 
Financially attractive spin-outs:  
the TTO’s objective is to create businesses that will generate 
financial returns to investors. The TTO’s mission is to create 
only 1 to 3 spin-outs a year. Those spin-outs target a global 
market, they all receive private VC money and all are based 
upon a proprietary technology developed at the research 
institutes.  
 
 
BUSINESS COMPLEXITY 
 
Variable Description 
VAC_1stPro 
 
This question applies to the first product that is/was 
developed by the company. 
1 = the value chain is very complex: The company needs to 
lobby with several (high level) parties in order to further develop 
and commercialize its technology.  
2 = the value chain is complex: The company does not have all 
knowledge and technology to bring a complete product to 
market and needs to rely on co-development with one other 
company.  
3 = Neutral; All knowledge is available in house.  
4 = the company is pulled into a market. In some cases, there 
can be a positive effect of other market players on the growth of 
the business activities of the focal firm. 
b. SalesProcess The customer is not necessarly the end consumer as such; it 
applies to the main targeted customer for the particular 
interrogated company. 
1 = one person is economic, technical and user buyer.  
2 = different buyer roles are covered by different people in the 
customers’ organization. However, the key decision-makers are 
straightforward and are found rather easy.  
3 = Very difficult sales cycles: different people play different 
buying roles and difficult to identify all people that influence 
decision making or decision makers are spread over different 
hierarchical levels and key decision makers (i.e. economic 
buyers) are located high in the organization (e.g. in corporate 
headquarters). 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MARKET 
 
Variable Description 
a. Competitors  
Comp_SU 
 
 
Ncomp_SU 
 
SizeComp_SU 
Competitors that develop similar products at time of start-up. 
0 = No, 1 = local, 2 = national, 3 = global 
 
N: number of competitors that develop rival products 
 
Size: the size of these organizations in terms of number of 
employees: 1= small; 2=medium; 3=large. 
Comp_Pres 
 
 
Ncomp_Pres 
 
SizeComp_Pres 
Competitors that CURRENTLY develop similar products 
0 = No, 1 = local, 2 = national, 3 = global 
 
N: number of competitors that develop rival products 
 
Size: the size of these organizations in terms of number of 
employees: 1= small; 2=medium; 3=large. 
b. Geographical scope  
Geog_SU 
 
LocalRev_Su 
 
EuroRev_Su 
 
GlobalRev_Su 
1 = National / local, 2 = European, 3 = Worldwide / global 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers at national/local level (0,00) 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers European level (0,00) 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers at worldwide/global level (0,00) 
Geog_Pres 
 
LocalRev_Pres 
 
 
EuroRev_Pres 
 
GlobalRev_Pres 
1 = National / local, 2 = European, 3 = Worldwide / global 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers at national/local global level (0,00) 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers European level (0,00) 
 
% = the percentage of the overall revenue coming from 
customers at worldwide/global level (0,00) 
c. Market size and targeted market 
TargetMarket 1 = Niche market, 2 = Temporarily a niche market, intention to 
penetrate new market segments, 3 = Mainstream market 
‘Calc_Msize0’ 
 
 
 
 
MarketSize0 
Did you calculate, at time of founding, the potential size of the 
total market that company aims to target? 
Yes (1): No (0) 
 
 
The calculated or estimated market size in MILLION € 
Mshare0_Calc 
 
 
 
Mshare0 
   
Did you calculate, at time of founding, the market share that 
the company targets? 
Yes (1)No (0)  
 
The calculated or estimated market share in ‘%’ (0,00) 
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Fulfill_Mshare  
 
 
 
MsizeToday 
 
 
Mshare_Today 
Could the company fulfill these calculations? (Today) 
Yes (1) 
No (0) 
 
What is the size of the market you are CURRENTLY operating 
in? 
(in €) This can be the same as marketSize0, but not necessarily! 
 
What is the current market share of the company: in € 
 
Calc_Growth 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
Effective_Growth 
Did you calculate, at time of fouding,  the annual growth rate 
of the targeted market? 
Yes (1) No (0) 
 
Indicate the calculated or estimated growth in %/year (0,00) 
 
What is the effective annual growth rate? Indicate the growth 
in ‘%/year’ (0,00) 
 
d. Sales strategy  1 = yes; 0 = No 
 
 
SUCCESS/ GROWTH 
 
 
Variable Description 
a. Revenues  
DRev1 Revenues generated first year (0: No; 1: yes) 
DRev2 Revenues generated last year (0: No; 1: yes) 
Rev1 Amount of revenues in first year (Amount in Euro) Equivalent 
for 12m 
Rev2 Amount of revenues in last year (Amount in Euro) Equivalent 
for 12m 
CrinRev1 Share of contract research for industry in first years’ revenues 
(%) 
CrinRev2 Share of contract research for industry in last years’ revenues 
(%) 
SubinRev1 Share of subsidies in first years’ revenues (%) 
SubinRev2 Share of subsidies in last years’ revenues (%) 
LicinRev1 Share of licensing in first years’ revenues (%) 
LicinRev2 Share of licensing in last years’ revenues (%) 
C&EinRev1 Share of consult ing and engineering services in first years’ 
revenues (%) 
C&EinRev2 Share of consulting and engineering services in last years’ 
revenues (%) 
M&SinRev1 Share of maintenance and support services in first years’ 
revenues (%) 
M&SinRev2 Share of maintenance and support services in last years’ 
revenues (%) 
CustSinRev1 Share of customized product sales in first years’ revenues (%) 
CustSinRev2 Share of customized product sales in last years’ revenues (%) 
StSinRev1 Share of standardized product sales in first years’ revenues (%) 
StSinRev2 Share of standardized product sales in last years’ revenues (%) 
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OtherinRev1 Share of other activities in first years’ revenues (%) 
OtherinRev2 Share of other activities in last years’ revenues (%) 
b. Break even 
BreakEven Is the company break-even  (0: No; 1: Yes) 
Break-even =returns – expenses= 0; as from the moment the company 
has positive operational cash flow, we say that company is break-even. 
DateBreakEven Since when is the company break-even (month/year) 
c. Burn rate  
TotBR1 Total burn-rate at founding (Amount in Euro/month) 
TotBR2 Total burn-rate today (Amount in Euro/month) 
d. Perceived Success/Growth 
GrowthExp_Rev Growth of the company compared to the expectations (of the 
entrepreneurs) at founding  in terms of revenues (1 = below 
expectations; 2 = as expected; 3 = little above expectations; 4 = 
above expectations; 5 = much above expectations)  
GrowthExp_Emp Growth of the company compared to the expectations (of the 
entrepreneurs) at founding  in terms of employees (1 = below 
expectations; 2 = as expected; 3 = little above expectations; 4 = 
above expectations; 5 = much above expectations) 
SuccessExp Global success of the company compared to expectations (of the 
entrepreneurs) at founding (1 = below expectations; 2 = as 
expected; 3 = little above expectations; 4 = above expectations; 
5 = much above expectations) 
f.  
TakeOff 
 
Take-off reached (0: No; 1: Yes) 
DateTakeOff Date of take-off (mm/yyyy) 
ExpTakeOff If NOT: 
Expected date of take -off (1 = short term, i.e. within a few 
week to a few months; 2 = middle -long term, i.e. within about 
one year; 3 = long term, i.e. over more than a year; 4 = slow 
growth is expected; 5 = staying a small company is expected) 
Bankrupt 0: not bankrupt; 1: bankrupt 
Exit 0: no exit; 1: exit (tradesale or IPO) 
Tradesale  0: no tradesale (or merger); 1:acquired by other firm/ tradesale  
IPO 0: privately held; 1: Publicly held (IPO) 
Bankrupt 0=No; 1=Yes 
Exit 0=No; 1=Yes 
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APPENDIX 6: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES FROM 
PUBLIC RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS 
 
 
SURVEY ON UNIVERSITY  TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
ACTIVITIES:  
FINANCIAL YEAR 200269 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
General instructions  
 
We have endeavored to make the questionnaire as simple as possible to complete. However, 
there are a small number of instructions that we would like to bring to your attention: 
 
· Words in CAPITALS in the questions are defined in the DEFINITIONS section at the 
end of the questionnaire. 
 
· The financial year may vary by institution so please use your own financial year. The 
survey covers the financial year ending during 2002. 
 
· Please note that the data you provide should be for the whole of your institution’s 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER activities. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.  Please state the period of your institution’s financial year for 2002: ____/___/_01_ to 
___/__ /_02 
 
SECTION 1: RESOURCES 
 
2.a) Does your institution include a MEDICAL SCHOOL?  ? Yes ? No 
 
Note: The institution must own all or part of the MEDICAL SCHOOL and have direct 
formal and operational links. 
 
2.b) Does your institution include a BUSINESS INCUBATOR? ? Yes ? No 
 
Note: The institution must own all or part of the BUSINESS INCUBATOR and have 
direct formal and operational links. 
 
2.c) Does your institution include a SCIENCE PARK?  ? Yes ? No 
 
Note: The institution must own all or part of the SCIENCE PARK and have direct formal and 
operational links. 
 
3.  In what year did your institution dedicate at least 0.5 PROFESSIONAL FULL-
TIME EQUIVALENTS (FTEs) toward TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
ACTIVITIES?  
___________________________ 
 
                                                                 
69 Adapted from UNICO / NUBS (2003) 
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Note: If you have answered this question in a previous year, please leave blank and 
go to Question 4. 
 
4. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND OTHER FTEs: 
 
Note: Please use either a full or fractional level of FTEs when allocating 
the number of FTEs employed in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
ACTIVITIES below.  
 
4.a) What was the total number of FTEs that were employed in your 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACTIVITIES in total during financial year 2002? 
 
________ 
 
Note: 4.a) Covers FTEs whose duties and responsibilities include licensing, patenting 
and SPIN-OUT Company creation processes, as well as FTEs providing 
administrative, secretarial, accounting, contract management and professional 
support. 
 
OF THIS NUMBER: 
 
4.b) How many LICENSING FTEs were employed in TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER ACTIVITIES in financial year 2002?   
________ 
 
Note: LICENSING FTEs refers only to the number of full time executives 
whose duties are specifically involved with the licensing and patenting 
process.  
 
4.c) How many SPIN-OUT FTEs were employed in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
activities in financial year 2002? 
________ 
 
Note: SPIN-OUT FTEs refers only to the number of full time executives 
whose duties are specifically involved with the process of creating new 
SPIN-OUT COMPANIES.  
 
4. RESEARCH EXPENDITURES 
 
 TOTAL 
RESEARCH 
EXPENDITUR
E 
NATIONAL 
GOVERNMEN
T 
SOURCES 
EUROPEAN 
GOV. 
SOURCES 
INDUSTRY  
SOURCES 
FY 2002 €  € € € 
 
Note: The sum of Research Expenditures funded by Government, EU, and Industrial sources 
may not equal Total Research Expenditures. 
 
SECTION 2: LICENCES/ OPTION AGREEMENTS/ ASSIGNMENTS 
 
6.a)   LICENCES/ OPTION AGREEMENTS / ASSIGNMENTS:  
 
6.a.i) How many of LICENCES / OPTIONS / ASSIGNMENTS did your institution execute in 
financial year 2002? (Excluding research contracts) 
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6.a.ii) In total, how many LICENCES/ OPTIONS were ACTIVE as of the last day in financial 
year 2002? 
 
 
 
Total number 
of 
ASSIGNMENT
S/ 
LICENCES/O
PTIONS 
Executed 
(6.a.i) 
Total Number of 
ACTIVE 
LICENCES / 
OPTIONS 
Financial Year 2002 ……..  
Cumulative 
through end of 
Financial Year 2002 
 …….. 
  
6.b) How many of the of LICENCES / OPTIONS / ASSIGNMENTS executed in 
financial year 2002 were licences to NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES? 
 
 
Total 
(Same as 
6.a.i) 
To NEW SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES 
 UK FOREIGN 
…….. …….. …….. 
 
SECTION 3: LICENSING INCOME 
 
7. LICENCE INCOME: Excludes software and biological material end user 
licences under € 1500 
 
These questions want to shed some light as to what extent the research institution generates 
‘big’ licenses. If an e xact figure can not be given, please inlcude an estimate. 
 
7.a) How many licences generated between €72 205,90 and €359 585,40 for your 
institution in financial year 2002?  
N = __________ 
 
7.b) How many licences generated €360 995,97 or more for your institution in 
financial year 2002?  
 
N = __________ 
 
7.c) What was the amount of LICENCE INCOME RECEIVED at your institution 
during financial year 2002?   
 
Note: Number of licences here should exclude software and biological material end-
user licences under € 1500. 
 
€ ____________ 
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SECTION 4: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND PATENTING 
 
8. IP PROTECTION EXPENDITURES: 
 
How much did your institution spend in external legal fees, patent costs, and 
specialist IP consultancy advice in financial year 2002? Please give an estimate  if 
actual figures are not available. 
 
€__________________ 
 
PATENT-RELATED ACTIVITY  
 
9.a) How many INVENTION DISCLOSURES were received and NEW PATENT 
APPLICATIONS FILED by your institution in financial year 2002? 
 
INVENTION 
DISCLOSUR
ES received 
TOTAL PATENTAPPLICATIONS 
FILED 
 
Domestic US EU Other 
 
    
 
10. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS 
 
10.a) Does your institution have an agreed policy on how income from EXECUTED 
LICENCES is distributed amongst the (academic) Inventor, Department and 
Institution?  
? Yes ? No 
 
10.b) How is income from EXECUTED LICENCES distributed amongst the 
(academic) Inventor, Department and Institution for licence revenue in excess of € 
100k, or at the highest tier. 
 
 Inventor receives Department receives Institution receives 
Percentage of 
net revenues % % % 
 
 
SECTION 5: SPIN-OUT and START-UP COMPANIES 
 
Note: SPIN-OUT COMPANIES and START-UP COMPANIES are not 
equivalent. To avoid double counting, please refer to the Survey Terms and Definitions 
provided. 
 
11. NEW SPIN-OUT AND NEW START-UP COMPANIES: 
 
Note: Questions refer to SPIN-OUT COMPANIES and START-UP COMPANIES 
created during financial year 2002. 
 
11.a) How many NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES were formed during financial 
year 2002 (that is companies that depended on LICENSING or ASSIGNMENT of 
intellectual property generated at your institution for initiation)? 
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____________ 
 
11.b) How many new START-UP COMPANIES were formed during financial year 
2002 (that is companies that did not depend on LICENSING or 
ASSIGNMENT of intellectual property generated at your institution for 
initiation)? 
______________ 
 
 
11.c) Of the NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES in question 11.a) in how many does 
your institution hold EQUITY ? 
______________ 
 
11.d) How many of the NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES established from your 
institution during financial year 2002 were done so using EXTERNAL 
EQUITY FINANCE?  
 
______________ 
 
11.e) How many of the NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES established during 
financial year 2002 were done so using the following specific forms of finance?  
 
Venture 
Capitalist 
finance 
Business 
Angel 
finance 
Industrial 
Partner 
finance 
University 
Challenge 
Fund 
(UCF) 
finance or 
equivalent 
Other 
External 
Finance 
(e.g. 
repayable 
loans) 
 
Internal 
Finance 
(e.g. 
repayable 
loans) 
 
      
 
Note: Multiple sources of external finance for each SPIN-OUT 
COMPANY may be possible. 
Note: Proof of Concept Funding (Scotland) Spinout Wales 
Funding (Wales) and University Challenge Funds (England) are 
equivalent. 
 
11.f) How many of the NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES established during financial 
year 2002 have their primary place of business in your home region?   
______________ 
 
11.g) How many NEW SPIN-IN COMPANIES, (i.e. firms that have been 
established from your institution based on technology generated outside your 
institution), were formed during financial year 2002?   
 
______________ 
 
12. EXISTING SPIN-OUT AND EXISTING START-UP COMPANIES: 
 
Note: Questions refer to SPIN-OUT COMPANIES and START-UP 
COMPANIES created before financial year 2002. 
Note: SPIN-OUT COMPANIES and START-UP COMPANIES are not 
equivalent. Please refer to the Survey Terms and Definitions provided. 
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12.a) How many EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES became NON-
OPERATIONAL as of the last day in financial year 2002?  
______________ 
 
12.b) How many EXISTING START-UP COMPANIES became NON-
OPERATIONAL as of the last day in financial year 2002?  
______________ 
 
12.c) In how many EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES did your institution still 
hold EQUITY as of the last day in financial year 2002?  
______________ 
 
 
12.d). Please indicate if you use any of the methods listed below to arrive at estimates 
of portfolio values for OPERATIONAL SPIN-OUT COMPANIES.  
 
YES  NO 
 
Cost (less provision)      
Earnings Multiple       
Discounted Future Cash Flows    
Third Party Valuation        
Net Assets           
 
Other _______________________    
 
12.g) How many SPIN-OUT COMPANIES have exited your investment portfolio 
during financial year 2002? How much value was realised through sale of all or part 
your shareholdings in these SPIN-OUT COMPANIES through both FULL EXITS 
and PARTIAL EXITS? 
 
  
Total number 
of Exits 
(11.g.i) 
 
Exits via 
Trade sale / 
Acquisition / 
Merger 
 
Exits via IPO / 
Stock Maket 
Floatation 
 
Exits via 
Management 
Buy-Out 
Exits 
via 
Failur
e / 
Liqui
dation 
Full Partial Full Parti
alalal 
Full Partial Full Partial  Number of Exits 
in FY2002 
         
Value realized in 
FY2002 
€ € € € € € € € € 
 
 
Note: The Number of FULL EXITS and PARTIAL EXITS for each sub-category should add 
up to the Total Number of FULL EXITS and PARTIAL EXITS in (11.g.i). 
 
SURVEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
0.5 PROFESSIONAL 
FULL-TIME 
EQUIVALENT 
0.5 PROFESSIONAL FTE means a professional position whose 
duties included support of TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
ACTIVITIES (as defined in this Survey) at least 50% of the time.  
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ACTIVE LICENCES / 
OPTIONS 
The cumulative number of Licences/ Options over all years that 
had not terminated by the end of the Survey’s financial year 
requested. 
ASSIGNMENT /LICENCE 
/OPTION AGREEMENT 
WITH EQUITY 
 The number of ASSIGNMENTS/LICENCES/OPTIONS that 
were executed in the year requested that included equity, where 
equity is defined as an institution acquiring an ownership interest 
in a company. 
BUSINESS INCUBATOR 
BUSINESS INCUBATOR also refers to Technology Incubators, 
Innovation Centres and similar property units that provide an 
instructive and supportive environment to entrepreneurs at start-up 
and during the early stages of businesses. The institution must 
own all or part of the BUSINESS INCUBATOR and must also 
have direct formal and operational links. 
EQUITY 
Equity, for the purposes of this Survey, is defined as an institution 
acquiring an ownership interest in a company (e.g. stock and 
rights to receiving stock). 
EXECUTED LICENCE 
The signed grant of rights that does not amount to an assignment 
by the licensor (e.g. your institution) to the licensee (e.g. a biotech 
company) in the form of a contract that permits the licensee to 
exploit IP according to the contractual terms and conditions. 
EXISTING SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES 
EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES refers to SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES that were created before the start of financial year 
2002. EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES does not refer to 
those SPIN-OUT COMPANIES created during  financial year 
2002, which should only be referred to as NEW SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES. Please refer to the definition provided for what 
constitutes a SPIN-OUT COMPANY. 
EXTERNAL EQUITY 
FINANCE 
Finance provided in return for an external institution acquiring an 
ownership interest in a company (e.g., stock) or an option to 
acquire an ownership interest in a company (e.g. the right to 
receive stock at some future point in time). 
FOREIGN  
FOREIGN for the purposes of this Survey refers to countries or 
territories outside the United Kingdom, where the United 
Kingdom includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
FULL EXIT 
FULL EXIT refers to an instance when your institution has sold 
all of its EQUITY in a SPIN-OUT COMPANY to another 
institution or to the SPIN-OUT COMPANY itself, and no longer 
retains any EQUITY within the SPIN-OUT COMPANY. 
INVENTION 
DISCLOSURES 
INVENTION DISCLOSURES include the number of disclosures, 
no matter how comprehensive, that are made in the year requested 
and are counted by the institution. 
TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER ACTIVITIES 
 Includes those activities associated with the identification, 
documentation, evaluation, protection, marketing and licensing of 
technology (including trademarks but not university’s insignia) 
and intellectual property management, in general. It encompasses 
all other activities also associated with the day-to-day operations 
of a technology transfer office, including assisting with the 
negotiation of research agreements, material transfer agreements, 
reporting on inventions to sponsors, and all other duties performed 
by the office. 
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LICENSING FTE 
Person(s) employed in the TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Office 
whose duties are specifically involved with the licensing and 
patenting process in either full or fractional FTE allocation. 
Licensing examples include licensee solicitation, technology 
valuation, marketing of technology, license agreement drafting 
and negotiation. 
MEDICAL SCHOOL 
MEDICAL SCHOOL refers to a research and teaching department 
that the institutions must own all or part of. The institutions must 
also have direct formal and operational links with the MEDICAL 
SCHOOL. 
LICENCE/OPTION 
AGREEMENT 
 A LICENCE is where the Licensor (e.g. your institution) grants 
rights to use the technology under LICENCE in a defined Field of 
Use and Territory. An OPTION AGREEMENT grants the 
potential licensee a time period during which it may evaluate the 
technology and negotiate the terms of a LICENCE agreement.  
LARGE COMPANIES Companies that had more than 500 employees at the time the LICENCE/OPTION/ASSIGNMENT was signed. 
LICENCE INCOME 
RECEIVED 
 Includes LICENCE issue fees, payments under options, lump 
sum payments in consideration of an assignment, annual 
minimums, running royalties, termination payments, the amount 
of equity received when cashed-in. Does not include research 
funding, patent expense reimbursement, a valuation of equity not 
cashed-in, trademark licensing royalties from university insignia 
or income received in support of costs incurred under Material 
Transfer Agreements. 
LICENCE INCOME PAID 
TO OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS 
 A subset of LICENCE income received and should not be 
subtracted from the total. This number will be used to better 
define the double-count of LICENCE income reported under this 
survey. It includes the amounts paid to other institutions under 
inter-institutional agreements. 
NEW PATENT 
APPLICATIONS FILED 
 Relates to first filing of a patent irrespective of territory. Does not 
include continuations, divisionals, or reissues and typically does 
not include applications for continuation in parts (CIPs).  
 
NEW SPIN-OUT 
COMPANY 
 
NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANIES refers to those SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES that were created during  financial year 2002. NEW 
SPIN-OUT COMPANIES does not refer to those SPIN-OUT 
COMPANIES created before financial year 2002, which should 
be referred to as EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES. Please 
refer to the definition provided for what constitutes a SPIN-OUT 
COMPANY. 
OPERATIONAL 
 A company that possesses sufficient financial resources and 
expends these resources to make progress toward stated business 
goals.  
NEW PATENT 
APPLICATIONS FILED 
NEW PATENT APPLICATIONS FILED is a subset of TOTAL 
PATENT APPLICATIONS FILED. It does not include 
continuations, divisionals, or reissues, and does not include 
Continuations In Parts (CIPs). A provisional application filed in 
financial year 2002 may be counted as new. If a provisional 
application is converted in financial year 2002 to a regular 
application, then that corresponding regular application filed in 
financial year 2002 should not be counted as new. 
 
PARTIAL EXIT PARTIAL EXIT refers to an instance when your institution has sold part of its EQUITY in a SPIN-OUT COMPANY to another 
 231 
institution or to the SPIN-OUT COMPANY itself, but still retains 
some EQUITY within the SPIN-OUT COMPANY. 
PATENTS ISSUED 
PATENTS ISSUED includes the number of patents (for the region 
/ territory asked for in the Survey) that have been issued or 
reissued to your institution in the year requested. Plant breeders 
rights may also be included. 
NON-OPERATIONAL 
A company that does not possess sufficient financial resources 
and cannot progress towards stated business goals. The company 
is not diligent in its efforts to achieve these goals. 
RESEARCH 
EXPENDITURES: 
EUROPEAN 
GOVERNMENT 
SOURCES 
RESEARCH EXPENDITURES: EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT 
SOURCES include expenditures made by the institution in 
financial year 2002 in support of its research activities that are 
funded by the European Commission or other central European 
Funds e.g. Framework Five. 
RESEARCH 
EXPENDITURES: 
GOVERNMENT 
SOURCES 
RESEARCH EXPENDITURES: GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
include expenditures made by the institution in financial year 
2002 in support of its research activities that are funded by the 
national government. 
RESEARCH 
EXPENDITURES: 
INDUSTRY SOURCES 
RESEARCH EXPENDITURES: INDUSTRY SOURCES include 
expenditures made by the institution in financial year 2002 in 
support of its research activities that are funded by for-profit 
corporations, but not expenditures supported by other sources 
such as foundations and other nonprofit organisations. 
RUNNING ROYALTIES 
RUNNNING ROYALTIES refers to Royalties earned on sale of 
products. RUNNING ROYALTIES excludes LICENCE issue 
fees, payments under options, termination payments, annual 
minimums not supported by sales, and equity realised from Spin-
Out Companies, which should be reported separately. 
SCIENCE PARK 
SCIENCE PARK refers to a business support and technology 
transfer initiative that encourages and supports the start-up, 
incubation and development of innovation led, high growth, and 
knowledge based businesses. The institution MUST own all or 
part of the Science Park and MUST also have direct formal and 
operational links. 
SME (SMALL AND 
MEDIUM SIZED) 
COMPANIES 
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED COMPANIES that had 500 or 
fewer employees at the time the 
LICENCE/OPTION/ASSIGNMENT was signed.  
For the purposes of this Survey, this does not including NEW 
SPIN-OUT Companies initiated by your institution during 
financial year 2002.  
 
However it does include EXISTING SPIN-OUT COMPANIES 
AND EXISTING START-UP COMPANIES established before to 
financial year 2002. 
SPIN-OUT COMPANIES 
As used in this Survey, SPIN-OUT COMPANIES are companies 
or traders as persons engaged in businesses that were dependent 
upon LICENSING or ASSIGNMENT of the institution's 
technology for initiation.  
 
If a technology was licensed to an EXISTING SPIN-OUT 
COMPANY, and not to a NEW SPIN-OUT COMPANY, this 
company should be counted as an SME COMPANY as opposed to 
a SPIN-OUT COMPANY.  
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SPIN-OUT COMPANIES as used in this Survey, will continue to 
refer only to those companies that were dependent upon your 
institution's technology for initiation in the form of a LICENCE or 
ASSIGNMENT. 
SPIN-OUT FTE 
Person(s) employed in the TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER Office 
whose duties are specifically involved with the creation of SPIN-
OUT COMPANIES in either full or fractional FTE allocation. 
Examples include business plan development, conducting market 
research, searching for and securing finance from investors, 
searching for and securing a management team. 
START-UP COMPANIES 
As used in this Survey, START-UP COMPANIES are companies 
or traders as persons engaged in businesses that were not 
dependent upon LICENSING or ASSIGNMENT of the 
institution's technology for initiation.  
 
If a technology was licensed to an existing START-UP 
COMPANY, but not to a newly initiated SPIN-OUT COMPANY, 
this company should be counted as an SME COMPANY as 
opposed to a SPIN-OUT COMPANY.  
 
START-UP COMPANIES as used in this Survey, will continue to 
refer only to those companies that were not dependent upon your 
institution's technology for initiation in the form of a LICENCE or 
ASSIGNMENT. 
SPIN-IN COMPANIES 
Companies originating from your institution, which were 
predominantly based on a LICENSED or ASSIGNED technology 
that was generated from outside your institution. 
TOTAL PATENT 
APPLICATIONS FILED 
TOTAL PATENT APPLICATIONS FILED including any filing 
made during the financial year requested, including provisional 
applications, provisional applications that are converted to regular 
applications, new filings, and if applicable Continuations In Parts 
(CIPs), continuations, divisionals, reissues, and plant patents. 
Applications for certificates of plant variety protection may also 
be included. 
TOTAL RESEARCH 
EXPENDITURES 
TOTAL RESEARCH EXPENDITURES include expenditures 
made by the institution in financial year 2002 in support of its 
research activities that are funded by all sources including the 
national government, local government, industry, foundations, 
voluntary organisations and other non-profit organizations. 
 
